THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume XX NOVEMBER, 1955 Numbers 1-2

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Joseph L. Blau
Joseph G. Brennan
W. Norman Brown
John Dillenberger
Robert T. Handy
John A. Hutchison
Arthur Jeffery
John M. Krumm
John T. McNeill
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Carl Mayer
Isaac Mendelsohn
Wilhelm Pauck
Cyril C. Richardson
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published semi-annually. Subscriptions: $4.00 a year (foreign, $4.30); single copies $2.00 (foreign, $2.20). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City, and by the *Bulletin Analytique* and the *Bulletin des Sommaires*, Paris, France.

COPYRIGHT 1955 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

Demythologization—Crisis in Continental Theology
PETER L. BERGER 5

The Conflict of Buddhism with Native Chinese Ideologies
RICHARD MATHER 25

What Is Religious Truth? JOSEPH MARGOLIS 38

BOOK REVIEWS

Hartley Burr Alexander: *The World's Rim: Great Mysteries of the North American Indians* (KURT PINTHUS) 47

S. Radhakrishnan, ed.: *The Principal Upaniṣads* (GEORGE W. BRIGGS) 50

Bikrama Jit Hasrat: *Dārā Shikūh: His Life and Works* (I. H. QURESHI) 54

Enrico Castelli, ed.: *L'Umanesimo e il demoniaco nell 'arte* (MEYER SCHAPIRO) 56

KOLBROOK LIBRARY
PACIFIC SCHOOL
OF RELIGION

Alexis Khomyakov: *Izbranniya Sochineniya* (Selected Works)
Vladimir Solovyev: *Tri Rasgovora* (Three Conversations)
George Shavelsky: *Vospominaniya* (Recollections)
Bishop John of San Francisco: *Vremya Very* (The Age of Faith)
Alexandre Semenov-Tyan-Shansky: *Otets Ioann Kronshtadtsky* (Father John of Kronstadt)
Serge Verkhovsky, ed.: *Pravoslaviye v Zhizni* (Eastern Orthodoxy in Everyday Life)
Alexander Schmemann: *Istorichesky Put Pravoslaviya* (The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy) (CLARENCE A. MANNING) 60

John T. McNeill: *The History and Character of Calvinism* (EDWARD A. DOWEY, JR.) 64

Louis A. Landa: *Swift and the Church of Ireland* (MAURICE J. QUINLAN) 68

Mable S. Brailsford: *A Tale of Two Brothers: John and Charles Wesley* (WILLIAM WARREN SWEET) 70

Charles H. Foster: *The Rungless Ladder: Harriet Beecher Stowe and New England Puritanism* (LEWIS LEARY) 72

William O. Shanahan: *German Protestants Face the Social Question.* Vol. I, *The Conservative Phase, 1815-1871* (THOMAS LUCKMAN) 77

John R. Bodo: *The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812-1848* (ROBERT T. HANDY) 80

Martin P. Nilsson: *Religion as Man's Protest against the Meaninglessness of Events* (WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING) 83

L. Harold De Wolf: *A Theology of the Living Church* (DOUGLAS STRATON) 87

Erich Neumann: *The Origins and History of Consciousness* (GOTTHARD BOOTH, M.D.) 90

Albert C. Outler: *Psychotherapy and the Christian Message* (ROBERT H. BONTHIUS) 92

Adolph Lichtigfeld: *Jaspers' Metaphysics* (MAURICE S. FRIEDMAN) 96

BOOK NOTES 99

AMONG THE PERIODICALS 123

DEMYTHOLOGIZATION— CRISIS IN CONTINENTAL THEOLOGY*

PETER L. BERGER

Research Division, The New School for Social Research

THERE CAN BE LITTLE QUESTION that, since the end of World War II, the controversy over Rudolf Bultmann and his program of demythologization *(Entmythologisierung)* of the Christian message has occupied the center on the stage of continental Protestant theology. Ripples of the storm have touched theology on this side of the Atlantic as well and aroused keen interest if not participation. On the continent the Bultmann controversy has placed theology in a clear and present crisis. What is at stake is much more than a novel attempt of transcending the old formulations of liberalism and orthodoxy, both classical and "neo." Protestantism on the continent, especially in Germany, found itself in a state of exhaustion after the struggle with Nazi paganism. The great religious renascence hoped for in the fervor of that struggle failed to materialize, at any rate in the proportions anticipated. The unity of the Confessing Church dissolved before the new pagan invasion from the East, while the power of Catholicism, both cultural and political, seemed stronger than ever. There emerged a new urgency to the qualifying phrase which Bultmann ominously used in his original essay to point out the significance of his program—"if church and theology are to continue existing at all."[1]

Bultmann's essay on "New Testament and Mythology," which touched off the controversy, was written during the war from within the circles of the Confessing Church in Germany. Time and place are highly significant. By the time the war was in full swing, the German church struggle was, to all intents and purposes, over. Much of the fervor which had characterized its early stages had disappeared, and a certain modus vivendi had been established between the Protestant churches and the Nazi state. With the silencing of the early witnessing fervor, there was a new problem of communication in countless indi-

* Prepared under the Project, *Religion in Germany Today*, under the direction of Dr. Carl Mayer.

1. Rudolf Bultmann, "Neues Testament und Mythologie," in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.), *Kerygma und Mythos* (Hamburg, 1948), I, 25.

HOLBROOK LIBRARY PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

vidual situations. What did the Christian still have to say to his fellow men? Especially, what did the Christian in uniform still have to say to his comrades, caught up with him in the apocalyptic events of the last days of the Third Reich?

It is under the aspect of communication that the demythologization controversy must be understood, both at the time of its inception during the war and in the years since 1945. It is an almost desperate attempt on the part of a hard pressed Protestantism to speak out and reach its contemporaries. It is born of the same concern which motivated Dietrich Bonheoffer when he spoke of the need for Christians to accept modern man as free and mature, and to speak to him as such. How can the Christian communicate the message of the New Testament to this strange creature, modern man, for whom the sky has become empty, an occasion for aeronautics instead of wonder? Can this communication only be established by a return to a mythological sky full of gods? Or can, perhaps, the Christian message be understood by modern man without such an intellectual *salto mortale* back into mythology? If so, the Christian message must be freed from its mythological elements, must be *demythologized.* This became all the more important as Protestantism faced not only modern man flying his machines through an empty sky, but the massive mythological structure of Catholicism on the one hand and the fantastic "neo-mythology" of Rosenberg's "Myth of the 20th Century" on the other. The post-war situation has done nothing to lessen the urgency of this need for communication.

BULTMANN'S POSITION

Bultmann's program of demythologization is based on a certain conception of mythology on the one hand and of the mythological character of the New Testament on the other. While the latter is, at least in part, the result of Bultmann's exhaustive exegetical work, it also depends on the conception of mythology which Bultmann holds. This conception is not the result of exegesis, but of a philosophical position anteceding the scientific work, determining its significance and placing it in a certain perspective from the viewpoint of communication.

Mythology is defined by Bultmann as a pattern of thought in which the "otherworldly" is represented as acting within the world, in which God is represented in human terms, as, for instance, when God's re-

moteness from the world is represented as distance in space.[2] It is a translation of transcendence into the terms of immanence. In its essence, mythological thought understands reality as an interpenetration between the world of men and the world of divine beings. Not only does the divine break into and interfere with the events of nature, but the human personality itself is open to constant influence from another world, by gods and demons, magic and sacrament. The mythological view of reality is the one which antedates the modern view, shaped by science, which understands the cosmos as a closed system of causalities. It also antedates the modern view of man as personality, which, whatever its relationship with the causalities of nature, is also closed to alien and mysterious forces acting upon it from a world beyond.

Bultmann maintains that, from this definition of mythology, the world of the New Testament is a mythological one.[3] The world is divided into three stories, as it were: heaven, hell, and earth, each the location of specific supernatural forces. Earth itself is not only the location of everyday reality in the life of men, but the scene of struggle between the forces of heaven and hell, God and the devil. Human events are interpenetrated by these forces, as is the human being himself.

The mythological character of the New Testament, however, lies not only in certain cosmological features which may be laid aside by theology as *adiaphora.* The very content of the Christian message of salvation, the *kerygma* itself, is couched in mythological language. The preexistence of Christ, his incarnation as a human being, his crucifixion as offering atonement on behalf of sinners, his resurrection as the victory in a cosmic struggle, redemption through Christ as the removal of the curse of sin inflicted upon humanity by Adam, Christ's ascension to heaven and enthronement on the right hand of God, his return on the clouds at the end of history, the resurrection and judgment of the dead, the presence of the risen Christ in the community through the spirit and in the sacraments—all these are mythological concepts, mythological thought patterns, mythological language. As such they form part of a view of the world which modern man is incapable not only of accepting but even of grasping. They are, in Bultmann's words, "finished" *(erledigt),* and, if Christianity depends for its existence upon them, then Christianity itself is "finished."

2. *Ibid.,* p. 23.
3. *Ibid.,* pp. 15 ff.

Man is not capable of freely choosing the view of the world with which he is to live and within which he is to think. This view of the world is given to him by his historical situation. Thus modern man, even if he wanted to think in mythological terms, is bound to the view of the world which science has given him. Therefore, it is impossible to ask modern man to accept the mythology of the New Testament. He may try to convince himself that this can be done by the kind of *sacrificium intellectus* performed by a modern Catholic when he accepts the dogma of the Assumption of Mary, but this is fundamentally deceiving oneself. The various attempts in our time to resurrect mythological thinking, such as the "neo-mythologies" of the Nazis or of various occultist groups like the Anthroposophists, only prove the fact that this type of thinking is moribund in the modern world. And, as Bultmann points out, even occultism today presents itself in the guise of a science. "It is impossible to use electric light and radio, to call upon modern medicine in case of illness, and at the same time to believe in the world of spirits and miracles of the New Testament."[4]

What follows from this? If Christianity is to be meaningful to modern man, it must be demythologized radically, at its heart as well as on its fringes. It is impossible to continue the process of the old liberalism, which, in full retreat before scientific thought, sacrificed this and that part of the message, gave in a little here and a little there, always in the hope that the heart of the message could be defended. Nor is it possible to follow any of the restoration movements back into orthodoxy, with its adherence to mythology in the teeth of modern thought. One must either reject or accept the mythological view of the world as a whole. This must be done clearly and unambiguously. For the Christian preacher this is a question of honesty before his congregation. It is this radical approach to the question which gives those qualities of freshness and excitement to Bultmann's position.

However, Bultmann cannot go along with the old liberal attempt to demythologize the New Testament by interpreting the Christian message in terms of ethics or some type of mystic experience. This would mean abandoning the *kerygma* along with the mythology, and would constitute the real end of Christianity. The *kerygma* must be maintained, but it must be communicated to modern man in a non-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

mythological form. That is, the *kerygma* must be understood and interpreted existentially, as containing truths concerning man's existence in the world and before God. Bultmann believes that his program of demythologization is capable of doing this.[5]

Bultmann maintains that this procedure is called for by mythology and by the New Testament themselves. Mythology, while containing a cosmology, has a fundamental existential concern, which must be uncovered and interpreted. As to the New Testament, the very contradictions in it, such as the conception of man as fallen under bondage to demonic forces and, at the same time, called to decision, make demythologization necessary. This procedure is also maintained to be in accordance with the fundamental insight of Reformation thought that the Christian is always concerned with the *Christus pro me,* the Christ, not of an abstract and impersonal history in the past, but the Christ in the history of my own existence.[6]

This interpretation is then carried out with the help of categories derived from existential philosophy, particularly that of Heidegger.[7] The New Testament is understood as offering a certain interpretation of existence in the world, which is existence in impermanence and toward death. In this world man is lost, cast into bondage under fear, in need of redemption. When man lives in accordance with the flesh, he lives unto himself alone, he tries to overcome his condition of forlornness by reliance on the self alone. He is closed within himself—as Luther put it, his heart is bent back upon itself. Contrasted with this condition is the life in faith and in the spirit, which frees man from the bondage to his past and opens him up toward God and the world. Faith in the Christian *kerygma* makes man free of this world by confronting him with the transcendent God. The things of this world become deeply insignificant and, by establishing distance between himself and the world, the Christian becomes free for the future. This life in the spirit, however, in contrast to gnosticism or mysticism, is not the entering upon a new psychic experience, such as occurs in ecstasy. It is always

5. *Ibid.,* pp. 27 ff.

6. Bultmann makes the distinction between *historisch* and *geschichtlich,* the facts of the New Testament being "historical" in the latter, existentially relevant, sense. Thus, the resurrection may be "historical" without the myth of the empty tomb. This is one of those occasions when one would like to make translation obligatory to all writing in the German language!

7. Bultmann, *op. cit.,* pp. 28 ff.

an act, a decision and, at the same time a free gift of God's grace, never to be possessed, never to be verified by any natural process, always to be chosen anew in each instant of time. Thus the Christian life is not to be understood in terms of supernatural relations and events. In its entirety it is located within the world. It can never be verified in terms of the miraculous, can never be taken out of the natural context of human existence.

The question then arises logically as to what the relationship of this Christian life is to Christ. Can there be Christian existence without Christ? If Christianity is essentially a certain understanding of existence, can it not be dissociated completely from Christ and the New Testament? Indeed, has this not been already done by modern existentialism, by the philosophies of Heidegger, Jaspers, Kamlah? Bultmann himself is far from complacent about this point: "I think one should be terrified by the fact that philosophy on its own has seen that of which the New Testament speaks."[8]

Bultmann grants that the Christian understanding of human existence can also be grasped philosophically, without Christian faith, though he points out that modern existentialism would be impossible without the New Testament, Luther, and Kierkegaard. However, he maintains that Christianity, in contrast to existentialism, maintains that more is needed for redemption from man's condition of forlornness than an understanding of this condition. Man cannot redeem himself by himself. Every act he performs is caught within his forlornness. Man can be freed only by an act of the transcendent God. This is the meaning of Christ—the act of God's love in freeing man from his forlornness, his life in death. In the *kerygma,* the proclamation of the risen Christ, the opportunity is given to man to accept this act of God through faith. It is this reliance upon God's act in Christ which distinguishes Christian faith from any existential philosophy without Christ.

The problematic of this position is obvious and was so to Bultmann from the beginning. It would appear that the line between the secular-existential and the Christian-existential understanding of man becomes uncomfortably thin. Moreover, it would seem that a limit is hereby set to the demythologization program. To speak of an act of God through

8. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

Christ, in any meaning which goes beyond man's consciousness of this act, would seem to fall back upon an irremovable hard core of mythology. In the original essay Bultmann cannot do much more than confess his uneasiness about it: "Whoever maintains that any speaking of action on the part of God is mythological, must certainly call the speaking of God's act in Christ a myth."[9] Bultmann can only point to Kamlah, who, for reasons of his own, is willing to concede that one can speak of divine acts without becoming mythological. However, no attempt is made to reconcile this with Bultmann's own conception of mythology.

The act of God in Christ is now itself demythologized.[10] In essence, the act is understood as taking place *hic et nunc* in the meeting of *kerygma* and faith. The Easter faith in the resurrection is no longer faith in an historical event some 2,000 years ago, fixated in the myth of an empty tomb, but concerns the God who meets me as the Christian message is proclaimed to me. "Christ, the Crucified and Risen, meets us in the Word of proclamation, nowhere else. Just the faith in this Word is in truth the Easter faith."[11] Eschatology is thus demythologized from a cosmic to an existential meaning. Cross and resurrection are no longer cosmic events in a mythological universe, but acts of God in my own existence.

If demythologization frees the individual Christian from having to engage in a game of mental acrobatics with regard to the mythology of the New Testament, it also has a liberating effect on Christian theology. No longer must the theologian be in a constantly defensive position before the advance of biblical science. He need no longer worry over the next discovery, the newest manuscript. The Christian message is placed on a plane where scientific analysis can never touch it. Even if one were to take the extreme example of possible scientific discovery, the Easter faith of Bultmann would be unshaken: if one can imagine that a set of motion-picture cameras had been trained on the burial place of Jesus on Easter morning, and if all these films were suddenly discovered by an archeologist, and if they showed nothing at all, or perhaps if they showed some of the disciples rolling away the stone and taking off with the body under cover of darkness—all this would yet

9. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 43 ff.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

leave intact Bultmann's Easter faith and, presumably, God's act in that faith.

In this way Bultmann also feels that he is maintaining the true paradox *(skandalon)* of Christianity, in Kierkegaard's sense. The paradoxical faith demanded of the Christian is not that he swallow the mythological view of the world found in the New Testament. On the contrary, the paradox consists in the full acceptance of all that history, psychology, and sociology can tell us about the natural causes of Christianity, in the development of the Church as much as in that of the individual Christian—and then, nevertheless, to have faith in God's act through Christ. It is an acceptance of the fact that Cross and Resurrection are always objects of faith, never objects of verification. The empty tomb as a miracle is as little able to verify the resurrection as Jesus' throwing himself down from the pinnacle of the Temple would have verified his Messiaship.

While this statement of Bultmann's position has, of necessity, been brief, it can already be seen what grave problems the future discussion had to face. There were, for one thing, the apparent inconsistencies within the demythologization procedure itself, above all the question as to whether God's act in Christ, even in Bultmann's version of it, was not, after all, a mythological remnant. There was the truly alarming correlation of Christian formulations with those of modern existentialism, putting in grave doubt the necessity of adhering to the *kerygma* in any form at all. Finally, there was the question whether, in fact, Bultmann had not reduced Christ to a datum of consciousnes. Had not the *Christus pro me* very subtly become a *Christus in me?* If so, was Christianity not reduced to an immanent process in human consciousness in a way different only in terminology from that of Schleiermacher or William James? And, if one thinks of Schleiermacher, one also thinks of Husserl. Is Christianity here not treated as a phenomenon in the sense of *epoche,* and, when Bultmann dismisses all questions of the cosmic significance of Christ as mythological, is he not actually putting phenomenological brackets around something taking place in the human consciousness?

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE POSITION

As the controversy proceeded in the years following the publication of the original essay, both Bultmann himself and his followers pro-

duced a large number of explanatory statements, using arguments ranging from epistemology to exegetical analyses of certain New Testament passages. However, the essential concern of these statements had to be the solution of the grave problems indicated above. Needless to say, the fierce attacks on the Bultmann program, both from the "right" and the "left" of his position, brought these problems into even sharper focus.

Friedrich Gogarten defended the program at length from the viewpoint of a philosophy of history.[12] He defends Bultmann against the accusation that he filled the New Testament with contents derived from existentialist philosophy by denying that existentialism has any such contents in the first place. Existentialism is not a *Weltanschauung* because it does not tell man how he is to exist; it only points out to him what existence means.[13] He also defends Bultmann against the accusation that, by saying that Christ can only be encountered in the *kerygma,* the historicity *(Geschichtlichkeit)* of the Christian message is denied.[14] Gogarten maintains that both sides of the controversy maintain that Christ antecedes the human encounter with him—the question is only, how? Bultmann, it is argued, does not deny that Christ exists over and against the human experience of him; he only denies that this preexistence is a matter of objectively verifiable historicity *(Historizitaet).* He attacks the theologians of the "right" for allowing themselves to remain in a "Babylonian captivity" brought about by introducing into theology an alien concept of "scientific objectivity," of the search for "objective facts."[15] This attitude is attacked as a subjection of Christian theology to thought patterns alien to the New Testament. The irony of this statement, in defense of a theological position designed to make Christianity understandable to modern man, does not seem to be apparent to Gogarten.

An early and very forceful defense of the Bultmann position is that of Goetz Harbsmeier.[16] He takes up the defense at precisely the point at which Bultmann had been most sharply attacked: one Lutheran critic had ironically paraphrased the Apostolic Creed according to

12. Friedrich Gogarten, *Entmythologisierung und Kirche* (Stuttgart, 1953).
13. *Ibid.,* pp. 51 ff.
14. *Ibid.,* pp. 56 ff.
15. *Ibid.,* pp. 98 ff.
16. Bartsch, I, 54 ff.

Bultmann—Christ, not conceived by the Holy Ghost, not born of the Virgin Mary, really suffered under Pontius Pilate, crucified and buried, but not descended into hell, not risen from the dead on the third day, not ascended into heaven, not sitting at the right hand of God, from whence he will not come to judge the quick and the dead. Precisely, says Harbsmeier, here our faith is narrowed down to the naked human being hanging on the cross. Everything else is "finished," and even that human being is "finished," because he is the crucified one. And then, just then, faith finds its object in the crucified Christ, who becomes Lord and Redeemer. It is this Christ, no longer protected by dogma or myth, with whom the Bultmann program wishes to confront man. In defending themselves against Bultmann, the theologians of the "right" are defending themselves, in reality, against the scandal of the cross.[17]

Harbsmeier, who himself was wounded in the war, stresses the problem of communication, or, as he calls it, translation. The message of the New Testament must be translated into the language of modern man. But we must realize that God always, in the Bible as elsewhere, speaks through human beings in human language. The task of translation is, therefore, not the purification of the divine Word from its human elements and presentation of it in this purified form. This cannot be done. It is rather the proclamation of the Christian message in our language, just as in the New Testament it is proclaimed in the language of mythological man. The attempt to hold onto the mythology is romanticism, the yearning for a world that is dead for us and cannot be resurrected.[18]

Bultmann himself developed his position in a final rebuttal to his critics.[19] He reiterates his analysis of mythology as illegitimate objectivization of the transcendent and the need to speak of existence in other terms. He points out that much of the fear of demythologization may be due to a tacit assumption that one's propositions have to be either mythological or scientific, thus failing to understand the existential language in which the *kerygma* is to be presented; for instance, the sentences "I love you," or "please forgive me," are neither mythological nor scientific, but speak directly and simply of existential realities. The same sort of language is to be used in presenting the realities of the

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 68 ff.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 78 ff.
19. Bultmann, "Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung," in Bartsch, II, 179 ff.

Christian life. He stresses the point, also made by Harbsmeier, that existentialism does not furnish the content of his program, but only its formal presuppositions.

He then returns to the crucial question about the possibility of speaking of "God's act" within the demythologization program.[20] God does, indeed, act "objectively," that is, outside of and over against human consciousness. However, I can only become aware of God's acting within my existence, which takes place in space and time. Within this existence, it is only faith which can recognize God's act. To all eyes but those of faith, only natural, causally explainable acts take place. Within these, however, are God's acts hidden. Nowhere does God "break into" the world of natural phenomena. He always remains the *Deus absconditus*. For this reason, faith must always retain its paradoxical character, perceiving the hidden act of God in spite of that which is visible to the eyes of all. It is clear, though, that, by saying that God is visible to faith only, we are not saying that God exists only within the consciousness of that faith. It follows that God's act in Christ also can be perceived only in the encounter of my existence with the *kerygma* hidden within the Bible. It cannot be objectively discovered, verified, made visible as a historical fact. This realization does not diminish the "once and for all" *(ephapax)* quality of Christ. As I accept Christ through faith, I recognize him also as having redeemed me once and for all, in the sense of the New Testament.

Bultmann presents demythologization as the final consequence in the area of understanding of the Pauline conception of justification by faith without the works of the law. Reformation thought emphasized that there are no sacred places in the world, that the world as such and as a whole is profane. Well, says Bultmann, it must be recognized that nature and history in their entirety are profane also, that we cannot locate the sacred places within them by factual observation. Only faith sees the hidden hand of God acting within the world.

We thus see Bultmann's position as an extreme and radical consequence of the Protestant alienation between God and man. The Catholic *analogia entis,* the hierarchical universe connecting man with God through the angels, is denied as never before. God is totally hidden and man is totally alone within his profaneness. Faith, therefore, is

20. *Ibid.,* pp. 191 ff.

totally paradoxical. Is this perhaps, finally, a reduction to total absurdity of this approach to religion?

ATTACK FROM THE "RIGHT"

The bulk of the attack on Bultmann's position naturally came from the "right," from the side of orthodoxy, both "neo" and otherwise, Lutheran and Reformed. By 1950 the official organs of German Protestantism, particularly the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKID) and the United Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Germany (VELKD), felt called upon to debate the matter officially. These official statements are marked throughout by considerable restraint, a willingness to listen to what Bultmann has to say (despite the repeated accusation by his followers that his position is always "misunderstood"), but a generally firm rejection of the entire procedure.

The first official statement came out in 1950. It was issued by the Church of Hesse-Nassau, the United Church of which Martin Niemoeller became president after the war.[21] It discussed various aspects of the controversy without taking a definite position, but is generally negative in tone. This attitude was characteristic of the circles of the Confessing Church, from which, after all, Bultmann himself had emerged.

The most violent controversy broke out, not surprisingly, in pietist Wuerttemberg. Early in 1951 Bishop Haug of the Wuerttemberg Church (Bishop Wurm's successor in that mildly Lutheran territory) issued a pastoral letter on Bultmann which, for the first time, officially warned against the consequences of the position and, without trying to coerce the conscience of the pastors in that Church urged them to seriously question the implications for their ministry.[22] The attacks on the part of Wuerttemberg's "Bible-believing" circles were less restrained. A pamphlet published in the same year boldly proclaimed "The Bible is at stake!" and passionately condemned Bultmann as a heretic undermining the very foundations of the Protestant faith.[23]

While the EKID hesitated to take a public position on the matter (it was discussed at several conferences), the Lutherans of the VELKD came out with a clear warning and rejection. In 1953 the Conference

21. *Kirchliches Jahrbuch fuer die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland,* 1951 (Guetersloh, 1952), pp. 185 ff.
22. *Ibid.,* pp. 199 ff.
23. *Ibid.,* pp. 210 ff.

of Bishops of the VELKD issued a statement on the Bultmann controversy urging pastors and congregations not to be confused and not to deviate from the traditional proclamation of the Gospel.[24] This warning was reiterated in subsequent synods of the VELKD and by a theological commission appointed by that body.

The discussion by the theological world proper was intense in circles ranging from the orthodox Lutherans to the Barthians. Its range of approach was equally wide. An example of a rather naïve approach is an article by Ethelbert Stauffer, in which the author confronts Bultmann with what he terms "realistic theology."[25] Stauffer attempts to show, by the results of archeology and other scientific investigations, that the Bible is much more credible today than it was when Bultmann began his critical work in the 1920's. This approach hardly touches the meaning of the demythologization program.

An early very serious discussion of Bultmann from the "right" was that by Julius Schniewind.[26] Schniewind questions Bultmann's premises as well as his deductions. Mythology is defined as any attempt to represent the invisible by the visible, the unspeakable by that which can be named. It may be asked, then, whether man's thought can ever escape mythology, unless it is to fall into complete nihilism. The very mention of God, even philosophically, involves us in mythological thought. If one is to remain completely unmythological, God can only be spoken of negatively, in the manner of the mystics' *via negativa.* Indeed, Bultmann might be understood from that philosophical tradition. Christianity, however, makes positive assertions about God and God's actions. The paradox *(skandalon)* of Christianity lies, at least partially, in this "mythology," not, as Bultmann maintains, only in the naked Man on the cross. Moreover, Christianity is such a paradox, not only to modern man but to man as such. By escaping from historicity into the "here and now" of existential decision the full weight of the Christian paradox is avoided. The *skandalon* lies precisely in Christ's presence "in, with and under" the events of history, one certain history. It is

24. *Informationsdienst der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands,* November 1953, pp. 107 f.

25. Ethelbert Stauffer, "Entmythologisierung oder Realtheologie?" in Bartsch, II, 13 ff.

26. Julius Schniewind, "Antwort an Rudolf Bultmann," in Bartsch, I, 85 ff.

then, again, asked urgently whether this procedure does not destroy the heart of the Christian message.

A sharp attack from the Lutheran side came from Helmut Thielicke.[27] He starts the attack by discussing Bultmann's concept of faith. This faith, though couched in the aura of the Reformation's *sola fide,* is really a perversion of it. The Reformation understood faith as objectively bound to and dependent on Jesus Christ, not as a pale, abstract maneuver of man's consciousness. Faith, according to Bultmann, becomes a process within man's consciousness. The history reported in the New Testament becomes nothing but a prolegomenon to what goes on in my consciousness; the question of its extraconscious reality is pushed aside. Christ, at best, stands only in the background of the Christian existence. Like the chained men in Plato's cave, we can only see the reflections on the wall. Perhaps, indeed, our consciousness of Christ presupposes the extra-conscious reality, but the former is understood as being "deistically started" *("deistisch angekurbelt")* by the latter—there is no actual encounter with the living Christ. Bultmann sets up the idol of a secular world view within theology, says Thielicke. The result of this is a "philosophical palace revolution," against which Bultmann can only defend himself feebly. Demythologization becomes the reduction of theology to philosophy. This entails the destruction of the Christian message, not its communication to modern man.

Scandinavian theology entered the controversy in an interesting contribution by the Danish Lutheran Regin Prenter.[28] Prenter reduces the controversy to two basic questions: Has Bultmann succeeded in the demythologization program itself? Does his program reach the understanding of God and man in the New Testament? Both questions are answered negatively. Bultmann does not, in fact, remove mythology. He merely interprets it existentially instead of cosmologically. A better name for his program would be "decosmologization." This entails a contradiction: either one eliminates mythology, but then one cannot interpret it; or one gives an interpretation of mythology, but then one cannot speak of demythologization. Bultmann seeks to maintain the Christian existence as the acceptance of God's gift, living towards transcendance, open to the future. Measured by the standards of secular ex-

27. Helmut Thielicke, "Die Frage der Entmythologisierung des Neuen Testamentes," in Bartsch, I, 177 ff.

28. Regin Prenter, "Mythos und Evangelium," in Bartsch, II, 70 ff.

istentialism or Bultmann's modern world view, these concepts are as mythological as the breathing-in of the *pneuma* in the New Testament, which Bultmann finds unacceptable.

Again, as in the characterization of Bultmann's procedure as an expression of the *via negativa,* he is presented by Prenter with a mystic label. If Christ loses his past significance, in any historical sense, then his "presence" can only be understood mystically, that is, ultimately in the sense of a psychologism. Christ becomes only the example, and the Christian life becomes an *imitatio Christi.* What is the end result of Bultmann's program? The Christian picture of God, rejected as mythological, is replaced by a concept and a feeling of God. When mythology disappears, metaphysics takes its place. Also, when mythology disappears, emotionalism takes its place. In this way Bultmann is again placed in a heretical tradition within Protestantism, that of the crucial alliance between rationalism and pietism which once before spelled the end of Protestant orthodoxy.

Karl Barth entered the controversy with some remarks in the third volume of his monumental *Dogmatics.*[29] His main broadside, however, was fired in a pamphlet published in 1952, ironically entitled *Rudolf Bultmann—An Attempt to Understand Him.*[30] The pushing back of Christ into a vague causality of the Christian consciousness is represented by Barth as an absorption of christology into soteriology, the entire loss of any christological concern in the preoccupation with my own salvation and its processes. It is a complete reversal of the Christ-centered theology of the Reformation, which cannot be hidden by a facile quotation of Melanchthon's saying that to know Christ is to know his benefits—a saying which, before Bultmann, had been as piously quoted by the old liberals. And Barth asks whether Bultmann does not, indeed, reduce the Gospel to a new law, the law of my own consciousness, in which, when all is said and done, it is man's act rather than God's act which accomplishes my salvation. It is as if Christ goes forward toward his resurrection—in us. He then sharply attacks Bultmann's conception of mythology, his "canonization" of the modern world view and particularly its expression in existentialism.

Barth concludes with some interesting questions regarding Bult-

29. Reprinted in Bartsch, II, 102 ff.

30. Karl Barth, *Rudolf Bultmann—Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen* (Zollikon-Zuerich, 1952).

mann's historical antecedents. He feels that Bultmann cannot be understood only within the Marburg tradition of mercilessly grim "intellectual honesty," in spite of the absolute readiness to sacrifice the belief in demons before the universal use of the telephone. Also, Bultmann cannot be simply understood as an apologist or a historian. Barth, with considerable *Schadenfreude,* would like to address Bultmann above all as a Lutheran, and warns those who would strike at Bultmann to look out, as they might accidentally hit Luther. It is already in Luther that one finds, according to Barth, this absorption of christology into soteriology. Luther's *theologia crucis* carried within itself much of what later became experiential interpretations of Christianity. Moreover, Luther's conception of the world, its profaneness and autonomy, finds its echo in Bultmann's slavish acceptance of nature and history as "closed." It may be asked, therefore, whether Bultmann's position could have developed anywhere but on Lutheran ground. And was not, after all, the Lutheran Kierkegaard the father of modern existentialism, including Heidegger's?

After this Calvinist smirk Barth returns to the matter at hand and sums up his attack on Bultmann. One cannot approach the New Testament with a preconceived idea as to how much one can and how much one cannot understand. One cannot argue with God in this way. The New Testament must be approached humbly, in faith, with a willingness to listen rather than argue. The deepest difficulty Barth feels with regard to Bultmann is not his many negations and pronouncements of biblical statements as "finished," but his basic anthropocentric approach—something which Barth aptly describes as "pre-Copernican."

ATTACK FROM THE "LEFT"

Bultmann's position has been under attack not only by the orthodox, who felt that he had gone too far, but by those on the "left," who felt that he had not gone far enough. In the objective analysis of his concepts these two sides often agreed, as is not surprising.

Fritz Buri, a Swiss follower of Karl Jaspers, submitted the thesis that Bultmann's demythologization must be followed by a "dekerygmatization," adding, as Barth points out, another unfortunate term to the poor German language.[31] The *kerygma,* which Bultmann tries to save,

31. Fritz Buri, "Entmythologisierung oder Entkerygmatisierung der Theologie," in Bartsch, II, 85 ff.

is nothing but the last intolerable remnant of New Testament mythology. The Christ-myth is nothing but a symbol of an existential process within man's consciousness, of his transcending his closed-in selfhood (what the existentialists have called *Eigentlichkeit*) and receiving the gift of freedom, a process which may be described by the word grace. The paradox of our existence lies in our acting decisively despite our knowledge that all we know is historically bound. We must not let this genuine existential paradox be obscured by an unreal mythological paradox. The task of such a "dekerygmatized" theology is to work together with philosophy in clarifying and appealing to man's understanding of himself. There is nothing any more to be proclaimed.

Jaspers himself entered the controversy through a series of exchanges with Bultmann published in 1954.[32] He sharply attacks the premises of Bultmann's program and denies their right to present themselves as philosophy. Jaspers attacks, first of all, Bultmann's conception of science and the scientific view of the world.[33] Bultmann exaggerates the differences between the various world views, such as those between our own and that of the New Testament. What all ages have in common is, on the one hand, crass realism and materialism resisting all thought; on the other, the willingness of people to believe the absurd. What Bultmann calls the scientific world view is not really scientific. Science, properly understood, has no world view, can never have one. What Bultmann has in mind is rather the scientific superstition, the "scientism," of our age, for long an object of Jaspers' wrath. So much for Bultmann's understanding of science. As to his understanding of philosophy, it seems to be limited exclusively to the one major work of Heidegger, and even that, says Jaspers, largely misunderstood. Bultmann's conception of philosophy is doctrinaire, narrow, full of an objectivizing spirit, as if existential decision could be combined with scientific objectivity. Bultmann is as much a stranger to philosophy as to science.

Also, Bultmann's conception of mythology is inadequate.[34] The function of the myth is to tell a story, to think in terms of representations instead of general concepts. As such, mythology is a vital part of our

32. Karl Jaspers & Rudolf Bultmann, *Die Frage der Entmythologisierung* (Munich, 1954).

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 9 ff.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 18 ff.

thinking processes. Demythologization would involve a radical impoverishment of all human thought. We must, it is true, understand and grasp the message of mythology, but this is not really demythologization. The philosopher is aware of God's total transcendence, over and above all mythological imagery. He knows that one cannot possess God in these images. He also knows that magic, demons, angels, and all the beings and events of mythology have no empirical reality. Yet he will struggle with the contents of mythology to clarify his own existence. The Bible is for western man the preferred place for this struggle. This, however, is not to eliminate the Greek epics and tragedies, or the sacred books of Asia. Bultmann not only restricts himself to the Bible, as, indeed, he must as a Protestant theologian, but very narrowly to certain parts of the Bible. He has no use at all for the Old Testament, very little for the Synoptic Gospels. Bultmann's *kerygma* is restricted, in fact, to the Johannine and Pauline literature.

If Bultmann is full of the spirit of a false enlightenment, he is ultimately to be counted also among the orthodox. For orthodoxy is the coming-to-rest of reason in the illusion of knowledge as a firm possession. Philosophy, as the free exercise of reason, never reaches this stage. It is in continued movement, always open, always ready for communication.

One voice is markedly absent on the "left" of the controversy. Heidegger did not raise his voice. It was left to others to discuss Bultmann's relationship to his philosophy.

CONCLUSION

Once more, it is important to see the Bultmann controversy in its sociological context. It reflects the situation of Protestantism in a state of acute alienation within European civilization, at any rate on the continent. In the immediate post-war years in Germany, it seemed for a while that this alienation had been broken through. A great religious renascence seemed in the offing. The development of the new Germany, particularly (and embarrassingly) the economic "German miracle" following the currency reform, showed that these expectations were unfounded. It is understandable, therefore, that the demythologization question, involving, as it does, the relationship between church and "world," should stand in the center of German theological interest. It is an agonizing self-questioning on the part of a church no longer at

home in this "world," an attempt to grasp and solve intellectually this problem of alienation.

As Barth points out in his discussion of demythologization, there is something peculiarly Lutheran in Bultmann's program, despite its clash with the neo-Lutheran orthodoxy in Germany. It is an extreme development of Luther's doctrine of the "two kingdoms," as it were, a final acceptance of the autonomy of the "world" on the latter's own terms. Also, here the denial of the Catholic *Analogia entis* (which Barth has claimed to be the sharpest dividing line between Catholicism and Protestantism, both Lutheran and Calvinist) is carried to its final conclusion. Man is totally alone, enclosed by a nature and history which at no point are or can be "broken into" by God, except in the paradox of faith, whose object may never be seen or experienced. Demythologization becomes an extreme expression of the *sola fide*—faith *alone* in the most terrible sense of the word.

Two other trends in German Protestant theology may be mentioned which, despite their differences from the demythologization program, may be understood as arising out of the same sociological situation. The one is that broad movement of thought, having many aspects outside the theological area proper, which seeks to bring back to modern man an understanding of what is regarded as the reality of mythological perspectives. Within theology in Germany, the liturgical-sacramental movement associated with the name of Bishop Staehlin comes closest to expressing this trend. It is generally associated with "high church" Lutheranism, breathing an atmosphere of much Anglican and Scandinavian inspiration. However, beyond theology, we find this trend in the broad neo-mythologism rampant in post-war Europe, within which we may classify such divergent movements as the renewed appeal of Anthroposophy and the *mode* of Jungian psychology. Here, as it were, the problem of alienation is attacked from the opposite pole: instead of seeking to demythologize religion itself, as Bultmann does, the attempt is made to bring modern man back to mythological thought patterns now re-interpreted as objective facts (even if only psychological facts) whose significance has been lost in the historical process of western civilization.

Another trend, perhaps not very influential but highly interesting in conception, is Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theory of the "world come of age,"

and of "non-religious Christianity." It is an even more radical formulation of the problem than Bultmann's, but it is free from the debatable epistemological position of the latter. Here the radical statement is made that, with Christianity and its doctrine of the Incarnation, the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane is destroyed. Since this dichotomy is the foundation of all religion, we may speak of "non-religious Christianity." The Christian life, therefore, is not lived in an area separated from the "world," but right within it. Christianity is not a religion of "marginal situations," but takes place in the center of life. It is altogether worldly. Therefore, the Christian must cease to deplore the "secularization" of western civilization, which only means that modern man has come of age. Instead of trying to lure him back into religious dependency by playing on his weaknesses and failures, Christianity should accept him in his freedom and maturity. Unfortunately, Bonheoffer only knew of the demythologization program in its very beginnings and could only make a few critical remarks about it before his death at the hands of the Nazis in 1945. Bonhoeffer states that Bultmann does not go far enough: not only the mythology, but the religion of Christianity must be abandoned. What is interesting in his attempt is that here, as contrasted with Bultmann, the Lutheran conception of the "two kingdoms" is discarded completely and the Christian life is understood as, by its very nature, "worldly," yet also attacking the "world's" autonomy.

All these attempts to rehabilitate Christianity in the modern world express the same underlying alienation. They are products of a Protestantism with its back to the wall. The importance of this situation becomes evident when we reflect on what faces this Protestantism today—that "new faith" from the East, to which the West is as much of a mission territory today as it was to Christianity when the latter first emerged from its Oriental background.

THE CONFLICT OF BUDDHISM WITH NATIVE CHINESE IDEOLOGIES

RICHARD MATHER

Assistant Professor of Chinese, University of Minnesota

INTRODUCTION

IN THE WEST the notion of conflict is well defined and can be documented from both our political and religious history. The notion can be traced in part, I believe, to a generally assumed world view inherited from the Hebrew-Christian tradition, which, stated in its barest terms, sees the created world set over against a transcendent Creator, and man, who was made in the Creator's image, set in a triple relation of confrontation: (1) to God, in which his reaction is, more often than not, one of anxious rebellion, (2) to nature, against which he is pitted in a life-and-death struggle for mastery, and (3) to other men, among whom his relation is often that of a competitor.

In China conflict is certainly not unknown, but it is less well defined, and, in using the term to describe Buddhism's relation to native ideologies, we should be warned at the start that it is not quite comparable with the conflict, let us say, between the early Christian community and the Roman emperors, in which context the slogan was born that "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church." None of the Chinese religions has, to my knowledge, produced any extensive martyrology, and this illuminates in a striking way their different notion of conflict. If, as their world view describes it, Ultimate Reality is completely contained within the framework of the self-created, self-sustaining natural-social order, with its immanent principle of operation, the Tao, then all conflicts appearing on the periphery, since they cannot originate outside the order of Reality, will, if followed back to the Source or Center, be found to be in harmony.

Most Chinese Buddhists, therefore, clung to the traditional harmonious world view. They saw no real conflict of the new religion with China's best traditions. On the contrary, it represented for them a needed complement, offering a penetrating and consoling analysis of neglected problems like suffering and death, and affording a metaphysical basis for morality without altering accepted standards. A vast num-

ber of non-Buddhists as well were willing to accept the new religion as a colorful variation on a familiar theme—the cultivation of goodness.

A few discerning critics, however, saw in the Indian doctrine of Nirvāṇa a complete negation of the Chinese world view itself, for which no harmonious integration within the system was possible. Nirvāṇa, the sole Buddhist Reality, lay outside the Chinese order of reality altogether. The empirical world and its inner principle, which the Chinese assumed to be all of Reality, was, according to Indian Buddhism, sheer illusion. Reactions of the critics, therefore, were mostly of two sorts: (1) during the first three or four centuries of our era, while the Buddhist community was predominantly foreign, they ignored it as a mere barbarism which would eventually yield to the civilizing influence of Chinese culture; (2) especially after about A.D. 400, when Chinese Buddhists were a conspicuous segment of the population and even gentry families and members of the imperial household were being attracted to its support, they attempted belatedly to suppress it root and branch. This may seem odd in a system built on harmonious compromise, until we realize that it was precisely because the critics saw this delicately balanced system, which for them was the system of the universe itself, being turned upside down, the catastrophic omens of which were everywhere apparent, that they reacted in alarm.

Though particular criticisms arose over many separate issues, the underlying complaint was invariably the same: the adherence of Buddhist monks and nuns to an other-worldly ideal, which caused them to repudiate the actual world with its obligations and to practice principles contrary to nature, was a dangerous threat not only to society and the state, but to the harmony of the universe as well. For every issue raised, however, the Buddhist had a ready answer: Truth is one, but the traditional Chinese view of it is too circumscribed. In the words of the popular *Vimalakīrti Sūtra,* "The Buddha preaches with one voice, but all beings understand according to their several capacities."[1] Confucius, according to one apologist, accommodated his teaching to a crassly materialistic society and hence addressed himself only to "salvaging abuses in their final stages," while the Buddha "illumined their root causes."[2]

1. *Taishō* 475 (vol. 14) 538a; quoted by Tao-an *(Kuang hung ming chi* 8.25b) and others.

2. Sun Ch'o, in *Hung ming chi* (hereafter abbreviated *HMC*) 3.17b.

Lao-tzŭ, wrote another, confined his teaching to the "fulfilment of life," while the Buddha "illumined the ideal" beyond the relativities of life.[3] Thus they felt Buddhism did not contradict any of China's sages. It merely went deeper than they dared to go.

Beginning with the basic conflict in world view, I shall briefly trace the controversy as it centered about particular issues.

METAPHYSICAL ISSUES

Interestingly enough, the earlier critics of Buddhism, while recognizing in concrete situations conflicts with their own ideology, rarely discussed the underlying metaphysical conflict. The first clear expression of it which I have discovered is by the Neo-Confucianist, Chang Tsai (1020-1077), in his "Western Inscription." "As for those who speak about Nirvāṇa," he wrote, "they mean by this a *departure* (from the universe) which leads to no return," while the Confucian sage is "one who completely understands the course that lies *within* (the cosmic cycle), who embodies it in himself . . . and who to the highest degree preserves its spirituality."[4] Though Chang Tsai would have quickly rejected the thought, his view of the sage "embodying" the Tao and "preserving its spirituality" was very close to the concept of the monk's relation to Nirvāṇa held by Chinese Buddhists themselves, and may have owed something to it. Hui-yüan (334-416), the founder of the Pure Land Sect, expressed this relation as the "embodiment of the Ultimate" *(t'i chi)*. The Ultimate, or Nirvāṇa, however world-denying or transcendent it may have been to Indian Buddhists, is clearly identified in Hui-yüan's mind with the immanent principle of the universe, the Tao.[5] Embodying the Ultimate in the world of relativity, the monk is able to transcend mortality and shower benefits on the world. What could be more sagelike than this?

Discussions of the immanence or transcendence of Nirvāṇa probably made scant impression on the average unlettered Chinese who embraced Buddhism in the early days, but one thing appealed to him

3. Ming Seng-shao, *HMC* 6.14a.

4. Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1953), II,497 (italics mine).

5. *HMC* 5.12b-15b; cf. Liebenthal, "Shih Hui-yüan's Buddhism as set forth in his Writings," *JAOS* 70 (1950), 247, 258.

mightily, namely, life after death—rebirth in the jeweled splendors of the Western Paradise of the faithful, and amid the unintermittent tortures of Avīcī Hell for the violent and oppressive. All schools of Indian Buddhism denied the survival of a personal entity or "soul" from one incarnation to the next. Only one component of the pseudo-personality survived, namely consciousness, *vijñāna* (Chinese *shìh*). Chinese Buddhists, on the other hand, linked this surviving consciousness to the native concept of the departed spirit, or *shén,* calling it the "conscious spirit" *(shìh-shén),* or "spirit-consciousness" *(shén-shìh),* and from it developed a purely indigenous doctrine of immortality.[6] It was not surprising, however, that Confucian and Taoist intellectuals should view this new departure with disfavor, since the calm acceptance of one's fated span was a measure of one's adjustment to the cosmic cycle. Even Taoist efforts at prolonging the span consisted primarily of a more thorough adjustment to the cycle. Personal survival after death would upset the balance of the universe quite as much as the survival of summer weather into winter.

The controversy, already alive in the second century,[7] reached its most articulate stage over the publication in the southern capital of Fan Chen's essay on "The Destruction of the Soul (at Death)," *Shén mièh lùn,* toward the close of the fifth century, to which literally scores of rebuttals were composed, one by the Emperor Liang Wu-ti himself.[8] Recognizing this doctrine as Buddhism's most powerful appeal in China, Fan Chen concentrated his attack on it, marshalling simple logic and homely analogy to demonstrate that the soul is an inseparable function of the body, and that both belong to the natural cycle. "When we come," he wrote, "it is not because we cause it to come, and when we go it is not because we drive it away. We but ride on the principle of Heaven."[9]

Buddhist apologists for the doctrine insisted on the separate and eter-

6. See Bodde, "The Chinese View of Immortality," *Review of Religion* 6 (1942), 371 ff.; also Liebenthal, *op. cit.,* p. 252.

7. See Mou-tzu (*HMC* 1.8b-9a); Pelliot, "Meou-tseu ou les doutes levés," *TP* 19 (1920), 301 f.

8. Fan Chen's treatise is found in *Nan shih* 57.20ab, and *Liang shu* 48.5b-10a; most of the rebuttals are in *HMC* 9 and 10. It has been translated by Balasz in *Sinica* 7 (1932), 220-34, and in part by Ch'en in *HJAS* 15 (1952). See note 11 below.

9. Fung, *op. cit.,* II,291 f.

nal existence of the soul. They discovered dim intimations of immortality in China's own custom of recalling the departed spirit,[10] and in the writings of Lao-tzŭ and Chuang-tzŭ.[11] Far from accepting the charge that they were upsetting the traditionally calm acquiescence to fate, they claimed their approach to the Great Change was even less perturbed than the traditional one. The anonymous author of the "Rectification of False Charges," *Chèng wū lùn,* describes the Buddhist attitude as one of fearless repose in the midst of calamity. Quoting the *Book of Changes* he wrote, " 'Rejoicing in heaven (the Buddhist) knows his fate,' content with the times he dwells in resignation, and that is all." But the others, on the contrary, mourn death and dread its finality, thereby merely aggravating their perturbation over it.[12]

SOCIAL ISSUES

Almost from the beginnings of Chinese monasticism objections were leveled against its obvious upsetting of the family system. Mou-tzŭ's questioner in the late second century raised the issues of abandoning the care of parents and family, disfiguring (by shaving and burning) the body bequeathed whole by one's parents, cutting off the family line, and giving away the family patrimony. Mou-tzŭ's reply was that "if there is a great good (to be gained), one does not hesitate at small (obstacles)." This was for him merely an application of the Confucian principle of "doing what is appropriate to the moment" *(shíh i).*[13]

Later apologists quoted the *Classic of Filial Piety* itself to the effect that the highest form of filial devotion was to achieve the happiness of one's parents and to bring glory to the family name by establishing oneself.[14] Only a slight extension of meaning was required to interpret this as acquiring religious merit for oneself and one's family. One writer affirmed, moreover, that of the twelve divisions of the Buddhist canon,

10. Mou-tzu, *HMC* 1.8b; Pelliot, *op. cit.,* pp. 301 f.

11. See Ch'en, "Anti-Buddhist Propaganda during the Nan-ch'ao," *HJAS* 15 (1952), 174, and Liebenthal, *op. cit.,* pp. 251 f.

12. *HMC* 1.29b; *Chou I* 7.3a (Legge, *SBE* 16.354).

13. *HMC* 1.7a. The reference seems to be to the *Doctrine of the Mean* 25 (Legge 1.419). See Pelliot, *op. cit.,* p. 298.

14. *Hsiao ching* 1 (Legge, *SBE* 3.466). The passage was quoted by An-ling-shou to her father (Wright, *HJAS* 15.195) and by Sun Ch'o (*HMC* 3.18a), both of the fourth century.

the fourth is concerned solely with encouraging filial piety. "Its solicitude may be said to be unsurpassed," he wrote, "yet the irreligious, without having investigated the sources or having had any experience (of what they are talking about), proceed with blind assertions and false statements to make attacks and raise objections."[15]

While we may regard this as a somewhat sanguine view of the filial solicitude of the Buddhist scriptures, it is true that both Indian and Chinese texts on monastic discipline mention a requirement of parental consent before young men or women may be ordained.[16] Legislation in the Toba domain even provided for monks and nuns to observe mourning rites for their parents.[17] Devout families, of course, were not averse to offering their sons and daughters to the Church, and in times of distress, as at the close of the first quarter of the sixth century in the north, many did so to ease the strain at home and to evade forced labor and the draft.[18]

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The sight of large numbers of able-bodied men and women flocking from their farms and mulberry groves to the monasteries and convents, the deeding of large tracts of arable land to tax-free temples, and the investment of huge sums in bronze images and pagodas could hardly be expected to arouse the enthusiasm of officials charged with tax-collection and recruitment. Before the fifth century, when the monastic establishments were comparatively modest, not many overt attacks were made. But by 405, when Kumārajīva became State Preceptor in the later Ch'in state, it was estimated by one writer that in the heavily non-Chinese northwest nine-tenths of the population were Buddhist.[19] And after the early Toba rulers adopted the foreign religion as a sort of state cult, appointing a Chief Monk and constructing an official temple at the capital in 398,[20] the rapid expansion of the Church in the north

15. *HMC* 3.18a.

16. *Mahāvagga* 1.55 (Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts, SBE* 1.210); *Szu fen lü tsang* 34 (*Taishō* 22.810a, cited in Wright, *ibid.*).

17. Ware, "Wei Shou on Buddhism," *TP* 33 (1930), 158.

18. *Ibid.* 178 f.

19. *Chin shu* 117, 10 b; *Tzu-chih t'ung chien* 114, 1 b.

20. Eberhard, *Das Toba-reich Nordchinas* (Leiden, 1949) p. 229.

threatened to get out of hand. Urged on by the Taoist minister, Ts'ui Hao (d. 450), the Toba Emperor, T'ai-wu-ti, published his repressive edicts of 444 and 446, which were directed not only against the clergy but against their lay supporters as well. The immediate occasion for the first edict was the discovery of arms and supplies in a certain monastery near Ch'ang-an, in the territory of a local chieftain then in revolt against Toba rule,[21] and the issue of the economic and political role of monasteries was dramatically raised. Though the edict of 446 called for the virtual annihilation of Buddhist property and personnel, the intervention of a sympathetic prince, and the willingness of local officials, many of whom doubtless had investments in monastery property, to turn their backs, enabled most of the monks to return safely to lay life, while some, like T'an Yao, continued to practice their religion in secret.[22] The proscription was short-lived and was followed by further official patronage.

But the economic loss involved in the dislocation of the normal division of labor, with its primary stress on agriculture, continued, at least until the ninth century, to be a conspicuous source of irritation. Fu I (555-639), in his memorial to T'ang Kao-tsu in 624, recommended that the estimated 100,000 monks and nuns of his day be made to marry and produce sons for the army and silk and food for the empire.[23] When we read that in the devastating proscription under T'ang Wu-tsung in 845, in which 4600 larger and 40,000 smaller monasteries were ordered demolished, 260,500 monks and nuns secularized, 150,000 temple slaves and thousands of acres of temple land redistributed among tax-paying families, tens of thousands of catties in bronze images and bells melted down for coinage, iron images recast into agricultural implements, and gold and silver ornaments returned to the state coffers, we can gain some impression of the sheer material wealth tied up in the Church at that time.[24] After 845 reprisals against the Church were mostly in the form of quota limitation rather than attempted extirpation.[25] The temporal power of the Church had been permanently broken.

21. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

23. A. F. Wright, "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism," *Jour. of the Hist. of Ideas* 12 (1951), 41.

24. J. J. M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China* (Amsterdam, 1903), pp. 36-40.

25. E. g., the measures of the first Ming Emperor, *ibid.*, 81 f.

POLITICAL ISSUES

I have mentioned the implications of the discovery by the Toba Emperor, T'ai-wu-ti, of a stockpile of bows and arrows and other goods in a Ch'ang-an monastery. While the smaller Buddhist sects shared with their Taoist counterparts a history of guilt by association with rebellion,[26] there was a deeper underlying mistrust of the principle of monasticism itself, with its extraterritorial immunity from Chinese law.[27] The origin of this immunity was undoubtedly the predominantly foreign constituency of the earlier religious communities, but as more and more Chinese joined the Order the problem became more acute.

Controversy began in the south during the reigns of the Eastern Chin Emperors, Ch'eng-ti and K'ang-ti (326-345), when Yü Ping (d. 344) raised the question of *lèse-majesté* over the failure of Buddhist monks to kowtow in the presence of the Emperor. At that time the pro-Buddhist minister, Ho Ch'ung (d. 346), defended the monks on the ground that they should not be forced for the sake of outward ceremonial to compromise their method of cultivating inward goodness, a method which involved severing all worldly ties.[28] Later, in the year 402, the usurper, Huan Hsüan, anxious to buttress his authority, took up the argument with the significant observation that honors paid to the emblems of royalty were by no means an empty gesture, since the ability to "comprehend life and regulate objects" resides in the ruler, and in the role of life-giver he is the embodiment of Heaven and Earth. How could the monks accept his life-giving favors and neglect the honor due to him?[29] Huan Hsüan observed further that in the old days the first foreign devotees of Buddhism were permitted to observe their barbaric customs unmolested, but, now that Chinese emperors themselves were believers, they should make Chinese custom standard for all.[30]

It was primarily in answer to Huan Hsüan that Hui-yüan wrote his treatise, "Why a Śramaṇa does not do Obeisance to Kings," *Shā-mén pú chìng wáng che lùn*.[31] In it he marks a dualism between the Taoist prin-

26. E. g., the popular messianic Maitreya Cult in the north during the fifth and sixth centuries, see Eberhard, *History of China* (Berkeley, 1950), p. 156.
27. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
28. *HMC* 12.11a-14a.
29. *Ibid.*, 14b-15a.
30. *Ibid.*, 17b-18a.
31. *HMC* 5.9b-19a.

ciple of "conforming to transformations (both of nature and of the sovereign)," *shùn-huà*, and the Buddhist principle of "seeking the Ideal (beyond all transformation)," *ch'iú-tsūng*. The Buddhist layman takes the first course,[32] the monk the latter.[33] But in doing so his nonconformity is not disloyalty; he merely transcends the dualism. For the Ideal he seeks is Ultimate Reality itself (Nirvāṇa or Tao). During his quest he deviates from accepted patterns which involve him with other beings in endless rebirth and suffering. At the end of his quest he "embodies the Ultimate" *(tǐ-chí)*, and is in a better position than kings to bestow favors on other beings. Heaven and Earth can give life, and kings can preserve it, but neither of these can grant immortality or freedom from suffering. The śramaṇa, however, can do both. Therefore he treats kings and commoners with equal compassion and equal ceremony.[34]

Needless to say, this type of argument was lost on many hearers who saw in it a confirmation of their worst suspicions, namely that the monks were a group of "super-emperors" offering the inducements of heaven and the restraints of hell in full usurpation of the emperor's prerogatives as sole rewarder and punisher. Fu I, in the memorial to T'ang Kao-tsu referred to above, reminded his emperor of a passage in the *Book of Documents* that states. "The sovereign alone creates blessings and intimidations . . . and if his subjects (do the same) . . . they damage his house and bring misfortune on his kingdom."[35] He even hinted darkly that through their connections at court the clergy threatened to seize political control from the gentry.[36] In actuality, however, the struggle seems not to have been altogether one of gentry versus clergy, or Chinese versus foreigners, but the lines were drawn between factions among the gentry themselves, some of whom favored, and some of whom feared the Church.[37]

In the Toba state the monks got neatly around the loyalty issue by

32. *Ibid.*, 10b-11b.

33. *Ibid.*, 11b-12b.

34. *Ibid.*, 12b-15b.

35. *Shang-shu* 7.4b (Legge, *SBE* 3.144); de Groot, *op. cit.*, 38; Wright, "Fu I," p. 41. Fu I's argument had been anticipated a century earlier by Hsün Chi, of the Liang Dynasty, who had written "the most powerful and scathing attack leveled against Buddhism up to this time" (Ch'en, *op. cit.*, p. 191).

36. See Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 42, and de Groot, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 f.

37. Eberhard, *Toba-reich*, p. 239.

declaring the emperor to be an incarnation of Maitreya and publicly venerating him as such.[38]

CULTURAL AND MORAL ISSUES

After the proscription of 845, the sphere in which Buddhist influence was principally felt was in the culture and mores of ordinary people, among whom it had by now become permanently acclimated, with its impressive artistic monuments, its colorful temple ceremonies and festivals, its masses for the dead, and its contributions to folklore and mythology.

From the very beginning the process of acculturation was upsetting to China's intellectuals. Since, until very recent times, China has never exhibited the kind of xenophobia with which we are familiar in the West, the almost chauvinistic contempt for "barbarian" culture characterizing nearly all critiques of Buddhism in China seems paradoxical enough. But it was precisely because the Chinese intellectuals did not champion a nationalistic culture, but insisted instead on maintaining a *universal* one, that divergent practices were rejected, not so much on the grounds that they were Indian or Parthian or Kuchean, as that they represented *no* culture. If the foreign missionaries had accepted this universal culture and lived by its principles, no objections would have been raised. The cultured man (and he is inseparable from the moral man) is one who accepts the pattern of the universe, as it has been perceived and transmitted by sage kings and emperors, and cultivates it within himself. Among other things, this involves developing a proper balance between the physical, mental, and emotional forces of human nature.

Now the Buddhists were making men and women act contrary to their nature by living as celibates, and by mutilation and even self-immolation,[39] and were thereby upsetting the universal pattern. It was not simply a matter of cultural inferiority, but of cultural nihilism. The

38. Ware, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Eberhard, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

39. Cf. the case of the monk Hui-i, who drenched himself with oil and burned to death in a public square in Nanking in 463 reciting the story of Bhaiṣajya-rāja from the *Lotus Sūtra* (Goodrich, *A Short History of the Chinese People* (New York, 1951) p. 106; Hu Shih, "Buddhistic Influence on Chinese Religious Life," *Chin. Soc. and Pol. Sci. Rev.* 9, 1925, 148 f. It was this aspect of Buddhism which provoked the sharpest attack from Han Yü in his famous memorial to T'ang Hsien-ti in 819 (translated in Giles, *Gems of Chinese Literature: Prose*, London, 1926, 127).

argument had appeared already in Mou-tzu, where it was countered by the extraordinary observation that even one of China's own commentators had acknowledged that the pole star is in the middle of the heavens but to the *north* of China, which proves that China is not in the middle of the world. Those, therefore, who honor Buddha are not necessarily moving off center, nor is the gold of India necessarily incompatible with the jade of China.[40]

China's cultural Great Wall, erected over centuries of relative isolation from other major cultures, was not, however, to be breached in a day. During the fourth century, and intermittently on down to the thirteenth, controversy raged between Taoists and Buddhists over the tract, "The Conversion of the Barbarians," *Huà-hú-chīng*, which had claimed that Lao-tzu, in his mission to the king of Kashmir, adapted his teaching to people completely lacking in the amenities of life, and hence the doctrine which he developed there (later known as Buddhism) was totally negative. It could not in any sense apply to those who had benefited from the influences of culture. In 467 another Taoist, Ku Huan (390-ca. 483), added fuel to the fire with his "Treatise on Barbarians and Chinese," *I-hsià-lùn*,[41] in which he stated: "Buddhism and Taoism may be equal in aiming at conversion, but there is a difference between the methods of barbarians and Chinese . . . Buddhism is a means of destroying evil; Taoism is a device to develop goodness . . . ."[42] The implication is unmistakable that one religion is suitable for boors and the other for the cultured.

It is to the credit of the apologists for Buddhism that they were able to extricate themselves from the cultural isolation in which their opponents stood all unaware. In doing so they represented one of the most salutary contributions Buddhism ever made to Chinese culture.

To Ku Huan's charge, Chu Chao replied: "I beg to inquire, the cruelty of branding (criminals)—is this a Sogdian or Indian form of punishment? The pain of shedding blood—was it not begotten in the (Chinese states of) Ch'i and Chin? The atrocity of ripping up (pregnant women)—did this idea originate with those who button the lapel on the left? . . . If we probe their nature and sentiments, Chinese and barbarians are one and the same. I resent the false assumption that the one is civilized and the other boorish."[43]

40. *HMC* 1.10ab; Pelliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 303 f.
41. Largely preserved in rebuttals (see *HMC* 6 and 7).
42. Ch'en, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 f.
43. *HMC* 7.5a.

On the positive side, many of the Buddhist clergy, especially in the south during the period of division (317-589), came from the educated classes and were prominent figures among the intellectual élite at the capital and at K'uai-chi in modern Chekiang.[44] The Buddhist historians Seng-yu (d. 518) and Hui-chiao (d. 554) were at great pains to demonstrate the intellectual respectability of the Buddhist religion and its adaptability to the Chinese scene.[45]

CONCLUSION

In describing here the *conflict* which Buddhism encountered with China's native ideologies I hope not in any sense to have distorted the normal view of the essential unity of the "Three Religions" held nearly universally in all periods by the educated and illiterate alike in China. While certain vocal critics deplored what they considered the wholesale abandonment of the traditional view of a real, self-contained, and basically good universe, with social, economic, and political responsibilities built into the nature of things, they remained a minority, and their counsels were only sporadically, though sometimes devastatingly, applied against the foreign cult.

What was probably a majority view among non-Buddhist intellectuals was expressed by Liu Tsung-yüan (773-819), who, though a close friend of the implacable foe of Buddhism, Han Yü, did not share the latter's views on the subject. He wrote:

> There is much in Buddhism which could not well be denounced; namely, all those tenets which are based on principles common to our own sacred books. It is precisely to these essentials, at once in perfect harmony with human nature and the teachings of Confucius, that I give my adhesion. . . . Now Han Yü objects to the commandments. He objects to the bald pates of the priests, their dark robes, their renunciation of domestic ties, their idleness, and life generally at the expense of others. So do I. But Han Yü misses the kernel while railing at the husk. He sees the lode but not the ore. I see both; hence my partiality for the faith.
>
> Again, intercourse with men of this religion does not necessarily imply conversion. Even if it did, Buddhism admits no rivalry for place or power. The majority of its adherents love only to lead a simple life of contemplation amid the charms of hill and stream. And when I turn my gaze towards the

44. See Wright, "Biography and Hagiography, Hui-chiao's Lives of Eminent Monks," *Silver Jubilee Volume, Zinbun-kagaku-kenkyūsyo,* Kyōto University, 1954, p. 397.

45. *Ibid.,* p. 392.

hurry-scurry of the age, in its daily race for the seals and tassels of office, I ask myself if I am to reject those in order to take my place among the ranks of these. . . .[46]

For Liu Tsung-yüan and scores of other officials similarly caught in the net of political intrigue,[47] this sentiment was expressed out of a burning personal conviction hardly to be matched by any conventional allegiance to Confucian orthodoxy.

46. Giles, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 f.

47. On the verge of high political power, Liu Tsung-yüan became involved in an aborted coup d'état and was banished to a distant post at the age of thirty-three, dying fourteen years later in obscurity. Against this background his interest in Buddhism becomes most meaningful. (See Crump, "Lyou Dzŭng-ywán," *JAOS* 67 (1947) 166-171.

(Bibliographic note: Chinese references are cited from the Commercial Press *Szu pu ts'ung k'an* edition, unless otherwise indicated.)

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS TRUTH?

Joseph Margolis

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Long Island University

There was a lively symposium[1] on the question "Are Religious Dogmas Cognitive and Meaningful?" held during the 1953 meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Rochester. I have turned back recently to reread the papers which Professors Raphael Demos and C. J. Ducasse offered at that time and confirmed for myself what I take to have been a general disappointment in the inconclusive nature of that discussion. The question is an intriguing one, but it is very difficult to answer. Most persons who approach the issue answer (like Professor Demos) that certain specific dogmas—say, Christian—are most certainly true, though they hardly see the need for a systematic defense; or they answer (like Professor Ducasse) by belittling the cognitive claims and transforming them into otherwise important social and psychological functions, which may indeed have other cognitive aspects as well. Of course, what all of us wonder about, if we give any attention to the question raised, is whether it is possible to make sense out of religious claims without simply falling back on an authorized faith, without reducing these claims to some obviously nonreligious level of discourse, without failing to admit the incompatibility of the literal statements of the world's religions, without losing the seriousness, the directness, and the variety of the apparent claims of these religions, and without abdicating the general procedures of scientific inquiry.

Perhaps our answer must be No. But there is something embarrassing about this conclusion in the face of the persistent and obviously sincere claims of persons of every possible distinction to the contrary. This is not to say that there is not much dupery and mere superstition that masquerades as religious experience; but I think we must be honest enough to say that this surely could not by itself account for that experience. And though it is possible that the regular social "benefits" of religion might explain its career without admitting any genuine re-

1. The papers of the symposium are published in *Academic Freedom, Logic and Religion,* edited by Morton White (Philadelphia, 1953), Volume 2 of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division).

ligious cognitions, this too would go quite contrary to the clear convictions of the faithful.

I think we must begin naïvely—perhaps falteringly. But what we want to do is strip away the "obviously" improper ways of approaching our question, that is, ways that lead back to the triumphant dogma of some single cult, or lead too far afield of apparently religious insight. Now, to make a start, suppose we find that passages concerning the birth of Jesus do not seem to tally in a critical regard. What is to be said? Take, for example,

> Concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh.[2]

and

> Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise: When as his mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost.[3]

It strikes me that this apparent discrepancy *could not have escaped* the notice of the writers and compilers of the New Testament, and that, in some sense therefore, it is not as serious a matter as friends and opponents of the Virgin Birth might assume. To be sure, it is an important doctrine for Christians that Jesus was an historical human being and also the Incarnation of Divinity. But, let it be noted, the two accounts acknowledge both themes; though, in giving emphasis to one or the other, they seem to have produced a contradiction. No doubt, ingenious theology could reconcile these differences and a thousand others like them in the religions of the world, but the truly interesting thing is that the great and primary oral and written literature, of the religions of the world abound in these discrepancies and *ignore* them.

Again, one has the feeling that after the *arahat* ideal of Hīnayāna Buddhism had been supplemented and considerably displaced by the *bodhisattva* ideal of the Mahāyāna schools, imagination found an incredibly fertile way of expressing the rather varied powers of the Buddha, including, for instance, the extreme convictions of the Amida cult. An indefatigable army of theologians might seriously undertake to reconcile in detail the truly vast array of Buddhist literature, or,

2. *Rom.* 1: 3.
3. *Matt.* 1: 18.

some believers might cling to special traditions only, disregarding or rejecting others. It is important for these persons to hold on to the special visions in which they have been trained, but the sympathetic and uncommitted observer can hardly be expected to decide whether the typically marvellous events reported in the great antiquity or in the more recent history of the religion were, to put it flatly, truly reported. As a matter of fact, it really seems (if I may use the term) to be vulgar to raise such an issue; and, contrariwise, unbelievably stupid (or, if pretended, shameless) to attempt to offer specific proofs, in an acceptable scientific fashion, for the events reported. I think we must concede, as a first generalization, that, *though the faithful of every religion do accept the doctrines of their religion, and do so sometimes in a way that borders on the literal-minded, the doctrines themselves cannot be intended in a merely literal way.* There is something more of exuberance than of logical sequence that impresses us in religious literature, and the faithful of every cult have no difficulty in recognizing the *invented* (even if spontaneous) myths of their rivals. Or, to put it in a slightly different way: if we are prepared to try to find religious truths in, say, the great religions of the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims, we cannot consistently treat as literally true the conflicting views which Jews and Christians and Muslims must hold about the role of Jesus (granting of course that we should still want to acknowledge the importance, for the faith of true believers of each sort, of the different views they would be obliged to hold).

If we reject this first generalization, we shall have to answer No to the question of Demos' and Ducasse's symposium, for no public procedures of any sort would be available to disentangle the fantastic records which the world's religions have managed to concoct. Otherwise, we could quietly settle for that doctrine which, without regard to public proof, captures our enthusiasm. But this defeats our project at the very start, and I think we must, therefore, set it aside. It explains also why theology is largely useless for our purpose, since it is, and must be, frankly committed to some such choice of doctrine and resolutely refuses to call this doctrine into question as a hypothesis—to be or not be confirmed on further examination.[4] I do not mean to say that religious

4. Compare Demos in *Academic Freedom, Logic and Religion,* p. 76. (Ducasse, it seems to me, has quite neatly disposed of Demos' analogy between the procedures of theology and naturalistic philosophy.)

doctrines like the Trinity or the Incarnation should be submitted as scientific hypotheses. On the contrary, they cannot be so submitted in any literal sense. And they cannot, therefore, be said to be true, if we take the ordinary meaning of that term. But they are, clearly, in some sense believed to be true, and we shall want to understand this as well in a sympathetic way.

Our bias, if one may call it that, forces us to a rather obvious conclusion, one however which really needs to be stated: *If they are true, religious propositions are ordinary propositions of science.* This may seem, at first, to defeat our effort, but it need not be so construed. After all, it is only a tautology, and we were committed to it from the start, and it is not necessarily an "unfriendly" condition, despite much popular feeling about the conflict of science and religion. I think we may begin to see this if we recall some of the familiar facts of religious life. Generally speaking, when we think of religious individuals, we attend more to what they *do,* how they behave (particularly in the crises of their lives, though the whole of life may in a sense be viewed as a crisis), than to what they *say.* What I mean is that religious expression tends to be exceedingly conventionalized (except of course in the important instance of a religious genius who seems to "invent" ways of expressing his own new insights—we shall have to return to him). The rest of us properly repeat what amount to religious formulas. But when we point to a religious individual, we draw up evidence of his particular piety in terms of appropriate deeds which we take to be signs of, and the result of, his privileged conviction. We are even prepared, I daresay, to admit that an officer of a religious organization need not necessarily be "religious," though he know his scriptures and ceremonials and theologies quite perfectly. What I am insisting on is, simply, that *religious truth, whatever it may be, requires much more than true religious propositions; it requires these at least, but also some active attitude with respect to these propositions and to the world to which they refer.*

Now, if we consider the symposium question again, "Are religious dogmas cognitive and meaningful?," I think we shall be able to find a somewhat more helpful way of posing that question. If we regard religious dogmas and pronouncements as mere propositions, we fall into all the difficulties already considered. On the other hand, if there are no propositions of an important sort somehow embedded in systems

of doctrine, we must answer No to our question and admit the incredible pageant of the systematic hoaxing, voluntary and involuntary, of most of the world's population most of its life. I, for one, prefer to solve this mystery in another and more sympathetic manner. It seems plain to me that the religious individual *responds* in a characteristic way to certain *truths* about the world—much as, say, the artist does. Clearly, they respond in different ways. But what I wish to emphasize is that the celebration, the devotions, the ritual, the myth of the religious individual are essential parts of his creative *response* to certain general truths about the world (which science may formulate and verify) and not simply literal propositions about the world which may be confirmed or disconfirmed in some ready way. Similarly, the art object is the work of the creative response of the artist to the world about him, and, in both instances, it is of primary importance to recognize that the response *is* what it is long before we tamper with the possibility that the response is in some odd way *true*.

The analogy with fine art is useful in a further respect, since at times (granting the vagueness and perhaps figurative use of the term) works of art are said to be *true,* sometimes "true to life" or "true to experience" or "true to our emotions" or some such way. I do not wish to attempt to define here the conditions under which works of art may defensibly be said to be true; but at least we know that attempts are regularly made to speak in this way, even though works of art exhibit the same sort of extravagance and exuberance and imagination that appears in religious responses. I *would* like to try to state in what minimal sense the corresponding religious expressions may be said to be true. To summarize our argument up to this point: *religious dogmas embody, in one respect, certain ordinary propositions of science and constitute, in another, a part of a certain appropriate response to the truths which these propositions express.* Therefore, when we suggest that dogmas may be true, we must be careful to observe that their implicit propositions may be true in the usual scientific sense, and their responses may be "true" in a special sense analogous with usage in the fine arts.

Take, by way of illustration, the Jātaka tale of the Bodisat Viśvaṇtara, allegedly the last incarnation of the Buddha before his rebirth as Gotama. The distinction of his career lay in the fact that he

was considerate as to his own welfare and that of others, compassionate and addicted to magnanimity, kindly toward men, of a yielding and generous nature, bestowing presents freely and quite dispassionately, and assiduous in giving away. When men heard of this excessive generosity on his part, numberless crowds came to beg of him, whom he sent away with their expectations completely fulfilled.[5]

Quite literally (though thoughtfully), he gave all his possessions away, including his wife and children. And he recited after each gift a formula of the following sort, which expresses his devotional attitude:

As I have given away the chariot with the greatest pleasure, so may I, giving away the Three Worlds, become possessed of the greatest insight![6]

I would imagine that most observers would be willing to say that Viśvaṇtara was a model of one form of the religious respondent. I do not see that there is anything here immediately resembling a proposition that could be tested, but when Viśvaṇtara explains shortly thereafter:

However long anything may be loved and held dear, yet separation from it is undoubtedly imminent. Friends and relatives must undoubtedly be severed from what is dearest to them, as from the trees of the hermitage wherein they have rested from the fatigues of the journey. Therefore, when ye reflect that all over the world men are powerless against separation from their friends, ye must for the sake of peace strengthen your unsteady minds by unfailing exertion,[7]

I think we see a very general, undoubtedly true, and clearly relevant proposition which, as such, belongs to science; namely, that *the things of the world (including other persons) to which men attach themselves (being the creatures that they are) come into existence and pass out of existence and cannot escape this condition.* This may be a trivial discovery, but it is not a false discovery; for, if we treat it as a hypothesis, we shall find it abundantly confirmed in the world about us. I believe it to be a version of the principal truth that all religions reflect upon, but I must leave that to the reader's judgment. We may, however, discover this fact *to our sorrow.* Viśvaṇtara wishes to emphasize this possibility just as much as the general proposition, and the proposition

5. From the story of the Bodisat Viśvaṇtara, Ch. XXXVIII in *Buddhism; A Religion of Infinite Compassion,* selected and edited by Clarence H. Hamilton (New York, 1952), p. 160.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 161.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 163.

becomes religiously significant as each of us is reconciled to, and in some deep sense "accepts," its truth.

I am inclined to think that the reconciliation or response takes the following form: however tempted a person may be to commit himself by the actions of his life as if to the permanent, unchallenged possession of some good of the world, that person restrains himself finally, acknowledges the futility of the effort (which may be verified) and accepts "joyously," "with good cheer," "without reservation," "with love" the world which is the actual, living condition of his existence (which cannot be verified in any ordinary sense, but which is essential to his religious behavior). In brief, a man continues to act in whatever way (on available evidence) he is convinced is the best way to act; but there is now an implicit "ultimate reserve" in his action by which we understand that he has no illusions about the permanence of his effort or the standards by which he has arrived at his decisions. The point is that he remains committed to his life (we surely do not call religious the discovery of our true proposition if it merely demoralizes and disorganizes and makes completely hopeless one's life); his commitment is now, however, a pious one. "Thy will be done," says the Lord's Prayer. We need not ask, like fledgling scientists, who is the Lord? "Thy will be done" is a way of pronouncing and ritualizing our religious response to the great (and obvious) truth that we have already noted.

Though it is fairly easily discovered, our proposition is not nearly so easy to accept when we realize, particularly in moments of genuine crisis, that we are precisely the ones who must with full awareness give up all those things we have become desperately attached to (including our own lives). It is for this reason that it is religiously important, though perhaps scientifically trivial, to observe in the greatest detail that the rule applies to money, to furs, to health, to athletic powers, to romantic hopes, etc. Religion seeks to ceremonialize all of the engagements of man, linking them ultimately to the appropriate response of acceptance. With this in mind, I think we may be able to state in what sense religious dogmas are true.

The proper beginning may be made, perhaps, if we admit that the religious commitment may very well occur without any apparent, attendant dogma or myth. A man may simply "accept" the fundamental proposition. It may be an extraordinary feat; I am inclined to think that Epicurus' maxim "[Death] does not . . . concern either the living

or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more" really approaches this kind of religious directness. I do not attempt to evaluate this way of responding in comparison with one which appears to depend on the acceptance of some rather elaborate religious vision. I wish to argue only that, in religion, a "well-made" dogma will be one which facilitates and stabilizes and reassures the religious response itself in the face of all challenge. (One might, even, not unreasonably argue that the reaffirmation of the worth of the world and of human life in it, after a truly poignant, or "existential," discovery of our religious proposition, implicitly entails some mythical element however slight.)

I cannot pretend to understand all the conditions that limit religious and theological innovation. That there are many, and that they seriously restrict arbitrary invention, I have no doubt. But there is an important difference between a great and powerful religion, or a religion that enjoys a very long and successful history, and religious fictions (regardless of the number of persons who support them) which function correctly. I cannot see any prima facie reason for discrediting the most private religious conviction merely for its privacy. For instance, I cannot see that the belief of John the Baptist regarding Jesus is in any serious way affected, as far as its religious function is concerned, by the subsequent development of organized Christianity. Nor is the religious seriousness of William Blake doubtful, despite the highly idiosyncratic form of his vision. Again, though a well-established dogma may invite acceptance more readily than a novel vision, I see also that it may easily become banal or corrupt and drive men to invent new myths.

To resume our analogy with fine art, if we must say that religious dogma is true, why then (like the usage in the arts) it is "true to" the religious commitment. Dogma is the clue to a vision in whose terms persons may convincingly be reconciled to the religious proposition and to the world to which it refers. The important thing to notice is that, just as in the arts, different systems of religious dogma need make no pretense at compatibility or harmony. What is a convincing vision for the Babylonian will very likely not be such for the Easter Islander. The issue of such selections is a very complicated affair. Part of its explanation undoubtedly falls to the well-trained sociologist and social psychologist. But not all. Much is related to the inherent power of some images—say, the compact between the Jews and God, the passion of

Christ, the Enlightenment of the Buddha—to organize in the interest of the religious devotion all of the changing experiences of a people over the centuries.

These are merely the bare bones of a theory of religion, of course. It is precisely in the comparison of the fertility and power of particular images that the most interesting questions arise. But our original purpose was to state the (minimal) conditions under which religious dogmas may be said to be true, and I think that purpose has been satisfied. *Dogmas are true, so far as they reduce to alleged propositions, if these correspond with, or refer to special instances of, the general religious truth (previously noted). And they are "true," in so far as they are imaginative inventions, if they successfully provide a vision of the world within which persons may convincingly perform and maintain the religious commitment.*

If it is insisted that religious dogmas are true in some other sense—in particular, in being literally and exclusively true about an eternal design which may be known only through privileged revelations—I must confess my own ignorance and complete inability to comprehend the claim.

BOOK REVIEWS

The World's Rim: Great Mysteries of the North American Indians. By HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953. xx, 259 pp. $4.75.

It is deplorable that the masses and the young people all over the world, even in the United States, have seen the American Indian as depicted from J. F. Cooper to the Western movies, as either a bellicose and cruel or a brave and noble savage. But they know very little about the Indians' concept of life and death, of world and religion. One of the scholars who worked for four decades to enlighten the people of the world about the culture of the American Indian was Hartley Burr Alexander, who represented the unusual composite type of anthropologist, poet, robust propagandist, and philosopher (he taught philosophy from 1908-1939 at the University of Nebraska and at Scripps College).

All his life Alexander was an indefatigable observer, collector, and interpreter of Indian ritual, and the older he grew the more he became convinced that Indian mythology and philosophy contain certain basic trends and even particular features which are, in many variations, common to all races, and that the abundantly surviving old Indian ritualism is able to illuminate other early, partly lost cultures. For the standard work *Mythology of All Races* Alexander wrote the two volumes on North American and Latin American myth, and his fame was so international that, in 1925, the Sorbonne called him to Paris to lecture on "L'Art et la Philosophie des Indiens de l'Amérique du Nord."

His book, *The World's Rim,* was ready for publication as early as 1935, but it appears only now, fourteen years after his death. His son Hubert G. Alexander edited it, making very few corrections and additions, for *The World's Rim* is the summary of Alexander's lifelong studies and, at the same time, the last will and testament, and the individual philosophy of a very active and vigorous personality. Of course the book could not make use of more recent anthropological publications (e.g., a study of the ritual drama of the Winnebago Indians *The Road of Life and Death,* as recorded and annotated by Paul Radin, or Gladys A. Reichard's *Navaho Religion: A Study of Symbolism*), but its value lies in its vivid presentation and profound and universal interpretation of Indian rituals, widened and deepened by comparisons with

rites of other civilizations. Thus the book grows into a general philosophy of religious culture.

Alexander does not believe that the similarities and parallelisms of Indian rites and their meanings with those on other continents were caused by migration or transplantation to America. But, as an enthusiastic humanist, he is sure of the existence of "the human truth," of "a common humanity" which Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, in a eulogizing Foreword, thus expounds: "The common understandings between men of different cultures are very broad, very general, very easily obscured by language and the external trappings of custom." Kluckhohn emphasizes that the other unifying thought in Alexander's book is the dynamic and dramatic presentation of life in myths and rituals. Alexander used to say: "Only drama catches things 'as they really are.' " And Kluckhohn adds, "Drama and mystery are almost the same thing. This book is about the dramatic mysteries of the American Indian." This is a welcome approval to the theatre historian who does not derive drama and theatre from the classic Greek tragedy and comedy, but thinks it necessary to go back to the theatrical expression in ritual and profane performances of other primitive or advanced civilizations since the Stone Age.

Alexander arranges his examples of ritual and mythology around a "limited and consciously selected list" of eight leitmotives, none of them universal among the Indian groups, but all of them intertribal and interregional. Each of the eight chapters is based on some fundamental Indian ritual; all together they result in a survey of religion and philosophy of the North American Indians, the first four, of their concept of the world, the last four, of their ideas of life and death. From the Pipe Rite Alexander deduces the "Indian conception of the phenomenal and indeed of the unseen world." In the second chapter he discusses the American version of the tree-and-pillar cult which here developed into a poetry of symbolism. The third chapter deals with the rite of purification by the sweat-bath "which for the Indians is cosmic in its significance and poetic in its associated mythology," related to the meaning of the sacred stones as developed by the Stone Age man of America. The fourth, "The Corn Maidens," offers myth and rite in connection with earth's vegetation, before all the Corn Dance, with analogies to corn cults of the Old World.

Of the four chapters interpreting human life, the first is occupied

with the Hako ceremony of the Pawnees, which Alexander considers the most beautiful and the richest in poetic meanings, with striking analogies to the mysteries of Eleusis, taken as typical for American rites symbolizing the Sacred Child and the victory of Life. The fifth chapter is a study of the Sun Dance, leading to the theme "of understanding and the discovery of valor-of-soul as heights of human attainment," and to vision in a kind of sun cult containing suggestions of Mithraic philosophy. The next subject matter is a series of rites which parallel the seasonal pattern with the pattern of individual human life. The concluding chapter is a discussion of the Algonquin Mystery of the Way, the road to the Other World and life in the Beyond, "directly suggesting the Orphic mystery of the Greeks and in more than one particular the central mystery of the Christian religion."

A summary of the contents of Alexander's book indicates the broad philosophical-metaphysical system which he finds in Indian ritual. It also shows his method: first describing the Indian rites, then analyzing and interpreting, and finally paralleling them with the corresponding rituals of other peoples, mainly of the Greeks. It is Alexander's belief

> that the centering of Indian thought in the ceremonial life of the tribes . . . affords us, certainly, the most instructive extant indication of what was the type and quality of our own ancestral thinking in that cloudy Age of the Gods which preceded the Fathers of our History—of what, for example, must have been the quality of the Hellenic mind in the period just anterior to the appearance of Thales and the birth of conscious philosophy, at the time when the holy mysteries of Orpheus and Eleusis were flourishing.

Thus he comes to the daring conclusion:

> Indeed, the most direct approach to pre-Hellenic thought may be directly through the study of the forming speculation which the Indian rituals reveal.

Alexander's last book, based on his encyclopedic knowledge of ritual and mythology of many races and written in an enticing and fluent language, is an informative, stimulating, if almost overwhelming study for the beginner. Because of the wealth of ritual examples, international analogies, and general, often controversial ideas, it is a book for the scholar, too—even if scholarly criticism will contradict and find errors and gaps. The critical reader may also object to Alexander's kind of presentation, which can lead to a onesided, idealizing, embellishing picture of Indian culture, as much as the Greek way of life for the last

200 years was plainly but wrongly considered a culture of mere beauty and perfection. Alexander apparently feels so himself, for he anticipates this objection in his preface: "In the texts which follow, the white pages of American Indian thought and understanding are definitely chosen with the intention of showing his heritage and achievement at its best."

KURT PINTHUS

Columbia University

The Principal Upaniṣads. Edited with introduction, text, translation and notes by S. RADHAKRISHNAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. 958 pp. $10.00.

The 135-page Introduction is a distinctive contribution to the understanding of Indian thought. In it the author reviews in a quasi-historical framework the main topics of the Upaniṣads under nineteen heads, integrating varying ideas into a unitary scheme. "Though the Upaniṣads do not work out a logically coherent system of metaphysics, they give us a few fundamental doctrines which stand out as the essential teachings of the early Upaniṣads. These are recapitulated in the *Brahma Sūtra* . . . an aphoristic summary of the teaching of the Upaniṣads" (p. 25). He then offers a concise résumé of the different views of various commentators on the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma Sūtra* (pp. 25-27). These notes are found in the section, "The Upaniṣads and the Vedānta."

Seventeen pages are given to the Ṛg Veda and Upaniṣad thought. Max Müller is quoted: "In the Ṛg Veda we find the first adventure of the human mind made by those who sought to discover the meaning of existence and man's place in life, 'the first spoken by the Aryan man' " (p. 44).

Turning to the section, "The Upaniṣads": "While the Upaniṣads use the Vedas, their teaching is dependent on the personal experience and testimony of teachers like Yājñavalkya [and] Śāṇḍilya. The authority of the Vedas is, to no small extent, due to the inclusion of the Upaniṣads in them" (p. 51). "Hymns to gods and goddesses are replaced by a search for the reality underlying the flux of things" (p. 48). And the author continues:

> We must see the eternal, the celestial, the still. If it is unknowable and incomprehensible, it is yet realizable by self-discipline and integral insight. We

can seize the truth not by logical thinking but by the energy of our whole inner being. . . . The Upaniṣad writers appeal from the rigid ordinances of custom to those divine and spiritual laws which are not of today or of yesterday, but live forever and of their origin knoweth no man. . . . The goal is not a heavenly state of bliss or rebirth in a better world, but freedom from the objective, cosmic law of karma and identity with the Supreme Consciousness and Freedom (pp. 50, 51).

"The Upaniṣads are respected . . . because they have inspired generations of Indians with vision and strength by their inexhaustible significance and spiritual power" (p. 18). "[They] give us both spiritual vision and philosophical argument" (p. 20).

The section, "Ultimate Reality: Brahman," is illuminating and may be used to illustrate the author's method and analysis. He quotes widely from the Hymns and the Brāhmaṇas. He had already pointed out: "When we pass from the Vedic hymns to the Upaniṣads we find that interest shifts from the objective to the subjective" (p. 49). "The distinction between *Brahman* in itself and *Brahman* in the universe, the transcendent beyond manifestation and the transcendent in manifestation, the indeterminate and the determinant, *nirguṇo guṇī,* is not exclusive. . . . The two are like two sides of one reality. The Real is at the same time being realized" (p. 70). In this section Professor Radhakrishnan's integrated scheme is found. "*Hiraṇya-garbha,* the World-soul is the divine creator, the supreme lord *Iśvara* at work in this universe. A definite possibility of the Absolute is being realized in this world. In the Upaniṣads the distinction between *Iśvara* and *Hiraṇya-garbha,* between God and the World-soul, is not sharply drawn" (p. 71). His summary is:

We have thus the four sides of one whole: (i) the transcendental universal being anterior to any concrete reality; (ii) the causal principle of all differentiation; (iii) the innermost essence of the world; and (iv) the manifest world. They are co-existent and not alternating poises where we have either a quiescent *Brahman* or a creative Lord. These are simultaneous sides of the one Reality (p. 72).

Another section, "The Status of the World: Māyā and Avidyā," is of special interest.

Both the Absolute and the Personal God are real; only the former is the logical prius of the latter. The soul when it rises to full attention knows itself to be related to the single universal consciousness, but when it turns outward

it sees the objective universe as a manifestation of this single consciousness. The withdrawal from the world is not the conclusive end of the spiritual quest. There is a return to the world accompanied by a persistent refusal to take the world as it confronts us as final. The world has to be redeemed and it can be redeemed because it has its source in God and final refuge in God. . . . The world is neither one with *Brahman* nor wholly other than *Brahman*. The world of fact cannot be apart from the world of being. From one being no other being is born. It exists only in another form. . . . The world is the creation of God, the active Lord. The finite is the self-limitation of the infinite. No finite can exist in and by itself. It exists by the infinite. If we seek the dynamic aspect we are inclined to repudiate the experience of pure consciousness. It is not a question of either pure consciousness or dynamic consciousness. These are the different statuses of the one Reality. They are present simultaneously in the universal awareness (pp. 79 ff.).

The author disagrees with Deussen's theory about Yājñavalkya's idealistic monism.

It is not necessary to look upon the theism emphasized in the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads as a declension from pure monistic idealism. It is in the direct line of the development of Upaniṣad thought. . . . The Absolute is not a metaphysical abstraction or a void of silence. It is the absolute of this relative world of manifestation. . . . The Ultimate Reality sustains the play of the world and dwells in it. . . . The unchangeableness of the Supreme does not mean that the universe is a perfectly articulated mechanism in which everything is given from the beginning. The world is real as based on *Brahman;* it is unreal by itself (pp. 84 f.).

Further:

The temporal being is by no means false. As to why the Supreme has this fourfold character, why it is what it is, we can only accept it as the given reality. It is the ultimate irrationality in the sense that no logical derivation of the given is possible. It is apprehended by us in a spiritual consciousness and accounts for the nature of experience in all its aspects. It is the only philosophical explanation that is possible or necessary (p. 90).

There does not seem to be any suggestion that the individual egos are unreal. They all exist only through the Self and have no reality apart from It. The insistence on the unity of the Supreme Self as the constitutive reality of the world and of the individual souls does not negate the empirical reality of the latter (p. 93).

Professor Radhakrishnan concludes the introduction under the topic "Religion," as follows:

We are heirs of a richer heritage than most of us are aware of. The life of the people of the spirit, from the beginning until now, has a great deal to offer us. If we cut ourselves away from the rich treasury of wisdom about man's aspirations on this earth which is available to us from our own past, or if we are satisfied with our own inadequate tradition and fail to seek for ourselves the gifts of other traditions, we will gravely misconceive the spirit of religion. Loyalty to our particular tradition means not only concord with the past but also freedom from the past. The living past should serve as a great inspiration and support for the future. Tradition is not a rigid, hidebound framework which cripples the life of the spirit and requires us to revert to a period that is now past and beyond recall. It is not a memory of the past but a constant abiding of the living Spirit. It is a living stream of spiritual life (pp. 144 f.).

The last quotation suggests the author's view of the universality of Upaniṣad ideas. It is indicated throughout the work by pertinent quotations from famous men of every age and civilization. The excerpts from the introduction, from a few sections, indicate the author's distinctive interpretation of the Upaniṣads. It appears to be nearer to Rāmānuja than to Śaṁkara. The Veda is treated as a self-contained and unified body of truth. The indigenous civilization which the Aryans encountered in the Indus Valley, and later in the Ganges Valley where the Upaniṣads took form, is practically ignored.

The inclusion in the volume of the text of the principal Upaniṣads in Romanized script, together with a close translation in attractive English, is of great importance. This is enhanced by notes from the great commentators. Radhakrishnan reserves his own interpretations for the notes as well. A good example of this may be taken from the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* I.3.1, where various opinions are cited in ample footnotes which he concludes: "All this indicates that, while meditation is the way to saving knowledge, due performances of the ordained sacrifices gives us a measure of spiritual understanding" (p. 622).

There is very little of importance or of tradition that is not touched upon somewhere. In an attractive volume we have an illuminating and comprehensive presentation of India's quest for the experience of Reality.

George W. Briggs

Drew University

Dārā Shikūh: His Life and Works. By Bikrama Jit Hasrat. Calcutta: Vishvabharati Publishing Department, 1953. xxi, 304 pp. Rs. 12.

The title of this book is a little misleading; the biographical part is very meagre, almost non-existent. Dārā Shikūh was the eldest son of the famous Indian Mughul Emperor Shāh Jahān, the builder of the Taj Mahal. He was looked upon as the heir apparent and, when his father fell dangerously ill, he managed the affairs of the state in the name of the sick monarch. This, however, precipitated the war of succession to the throne among the sons of the emperor and brought about Dārā Shikūh's downfall and ruin. His brother Aurangzīb, a more capable and energetic prince, who had made his mark as the viceroy of the troublesome Deccan and as a general of great courage and skill, won the war and the Mughul crown.

It was not, however, merely a dispute between two royal princes, different as they were in their temperaments, capacities and interests. After the initial confusion of the civil war for the throne, issues came to clarify themselves, and Dārā Shikūh and Aurangzīb emerged as the representatives of two forces: the former was the symbol of those elements in the political life of the Empire which were united in opposing the ascendancy of orthodox Islam in the councils of the state; the latter was the champion of the upholders of orthodoxy. This struggle had started in the days of Akbar, who himself became the leader of heterodoxy. Orthodoxy, tired of a deadly struggle against Mahdwism, had been taken by surprise and seemed to be losing its hold both upon the court and the people; but soon it made a remarkable recovery under the inspired leadership of Shaikh Aḥmad of Sarhind, known in orthodox Muslim circles of the subcontinent of India and Pakistan as the Mujaddid-i-alf-i-thānī, the Reviver (of Islam) in the second millennium. Gradually the movement became stronger until it was able to put a prince of practically its own choice upon the throne. It is against this historical background, not included in the book, that Dārā Shikūh's writings and opinions assume importance; otherwise the prince was only one of the many who thought like him in those days.

Dārā Shikūh was a prince of great culture and charm. His catholicity, his interest in mystic lore, his own mystic inclinations, have been described well by the author. Of particular interest is Part II of the book, which deals with the interest taken by the Muslims in the study of Hindu

SCANNED 43 of 82

religion and philosophy as well as other branches of Hindu learning. Here the author has given a brief historical background, which is well balanced and interesting. Dārā Shikūh's own contribution has been discussed at some length. It was his *Sirr-i-Akbar,* translated into Latin, which first introduced Western scholars to Hindu religious thought. The Prince, in spite of severe handicaps, acquitted himself well in translating the *Upanishads* into Persian, and when it is kept in view that, in those days, all the apparatus now available to the Sanskriticists was unknown, Dārā Shikūh's achievement deserves high praise. The *Majmaʿ-u'l-baḥrain,* however, it must be admitted, is of much poorer quality. The reason is that the Prince's anxiety to discover unity in diversity leads him astray; it is his enthusiasm which is at the root of many an error not only in this work, but also in his really solid achievement of having given the non-Hindu world the first translation of the *Upanishads.*

The Prince's essays in Sufism lack authority as well as originality; they fall into the category of unbridled pseudo-philosophical thinking which finds approbation neither in religious nor in philosophical circles. This is the main reason why the first part of the book under review is not so interesting; when treated just as religious or mystic thought without its importance in political history, Dārā Shikūh's sufist writings are merely dull rehash of much more brilliant thinking. Besides, Mr. Hasrat has not taken the trouble of finding out why should it have excited such hostility as ultimately ended in Dārā Shikūh's loss of his heritage and even of his life. The average reader, to whom the real reason has not been explained, will be mystified and even bewildered to read that monotheism should be repulsive to any section of the Muslims, who proclaim from the house tops their own adherence to it. The author should not have contented himself by translating *tawḥīd,* as used by Dārā Shikūh, literally into "monotheism"; he should have explained that Dārā Shikūh had used *tawḥīd* for the doctrine of *waḥdat-u'l-wajūd,* which is not just monotheism, and may well cause flutter in any monotheistic circles, because it means unity of existence (monism), by which its believers mean that all existence is one, and that it is God. It is crisply stated in the Persian sentence: *Hamahūst,* "all is He." It was here that the historical background would have helped; because the Mujaddid thought it necessary to counter this doctrine for fighting the philosophy of prevalent heterodoxy. The limitation of space forbids the enumera-

tion of all the reasons for the Mujaddid's attitude; the main cause was that, besides opening the sluiceway to Hindu ideas by providing common ground between Sufism and Vedantism, it was also pushed to the logical extreme of the doctrine that there was no real difference between different religions, all of them being like several paths towards a common goal. It sought to break the Islamic insistence upon its credo and its code; it created laxity and encouraged heterodoxy; it paved the way towards the assimilation of the Muslims into Hinduism. It had been by minimizing the validity of the peculiarities and characteristics of other religions and injecting into them its own feelings that Hinduism had, in the past, annihilated them and assimilated their followers into its polyhedral system. It was from these dangers that the Mujaddid wanted to save Islam and the Muslims when he countered the doctrine of *waḥdat-u'l-wajūd,* which has been misleadingly called *tawḥīd* by the Prince and erroneously translated into monotheism by Mr. Hasrat without giving any explanation.

This is merely an oversight on the part of Mr. Hasrat, because his approach has been objective throughout the book and he has shown a commendable spirit of sympathy and tolerance. The author's knowledge of Persian and Sanskrit have equipped him well for this kind of study; it is, therefore, a pity that the translation of some Persian passages into English, though placed within quotation marks, is not exact; the author, however, does succeed in giving the general sense without much violence to the meaning.

The book has real merit; it is based upon solid research and adds to our knowledge of a neglected topic. One only feels that the author should have widened the scope of his work to explain to the layman the real significance of Dārā Shikūh's essays into mysticism and comparative religion.

I. H. Qureshi

Columbia University

L'Umanesimo e il demoniaco nell'arte. (Atti del II Congresso Internazionale di Studi Umanistici.) Edited by Enrico Castelli. Roma, Milano: 1953. Fratelli Bocca Editori, xii, 311 pp. 60 plates.

The Second International Congress of Humanistic Studies, held in Rome in 1952, treated two themes: Christianity and Reason of State,

Humanism and the Demonic in Art. Both touch on the conflict of values during the Renaissance in Italy and the North. In connection with the second theme, the president of the congress, E. Castelli, arranged an exhibition of about eighty works of art of the 15th and 16th centuries with demonic subjects, including paintings by Bosch, Brueghel, and Grünewald. It is the papers (pp. 165-311) dealing with the demonic that are reviewed here. Not all of them are concerned particularly with the art of the Renaissance, but the series as a whole brings to clear view the intense fascination of the demonic to many artists of the period of Humanism.

Only André Chastel, in an excellent essay on Antichrist in the Renaissance, undertakes to explain why the demonic emerges in Italian art of the years around 1500. The age of the High Renaissance, the time of Leonardo, the young Michelangelo, Raphael, and Dürer, is a period of anxiety, of apocalyptic terrors, and prophetic passion, all provoked by political disasters and the decline of the Church. "With the shattering of the myth of the Platonic golden age, the disappointment of the humanist circles favored the eschatological speculations which nourished the Reform in its beginnings." One cannot forget, however, that this is the same generation that produced the harmonious classical art of the High Renaissance; an explanation that ignores this fact must be incomplete.

In contrast to Chastel, Dagobert Frey ("Mensch, Dämon und Gott") would deduce the necessity of the demonic in art from the nature of man. Individuality, especially when shaped by a concept of the deified human, means separation from others, hence solitude, estrangement from nature, and the demonization of the environment; scientific rationalism, too, in divesting the world of good and evil, reducing it to a mechanical system, also contributes to the growth of the demonic. To Frey, the polarity of the divine and the demonic is inherent in the development of consciousness, with its duality of the self and the other.

Celestina Piccinato ("Il significato divino dell 'arte demoniaca dei pittori nordici dei secoli XV e XVI") denies that the paintings with demonic subjects are a sign of crisis or an invitation to a choice of good and evil. Beauty and ugliness alike can express the demonic—beauty as a temptation, and ugliness as the true face of evil. But the paintings of Bosch and Brueghel, through the imaging of demonic ugliness, condemn evil and aim to restore men to a state of grace within this world. Reject-

ing an intellectualist approach to this art, Signora Piccinato still seems to us to ignore the psychological significance and appeal of the monstrous and deformed in such paintings.

Hans Sedlmayr, adopting an opposite apologetic attitude, approaches the whole of modern art since the French Revolution as the work of the devil. Just as the Nazis condemned recent advanced art as "degenerate" or as "cultural Bolshevism," so he characterizes it as diabolical. He denounces as a blasphemy Orozco's fresco at Dartmouth College of the risen Christ who cuts down his own cross amid the fallen images of heathen religions and the machines of war. One can see Professor Sedlmayr's crude bias in his mistaken idea that the head of Christ in this fresco is a portrait of Lenin; it is actually copied from the Catalan Romanesque Christ of the 12th century fresco from Sta. Maria di Mur in the Boston Museum. He also mistakes the torn flesh of Christ's legs for a worker's apron.

For other writers, too, the demonic is not peculiar to the art of the period of Humanism. Pierre Francastel ("Mise en scène et conscience: le diable dans la rue à la fin du Moyen-Age") treats it as a typical theme of the Middle Ages as a whole, and wishes to derive the new forms and attributes of the devil in art not from pictorial imagination, but from drama, from the direct vision of the devils impersonated in the medieval mystery plays. His arguments on this point do not convince me. As an example of such an influence of the religious theater on the painters and sculptors, he cites an image of Theophilus and the devil in a manuscript of about 1200; but he ignores the fact that the first known miracle play of Theophilus is considerably later, and that the same types and gestures as in this miniature occur in still older art, e.g., the great sculpture in Souillac.

There is no doubt that much in the demonic representations of the Renaissance comes from medieval art and literature. Peter Halm traces to the beginning of the 13th century and to still older literary tradition the image of the devil writing down the chatter of inattentive worshippers. The general tendency to regard images as endowed with a mysterious life and a power of responding to the spectator is studied by Hans Hahnloser in a fascinating paper on the cult of the image in the Middle Ages. It is remarkable how intense was this belief in the supernatural reality of the image in Switzerland on the eve of the Reformation. Hans Haug ("Les origines de l'élément démoniaque dans l'art de Grüne-

wald") characterizes the melancholia of Grünewald as medieval (in contrast to Dürer's humanistic melancholia), and attempts to prove the risky thesis that the young Grünewald is none other than the so-called Master of the Amsterdam Cabinet, an artist of decidedly medieval style.

The demonic in art is still a field of uncritical speculation. Few of its themes have been studied minutely, and, in the search for meaning, scholars have been too easily seduced by beautiful or startling analogies. The essay by Wilhelm Fraenger on Bosch's Prodigal Son is remarkable for its ingenuity; his observation of the formal structure of this painting is deep and true, but it is hard to accept his decipherment of the meaning which often seems far-fetched. Writing on the same picture in an article on Bosch and Brueghel, Ludwig Baldass interprets the central figure as The Vagabond rather than The Prodigal Son, and the whole work as a moral allegory of the evil and malice of this world. His main purpose, however, is to show the different approach to the demonic in Bosch and Brueghel, the first artist being more religious, the other more secular and moralistic. The prudent conclusions of Baldass, I must say, are less interesting than Fraenger's speculations.

For Carl Linfert ("Die Vermummung, eine Figuration der Angst und der Lüge") the demonic is given not only in the types of bestiality and deformed figures, but in a characteristic physiognomic or expressive form; as an example he discusses the masquerade as a kind of demonic concealment, which occurs in modern as well as in late medieval art.

Arthur Peltzer distinguishes the devils of Northern and Italian art; the latter are not truly demonic. He notes, too, the rarity of witches in Italy.

Valerio Mariani observes the demonic in Michelangelo and the special influence of Schongauer and Signorelli in this aspect of the great Italian master.

The article by Luigi Stefanini on the Christian component in Renaissance aesthetics does not lie clearly within the scope of the common theme of the Congress. To the aesthetics of classical antiquity, based on the beauty of the visual, he opposes a Christian concept of expression, based on the beauty and ideality of spirit. This concept permeates Renaissance and later aesthetics.

One of the most illuminating papers is that by Eugenio Garin on magic in the Renaissance. He brings out clearly the continuity of medieval and Renaissance magical belief and practice. Far from being in con-

flict with Renaissance rationalism, the interest in magic and astrology during that period was an approach to a modern scientific conception, linking the idea of an ordered universe with ideas of prevision and control.

Meyer Schapiro

Columbia University

Izbranniye Sochineniya (Selected Works). By Alexis Khomyakov. Edited by Nicholas Arseniev. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1955. 413 pp. $3.00.

Tri Rasgovora (Three Conversations). By Vladimir Solovyev. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954. 236 pp. $2.25.

Vospominaniya (Recollections). By George Shavelsky. 2 Vols. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954. 414 pp. $3.00; 412 pp. $3.00.

Vremya Very (The Age of Faith). By Bishop John (Shalovsky) of San Francisco. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954. 405 pp. $3.00.

Otets Ioann Kronshtadtsky (Father John of Kronstadt). By Alexandre Semenov-Tyan-Shansky. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1955. 380 pp. $3.00.

Pravoslaviye v Zhizni (Orthodoxy in Everyday Life). Edited by Serge Verkhovsky. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1953. 413 pp.

Istorichesky Put Pravoslaviya (The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy). By Alexander Schmemann. New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954. 389 pp. $2.75.

It is generally believed that the Patriarch of Moscow has been compelled to become the willing or unwilling agent of the Soviet regime, and it is a recognized fact that his published statements follow distressingly closely the Communist line of policy, even though he attempts to uphold the doctrines of the Christian Church. It is, then, especially valuable that the Chekhov Publishing House of the East European Fund, Inc. has been able to print in the United States such a wide assortment of books covering all phases of Russian Orthodox life and thought. The value of these works will depend in the last resort upon the tastes of the individual reader, but, taken as a whole, they cover those subjects that

are of especial interest both to the devout person and the Church scholar.

The works of Khomyakov and Solovyev are reprints of some of the classics of Russian theological thought. Khomyakov, one of the Slavophile leaders, was the real father of the new Russian theological school, and the introductory essay by Professor Arseniev is of especial value in understanding the point of view of the author. The *Three Conversations* of Solovyev has long been recognized as one of the greatest of eschatological writings, with its discussion of the morality of pacifism and the coming of Antichrist.

The *Recollections* of Father Shavelsky, the last Head Chaplain of the Russian Army and Navy, are in quite a different vein. They carry us into the confused days of World War I, the period of Rasputin and of the Revolution, and they shed an interesting light upon the actions of the Holy Synod and the court, as well as the attitude of the individual generals and soldiers toward the Orthodox Faith. They conclude with the defeat of the Volunteer Army, with which Fr. Shavelsky retired to Bulgaria, where he died in 1950.

The Age of Faith, by Bishop John, includes addresses on religious subjects which he has delivered over the Voice of America, short meditations on some of the less important figures in the Acts of the Apostles, accounts of his own journeys, including his trip to Japan and Korea during the last war as a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church in America at the invitation of the American government, and a number of short aphoristic sentences on religious subjects.

The Reverend Semenov-Tyan-Shansky's account of Father John of Kronstadt is less a biography of this unusual religious leader than it is an appreciation and explanation. Father John won a unique place in the Russian Church as a representative of an extremely conservative political point of view, and as a man of prayer whose religious influence extended into all classes of believing Russians. He was regarded as a man who could work miracles, and the author shows how he firmly believed that such powers as he had came from his reverence for the Divine Liturgy. It is a splendid picture of an unusual type of man, who will ultimately be canonized by the Russian Church.

The collection, *Eastern Orthodoxy in Everyday Life,* edited by Professor Verkhovsky, consists of a series of articles on the Russian Orthodox view of life, faith, and action. Some of them are of universal value,

although there will be many who will not share the conviction of A. Kartashev of the special religious mission of Russia and the tsars, and will not accept his views as to the necessity for a political unity of all the peoples of the old empire, where "a free Orthodoxy, standing on its own feet, along with other faiths, by its internal strength will again return to Russia, as a collective imperial and cultural whole, its seal, its aspect, its ikon—the ikon of Holy Rus." The other articles express the deepest conceptions of Christian thought on the church, the parish, the Bible, prayer, and Christianity and Christ. They form a valuable introduction to the understanding of Russian Orthodoxy.

The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy, by Fr. Shmemann, is especially valuable, for it not only traces the general development of Eastern and Byzantine Orthodoxy but attempts to explain philosophically the reasons for many of the features that appeared. After treating adequately the early Church as a community of Christians, he points out that the conversion of Constantine was, in a sense, outside of the Church. It was, in the Emperor's opinion, the Christianization of the imperial power, and not the submission of the Emperor to the Church. It was the reconciliation of this view with the normal Christian view that produced many of the more unfortunate aspects of the Byzantine period. In his treatment of the Christological disputes and the Councils, the author carefully notes how the Truth triumphed, despite the wavering efforts of the emperors to secure peace in the land and the haughty and untamed spirits of many of the religious leaders.

He discusses calmly and without bitterness the attitude of the Papacy and the Papal claims, something that is rare in the apologists for either side, but he might have emphasized more clearly that the Papacy also won considerable prestige because, for centuries, the Bishop of Rome was the bishop of the capital of the pagan empire, and this increased in some ways his standing, as well as the fact that Saints Peter and Paul were instrumental in the foundation of the Roman Church.

The weakest chapter is undoubtedly the part dealing with the Russian Church after the Moscow period. Fr. Shmemann accepts absolutely the typical Russian view that the transfer of the leadership from Kiev to Moscow meant merely a shift of the capital of a single people. This, of course, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians deny on many grounds, although they have to admit that a single family governed all the principalities. Yet the difference in the position of the Church in Kiev,

where it was free, and in Moscow, where it became a tool of the state, is extremely striking, and this cannot fail to arouse questions in the mind of the unbiassed reader. The same can be said of the relative levels of church culture and the attitude to the outside world.

This becomes more and more clear as we approach the fall of Constantinople and the proclamation of Moscow as the Third Rome. It is coupled with a clear picture of the long smoldering antagonism between Moscow and Constantinople, as the latter sank before the advancing Turks. The author bewails this and the dislike for the Greek faith, but he does, perhaps, less than justice to the work of Peter Mogila and the Kievan scholars who, to the best of their ability, sought in some way to include in Orthodox thinking at least some part of the new learning of the West. Orthodox scholarship was indeed brought to a slowdown by the rediscovery of pagan Greece, as opposed to the synthesis of Greek culture and Christianity that had marked the best days of the Byzantine Empire. A recovery of this without a breath of Western thought was hardly possible, and the crudeness of Moscow and its aversion to the West could not fail to impress the Kievan Church just as much as the efforts of the Polish Latin Catholic Kings to implant Latin Catholicism in Orthodoxy. Recent Catholic publications seem to show that there was as much Orthodox initiative in the formation of the Union as there was Polish. It was again the same type of cultural differences and applications of imperial theory that decided the events of the seventeenth century, created the Union and the Raskol, and furthered the Western absolutism of Peter.

The author is justifiably proud that, in the Russia of the past centuries, there began the freeing of Orthodoxy from its "Eastern" isolation. This began haltingly in Kiev, and we can be sure that future study will reveal yet more fully the full import of that stage of Orthodox development, which extended far beyond the boundaries of Kiev itself and even into the Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire. He realizes that a period in Russian Orthodoxy has come to an end, but he states only vaguely the fact that, in the new world and among the Orthodox scattered through it, there is a new chance for the renewal of that original unity that marked the early Church.

The book of Fr. Shmemann is important for an understanding not only of Orthodoxy but of Christianity as a whole. We can hope that it may be possible to publish it in English, so that it may reach a far

wider audience and command the respect and attention of all those who dimly feel that Orthodoxy is, indeed, a continuation of the original spirit of Christianity and the logical application of the Christian ideas of thought and faith.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

The History and Character of Calvinism. By JOHN T. MCNEILL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. x, 466 pp. $6.00.

Dr. John T. McNeill's distinguished career of judicious and comprehensive historical work now issues in a compact yet full bodied study of Calvinism, the tradition of his birth, yet a tradition he learned to appreciate only much later in his scholarly life. He has written for those "whose acquaintance with the subject matter may be slight, . . . and who may not have opportunity to read at large in the field." This modest intent, however, and resultant minimum of academic apparatus, need let no one suppose that more than a very few stones have been left unturned. "No unverified statement has been consciously admitted," nor have problems been shirked, or skeletons locked in closets. Schools of criticism, adulation, and caricature are met, albeit briefly, with the considered analysis of a quite modern, liberal, and deeply pious historian of Christianity. This synoptic volume, reminiscent of the broad cultural Calvinist interests of Abraham Kuyper (minus his orthodox zeal) or Josef Bohatec and many of the French writers, will help rescue the tradition from facile classification as religious fundamentalism or the churchly handmaid of developing capitalism—although it has, of course, been both at times. The accumulating recent monography on Calvinism —historical, theological and literary—makes this sole effort at comprehensiveness a long overdue necessity.

This history of "Calvinism" (a poor English equivalent of the German and French term "reformed" Christianity) begins with the Swiss reform in the generation before John Calvin. As background, Dr. McNeill traces in outline the late medieval union of fierce Swiss warriors into a sturdy cantonal federation which was, however, dreadfully lacking in either ecclesiastical or educational distinction until the admission of Basel with its great humanist university in 1501. Zwingli appears as

uniting in himself the rugged older patriotism and a Basel humanism, by virtue of which he led churchmen in city after city into the reform beyond the "Moab" where Erasmus had left them. Zwingli's successor, the "talented, wise, firm, and compassionate" Bullinger, appears, both as church statesman and theologian, to provide a deeper religious temper for the Zurich reform, although Zwingli is by no means seen as a rationalist. For all its political admixtures and dependence upon humanism, the German-speaking Swiss reform is said to be chiefly of biblical inspiration. Oecolampadius of Basel is called an unsuccessful precursor of Calvin for his effort to have church discipline removed from control of the state. Thus, "Calvinism" is shown to have had important foundations laid in Switzerland prior to John Calvin's becoming a Protestant.

A fine Calvin biography, the best short one available, occupies the 155 pages of Part II of the book. While lacking the imaginative liveliness of T. H. L. Parker's new *Portrait of Calvin* and of Emanuel Stickelberger's newly and poorly translated *Calvin: A Life* (in the latter case one is tempted to add "thank goodness"), the present is by far more responsible, trustworthy, and complete than either. Calvin is well placed in the context of university life in Paris and then of the reform in Geneva and the entire continent, so that the intellectual and moral rigor of his theology and church discipline appear in interaction with the world he experienced and helped form. Throughout the volume, brief and careful characterizations of innumerable lesser figures show the intricacy, variety, and independence of the many men and forces contributing to Calvin's own life and the phenomena that later took his name. Passing over many matters that invite comment, we note only that the issue of Calvin's conversion is here restudied in welcome, if disproportionate, detail; his personality is drawn independently of either Kampschulte's or Doumergue's formidable one-sidedness, as of the many pamphleteering biographies; the "Weber" thesis that property results from godliness is shown to derive neither from John Calvin nor Max Weber's picture of him, and, as a characteristic of later Calvinism, is seen to be held in common with Anglicans, Lutherans, *et al.* In fact, it is called the "bourgeois heresy" at large (pp. 418 f.). The latter is the strongest point of view taken in the book, and Dr. McNeill calls for further studies upon it making use of sources which he finds ignored by Tawney.

The presentation of Calvin's theology, although it rejects some com-

mon, easy misconceptions, and reflects knowledge of all important interpreters, strikes this reviewer as itself somewhat conventional. For example, while saying with Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel that predestination "is to be mentioned only in the context of redemption in Christ," Dr. McNeill follows an older school in treating it as part of Calvin's doctrine of God. Thus treated, it cannot but become evidence of a double-sidedness in the Deity. Calvin himself rejected this explicitly and finally, as Paul Jacobs has shown in *Praedestination und Verantwortlichkeit bei Calvin,* by locating the doctrine far back in the *Institutes* as the last and most comforting implication of a christocentric faith. Election is thus seen to be a doctrinal expression of the unconditioned *(gratuitus)* character of God's mercy itself, and reprobation an awe-ful systematic and biblical completion of the idea. Under Dr. McNeill's and the traditional treatment, mercy must be insisted upon as a palliative introduced to counteract the double decrees (p. 212). The very question of what the "reprobate" might think of the decrees (p. 211) is *praeposterus* for Calvin, since the whole doctrine is an implicate of the believer's assurance that he is held by God's mercy rather than his own works; it is not a general metaphysical theory of the relation of Creator to creature. Correspondingly, to my mind, the doctrine of the knowledge of God and of faith seem to have been written more with a generous recognition than with an acceptance of the chief insights of the last twenty-five years of continental Calvin study. This critique, from a partisan of those studies, is meant only to suggest that Calvin may have been doing a different *kind* of thing from what his system became in Beza, the orthodox, and most later interpreters including, alas, the present one. The doctrine of the church as developed by Dr. McNeill should further discourage the idea that the classical Reformation was individualistic or sectarian.

In Part III, "The Spread of Reformed Protestantism in Europe and Early America," Dr. McNeill paces evenly from country to country and decade to decade, showing the extent and quality of Calvinist advance and decline. The less creative movements of Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary are presented along with the classic and formative west European and American developments. Among interesting emphases in the English scene: the Zurich-Rhineland influence in Puritanism; the

openness of Beza and Calvin to episcopacy and vestments *in England;* and the comment that John Wesley was the only eminent personality in the evangelical revivals who was not a Calvinist. In these sections Calvinism appears as persecuted and persecutor, reform and reaction, self-righteous and self-critical, unified and fragmented, peaceful and battling, educating and obscurantist, as scholastic theology and a fountain of religious enthusiasm. The richness and variety of Calvinism in many lands are here displayed under a single cover better than anywhere I know of.

"Calvinism and Modern Issues," Part IV, goes back chronologically to special problems, first those of division and reunion brought on by the impact of modernity, cultural and political. "The fact is that Calvinism was disrupted over differences that were accidents of the age without becoming essentially sectarian. Intercommunion . . . was practiced and cherished . . . and organic union . . . of the whole church of Christ was never abandoned." The impact of Descartes, the Deists, the Enlightenment and the Romantic movement on Calvinist thought make up an all too short essay in *Geistesgeschichte.* The whole of what happened from, say, Beza to Schleiermacher, or among Hodge, Schaff, Briggs, and Brown or in Barth and his revolution, is dealt with in such tantalizing brevity that one can only cry out for another complete book on this aspect. A page on Ramus or a paragraph on Voet is less adequate and suggestive than the same amount of space devoted to more general historical treatments, probably because so much is yet to be done in restudy of this much neglected area of intellectual history. The undeniable potency of Calvinism for good and ill in public affairs, both theory and practice, carries us down to John Foster Dulles and down, in another sense, to Daniel F. Malan! As mentioned above, it is here that the Weber-Tawney theses are subjected to brief re-examination. The concluding chapter, on "The Spirit of Calvinism in the World Today," ends with a truly Calvinist statement: Calvinism "reminds every man who will harken to reflect that always, in good or evil circumstances, he has to do with God."

This book is both an introduction and the result of mature reflection. It should be standard for a long while to come.

Edward A. Dowey, Jr.

McCormick Theological Seminary

Swift and the Church of Ireland. By Louis A. Landa. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954. xvi, 206 pp. $3.40.

Despite the numerous books that have been devoted to a study of Swift—there have been a half dozen in the past two years—he remains one of the most curious and perplexing figures in English literature. Several of the recent volumes have been concerned with Swift as a rhetorician and, to a degree, they have helped to illuminate the nature of his playful and astringent wit. We shall probably never have a full or completely adequate explanation of his contradictory personality. For that we need more facts about his childhood and youth, and it seems doubtful that much further information will become available on the earlier period of his life. But if there is ever to be a work which approaches a definitive biography, we must first know more about the ascertainable facts of his life. For instance, Swift's role as a clergyman has never been thoroughly explored until Mr. Landa undertook that worthwhile task in this book.

Information on the subject was not easily available. For Swift's Irish period there is no such daily record as the *Journal to Stella,* and his letters contain relatively little about his duties and problems as a clergyman. Much of the information in this book, therefore, had to be gleaned from records of the Irish Parliament, documents pertaining to the Irish Church, and the correspondence of virtually forgotten contemporaries of Swift. These sources have enabled Mr. Landa to shed new light upon Swift's sojourn at Kilroot and Laracor, and upon his career as Dean of St. Patrick's in Dublin. Heretofore we have known little about the Kilroot pastorate, except that Swift had a love affair, of a kind at least, with Jane Waring, and that after a year's sojourn he was happy to leave. *Swift and the Church of Ireland* helps one to understand why he was eager, after so short a time, to return to the employ of Sir William Temple. Kilroot was a bleak and bitter experience for the recently ordained young clergyman. As prebend of Kilroot he served three parishes—Kilroot, Templecorran, and Ballynure. Church property in all of them was in a rundown condition. At Kilroot both the church and the manse had apparently disappeared under the ravages of time. In the other two parishes churches existed, but they were badly in need of repair. His parishioners consisted of only a few families in each town; the other inhabitants were, for the most part, Presbyterians. Knowing Swift's dis-

like for nonconformity, one can imagine that his frustration at Kilroot may have been owing as much to the strength of dissent as to the ruinous state of church property and to the personal discomfort of living in such a community. As Mr. Landa suggests, this close proximity to Ulster Presbyterianism may have contributed to the bitterness Swift expressed towards the nonconformists in *A Tale of a Tub*.

At Laracor, where he was again in charge of three parishes, Swift enjoyed a somewhat better income, but from the beginning he was disappointed. He went to Laracor reluctantly, having failed to receive the much better living of the Deanship of Derry. Although he was appointed to Laracor chiefly through the influence of the Earl of Berkeley, he blamed Berkeley, somewhat unjustly as Mr. Landa shows, for his failure to be named Dean of Derry. Humility was certainly not one of Swift's virtues. Later, when he received the well-endowed Deanship of St. Patrick's, he was again to feel bitter at having to accept a position which he deemed not equal to his merits.

During his long incumbency at Laracor, Swift apparently never served as active pastor. The clerical duties were performed by a succession of curates, but this was a custom of the times, and Swift was no more negligent than scores of other absentee clergymen. In other respects he appears to have been a conscientious churchman. He exercised care in the appointment of curates, he extended the glebe holdings of his parish, and in general he was an efficient administrator. The office of clergyman of the Anglican Church he held in great respect, and he zealously guarded its prerogatives. It was to protect these that later, as Dean of St. Patrick's, he engaged in bold controversy with the Irish Parliament and with the Irish Bishops. He also had several quarrels with his superior, Archbishop King. Yet it is one of the best tributes to Swift that King eventually came to respect his integrity and to welcome his championship of the Church.

This book is a valuable contribution, not only for the new information about Swift, but also for the picture it provides of the Irish Church in the first half of the eighteenth century. Although the author does not speculate about Swift's spiritual qualifications, the reader of this splendid chapter in ecclesiastical history may be led to conclude that Swift was, to some degree, a victim of the age. He showed "no strong compulsion," Mr. Landa observes, about entering upon the career of a clergyman. Briefly he considered both the army and the civil service. But,

after spending a few years as secretary to Sir William Temple, he finally decided that the Church offered the best opportunities for a university man without means. At any later period Swift's talents as a writer would undoubtedly have directed him to the vocation to which his abilities best suited him. But, except for Alexander Pope and a group of meagerly paid Grub Street hacks, almost no one at the time could make a living by his pen, unless he had a patron, and patronage was something Swift's proud nature abhorred. And so, like many of his generation, he entered the Church, *faute de mieux*. To the office of clergyman he brought his personal probity and a strong sense of duty. These qualities, he several times remarked in his works, were all that a man of normal intelligence needed to perform the tasks of public office. If Swift felt, as he presumably did, that these qualifications were sufficient to make a competent clergyman, he was not alone in thinking so. This was a prevailing opinion of the times.

MAURICE J. QUINLAN

Boston College

A Tale of Two Brothers: John and Charles Wesley. By MABLE R. BRAILSFORD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 301 pp. $4.00.

This is not just another Wesley book, of which there seems to be no end. It is not primarily an account of the rise and early development of Methodism in eighteenth century England, as might be inferred from the book's title, nor is it a biography of the Wesley brothers in the usual sense of that term. Rather, it is mainly the story of the personal relationship which existed between John and Charles Wesley during the course of their long lives, woven into the framework of their ceaseless activities as the principals in a movement which was remolding the social and religious life of England. Charles, rather than John, is the central figure in the *Tale,* though John, for more than half the lifetime of his younger brother, was the dominant influence in his life as well as in the developing Methodist movement. The whole family at Epworth have their part in the *Tale*—Samuel, the rector of Epworth parish, and Susanna the high-minded and efficient mother; the three living sons, Samuel the eldest, John, and Charles, and also the seven living sisters. Although improvident, though far from thriftless and always in debt, largely because the old Rector could not resist buying books, the Wesleys

found ways of sending their three sons to famous Public Schools, Samuel and Charles to Westminster, and John to Charterhouse, to prepare for Oxford. And all three came up to Oxford thoroughly grounded in the classical languages, gained in their Rectory home. The sons and the father could all converse in Latin and Greek, and all were imbued with a love of learning—something unusual in eighteenth century England.

The principal contributions made by this new Wesley book are the insights it furnishes into the home life of the Wesley family circle at Epworth. It seems to have been pretty generally assumed that, when the three Wesley brothers went to Oxford, they turned their backs upon the family at Epworth. But nothing is farther from the truth. The Wesleys were a closely knit family. Although the sisters were deprived of educational opportunities outside their home, that their brothers might have the advantage of famous public schools and the university, it seemed to increase their sisterly pride and made them all the more ambitious for their brothers' success. There seems to have been no feeling of jealousy on their part. "They had no feeling of jealousy, no word of bitterness." Throughout their lives long and loving letters passed between them all.[1]

Another myth that has been exploded by *A Tale of Two Brothers* is that John Wesley never understood children and bungled in his dealing with them. Of course there were no child psychologists in Wesley's day, but he loved children and, according to his light, he made a large place for them in Methodism, and as he grew older his interest in them increased. He preached to parents on the education of children and often to congregations composed entirely of children. On one occasion he preached a children's sermon in words of not more than two syllables. He was devoted to his nephews and nieces, welcomed them into his home, and, on one occasion, took his little niece Sally on a journey to Holland.

At least a third of the volume is given over to the love affairs of the two brothers and the impact of these experiences, direct and indirect, upon the Methodist movement. Charles found a home and domestic happiness with his "Sally" and his children, three sons and a daughter, but John found neither. Charles was married at the age of forty to Sally Gwynne, a Welsh young lady of beauty and fortune, and after a few

1. See Maldwyn Edwards, *The Family Circle: A Study of the Epworth Household in Relation to John and Charles Wesley*. London: The Epworth Press, 1949. Ch. VIII, "The Wesley Sisters."

years took up his residence in London, in an elegant home supplied him by a loyal Methodist friend, where his sons might have the opportunity of developing their unusual musical talent. John at forty-five fell deeply in love with Grace Murray, an attractive widow of thirty-three and a talented Methodist worker, who had nursed him through a serious illness. She was in every way a suitable wife for John Wesley, but she was a commoner and, through the unjustified interference of Charles, the marriage was thwarted, largely on the ground of her social unfitness. Not long after this heart-rending experience John Wesley married the Widow Vazeille, which soon proved to be a pathetic mistake.

As a consequence of these happenings, John and Charles Wesley grew apart, and their long partnership in the Methodist movement was, at least, partially, dissolved. This very human account of the Wesley brothers may be somewhat disillusioning to those who have placed the founders of Methodism upon a pedestal, but it furnishes not only a fresh and revealing picture of the founders of a great movement but also penetrating insights into eighteenth century English Society.

WILLIAM WARREN SWEET

University of Chicago

The Rungless Ladder: Harriet Beecher Stowe and New England Puritanism. By CHARLES H. FOSTER. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1954. xviii, 278 pp. $4.50.

Mr. Foster invites us to rediscover Harriet Beecher Stowe, whom he describes as the "author everybody *almost* knows." He would have us see her, not only as the social reformer who shot suddenly to fame in 1852 with *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* but as an "introspective artist seeking to resolve through the strategy of fiction the peculiar and fascinating psychological adventures of New England Puritanism," as she reaches in aspiration toward *The Rungless Ladder* which stretches toward Paradise from a foothold based on "human affections, tender instincts, symbolic feelings, sacraments of love." He has discovered for himself and successfully reveals to us a "significant drama in the neglected inner history of a sensitive, imaginative, and intelligent woman, driven by New England Puritanism to battle slavery, to flirt with spiritualism, to try out Catholicism in imagination, and ultimately to seek in the Episcopal Church a stay against religious and moral confusion." Only in a foot-

note does Mr. Foster suggest that this is something of a pattern discovered also in Henry Adams and T. S. Eliot. It remains to be suggested that it is, beyond this, something of the pattern of any literary artist in the United States, indicative of his necessity to escape—if he is to remain or grow as artist—from the imaginatively stultifying precepts of those elements of the Protestant Reformation which we have become accustomed to call Puritan. This, at any rate, is a pattern which a growing number of literary commentators—perhaps the most daringly provocative among whom is Lawrence Thompson in his *Melville's Quarrel with God*—find today as they examine our native past.

The pattern reduced to least common denominators is simple—Puritanism is unlovely and disdains beauty; its harshness creates ugliness and encourages the kinds of vulgarity sometimes conveniently categorized as Victorian, an unlovely ingredient of our Gilded Age; its concern with original sin, predestination, true salvation, and signs of grace disables the sensitive spirit or creates, as in the instance of Richard Chase's Emily Dickinson or Perry Miller's Jonathan Edwards, tensions which are resolved in works of superlatively excellent art. It has been applied to Hawthorne; up to a point Henry Adams applied it to himself; even William Faulkner can be read without great distortion into the pattern. But each of these is inconveniently warped when made to fit this or any such scheme, for each of these is something besides. It is part of the fate and part of the usefulness of a minor figure like Mrs. Stowe that she can be demonstrated to fit it more exactly, precisely because she is less the artist, and because the pattern is, perhaps, finally all that remains.

She was, as Mr. Foster ably demonstrates, more derivatively an Edwardian Calvinist than Hawthorne, but if she thought less profoundly than he, or if she dove less courageously than Melville, she gives ground to neither of them in the depth of her feeling. It is the depth—one might better say breadth—of her feeling which made her writings coincide, in the first instance, with what so many of her contemporaries felt about Negro slavery and, in her later and admittedly better, more expertly successful but less popular books, created an effective mirror in which historians like Edmund Wilson and Mr. Foster find compelling instances of the humor and the conflicts of New England, as it struggled from its Puritan bondage toward its still quietly fermenting tensions set forth today by Robert Frost and John P. Marquand.

There is certainly no better and more fruitful study of Harriet Beecher Stowe than this. It is focussed, not on day to day adventures, but on the growth of her mind. It is well reasoned and extremely reasonable. There is very little gossip in it about the Beechers; we admire Mr. Foster for his restraint and his straightforward emphasis on what is required for his thesis—that Mrs. Stowe's permanently significant contribution to American culture "must rest on her ability to give us a balanced and immediate sense of the vital and complex Puritan past." He reminds us that she is "a major myth-maker" who stands beside Fenimore Cooper, whose Natty Bumppo "popularly became the archetypal frontiersman ever in conflict with civilization" much as her Uncle Tom "become the archetypal American Negro, exploited by the white man and sold South symbolically again and again." It is well to be reminded that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is a "document no one can afford to neglect who hopes to understand the springs of our history." We can understand and sympathize with something of Mr. Foster's zeal when he presents it to us as a lesser masterwork of the American literary renaissance which, during a matchless five years in the middle of the last century, gave us *The Scarlet Letter, Moby Dick, Walden,* and *Leaves of Grass.* But we can understand this and his further suggestion that it anticipates and shares much in common with *Huckleberry Finn* and foreshadows the dark legend of inhumanity which in our time has outraged William Faulkner, only, I think, in the sense that we can agree that the wondrously popular *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* is a lesser masterwork of the year which gave us Dreiser's *Sister Carrie,* and that its scarecrow anticipates or foreshadows Mr. Eliot's hollow man with "headpiece filled with straw."

Certainly Uncle Tom and little Eva have become symbols, even for those who have never seen them on stage or read in story of their triumphant virtues. That Uncle Tom has become in some quarters a term of opprobrium directed against the Negro who gives lip-service to the white man's mores, only underlines his mythic longevity. Nothing that Mrs. Stowe herself has set forth to explain the factual origins of her work, or that Mr. Foster or other students have discovered of its literary ancestry, quite overshadows its author's confident belief that not she, but God was responsible for *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* If to some he seems a frightening God, that is beside the point. We may agree—as Mr. Foster does not—with James Baldwin, who, in the *Partisan Review* a few years

ago, said that "the spirit which breathes through this book, hot, self-righteous, fearful, is not different from the spirit of medieval times which sought to exorcise evil by burning witches; and it is not different from the terror which activates a lynch mob." We may agree, that is, that Harriet Beecher Stowe is for the historian, as we have said, an effective mirror of some attitudes of her time, much as Upton Sinclair was for his time, or Mickey Spillane is for ours. Her recognition of economic exploitation and class conflict identifies her as granddaughter of a revolutionary generation taught catchwords by Thomas Paine, a contemporary, not only of Orestes Brownson, but also of Karl Marx. Yet we must recognize, I think—in spite of our Henry James having called it "that triumphant work . . . less a book than a state of vision" —that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is a bad book, an ugly book, and, in the larger sense, immoral. It is powerful with evils not greatly unlike the kind to which we have recently been subjected in televised Senatorial inquiries. Mrs. Stowe, with God and the Constitution by her side, hunted out and found witches, and her intentions being good or her ends justifying her means only explain her in the same way that the popularity of her book explains something of our ancestors and ourselves. Mr. Foster is correct in saying that, after the publication of *Dred* four years later in 1856, Mrs. Stowe

> quite clearly filled the role in European eyes which Faulkner and Warren fill in our own time; she was the outspoken reporter to Europe of our failures in democracy, of our crudities, our cruelties, and at the same time she was the creator of a Southern world of such vitality that the European imagination was not so much depressed as it was refreshed by her pages.

But Mr. Foster's intention is not to explain *Uncle Tom's Cabin* by itself and of itself; he would have us see it as one major milestone in a career which stretched onward for thirty years more, during which Mrs. Stowe wove her own experience and her sympathetic observation into other books which deserve something better than to gather dust on our shelves. *The Minister's Wooing,* for one, is an examination of New England theology, an expression in part of Mrs. Stowe's own struggle to square what she had been taught with her actual experience, her irrepressible religious doubtings—specifically, her concern over her son Henry, who had died, and perhaps without true conversion. It is, as Mr. Foster points out, a book which plays its light on all sides of the

problem, expressing "those patterns of New England sensibility, so private and so subtle that they were seldom given full expression." He presents Mrs. Stowe to us—in Lionel Trilling's words—as one of those "artists who contain a large part of the dialectic," the struggle, the debate of their time, "within themselves, their meaning and power lying in their contradictions" as they present first one facet, then another of the situation which they examine.

We are invited to recognize Mrs. Stowe's "doubleness" of vision, her "New England doubleness" which allows her to stand apart, contrasting "virtually contradictory moods of Puritan earnestness and Yankee comedy." Surely, this is a qualification—of which Malcolm Cowley and Constance Rourke, among others, have recently made much—without which any artist would be handicapped indeed. We find this quality in *The Pearl of Orr's Island* which Sarah Orne Jewett so admired; we find it also in *Oldtown Folks* and *Poganic People,* Mrs. Stowe's later New England novels, the first of which Mr. Foster finds "one of the unquestionable, but still generally unacknowledged, masterpieces of New England, indeed of American literature"; we find it particularly, I think, in the volume of tales which she published as *Oldtown Fireside Stories.* Here, in Sam Lawson, the cracker-box man of all work and many stories, Mrs. Stowe created a figure as much like Uncle Remus as "like Huckleberry Finn, whom we can take seriously as the embodiment of his culture." His Down East humor, his lackadaisical ways, his reliance on Providence, his dialect, his tempering quiet wit are all in a tradition already established by Hosea Biglow, Sam Slick, and Jack Downing, but Mrs. Stowe's "affectionate respect for village character and village ways" does also anticipate Sarah Orne Jewett, Mary Wilkins Freeman, and Robert Frost.

For one is inevitably in the position, after reading Mr. Foster's painstaking examination and brilliant interpretation of what made Mrs. Stowe write as she did—and after having been led with gratitude to a re-reading of her fiction—of agreeing with almost everything he has to say about her success in putting herself and her sensitive reactions, both to her own conflicts and to the life around her, into her books so that she did become an index to what was happening to New England theological and social ideas during the latter part of the nineteenth century—of agreeing with all this, and yet still being forced by conscience (a treasured Presbyterian inheritance) to present a demurrer. The fact

of the matter seems to be that Mrs. Stowe was only in a very minor sense a literary artist. She felt strongly, she was a sensitive sufferer, she observed lovingly. She was successful in brief flights, in scenes, in anecdotes, in heart-clutching small dramatic situations, which is why her short stories seem to stand up better than her attempts at longer fiction. What she lacked finally was the shaping power of imagination, an ability to construct on a large plan, to create, as Henry James would have it, by a pattern of her own an extended and unified configuration of reality.

Yet we are grateful to Mr. Foster for having revealed Mrs. Stowe so expertly and her struggles for an answer to some of the problems which confused her because she was born to live sensitively in New England during the nineteenth century. She is significant, she is important, she is representative, she is a fascinatingly likable woman—knowing her is good for all of us, particularly for those of us who would search the past for springs which feed the present. The historian of American thought will welcome her and find much guidance in this book. If Mr. Foster makes claims of literary excellence which seem extravagant, we suspect it is because he likes her too. But liking Mrs. Stowe, or liking Uncle Tom, or liking Sam Lawson is not enough. Each has become something of a myth—like Rip Van Winkle, Parson Weems, or George Frisbie Babbitt—who lives apart and detached from the larger whole of which they were part. Mr. Foster has documented and made plausible the myth which is Mrs. Stowe. Her failure to respond completely as an artist to the tensions within and around her can certainly not be blamed on him; nor can they, except that she was not what she was not, be blamed on her. Perhaps we shall blame them on her time. But the best contribution of *The Rungless Ladder* is to suggest that, for the artist, aspiration alone does not suffice, that for him the ladder must have rungs, so that the climbing, though strenuous, is secure.

Lewis Leary

Columbia University

German Protestants Face the Social Question. Vol. I, *The Conservative Phase, 1815-1871.* By William O. Shanahan. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954. xii, 434 pp. $6.75.

In recent years the question of the de-Christianization of West-European societies has been frequently raised, usually in a polemical and

superficial manner. The present volume is therefore highly welcome. William O. Shanahan, formerly of the Columbia University History Department and now Professor of History at Notre Dame, has written a thorough and scholarly study of the early phases in the alienation of the industrialized and urban masses from the Church. The first part of his study, published under the auspices of the Committee on International Relations of the University of Notre Dame, covers the slow and tortuous development of Protestant social thought and action in Germany, from the War of Liberation to the establishment of the Second Empire. A second volume, analyzing the Protestant response to the social question in the following decades until the advent of National Socialism, has been announced.

The author has succeeded admirably in relating the treatment of his subject to the mainstreams of German political, intellectual and theological history. The factors which precluded a realistic social apostolate of German Protestants in an era of rapid and often turbulent industrialization are well presented. The naïveté of romantic conservatism, dependent on static corporate concepts of society, dominated the social thought of orthodox Protestants for decades. Discussion of the social question never escaped the limitations of theoretical argument and moralistic admonition. Theological as well as political liberals, too, failed to promulgate a consistent and applicable social program, because they subscribed to the dogmatic optimism of unlimited cultural and economic progress. The growing masses of industrial labor, however, were unwilling to wait indefinitely for the elimination of acute social evils by the free market. They resented even more the suggestion of orthodox churchmen and ultra-conservative Junkers that their economic distress could be ascribed to two causes, the corruption of an ideal monarchic-agricultural society and the moral-religious apostasy of the proletariat. Thus they embraced Marxism with rising fervor and favored a militantly atheistic socialism over both the religiously indifferent Lassallean socialism and the isolated social-religious chiliasts.

The confessional and theological particularism of the established Protestant churches prevented the emergence of a unified social outlook. The individual Protestant layman was seemingly free to interpret his social responsibility in accordance with the requirements of individual conscience. Hence the complex content of secular culture strongly influenced the response of individual Protestants to social and social-

political problems. Despite this formal freedom, the social outlook and policies of political conservatism seemed to have the sanction and endorsement of the Protestant churches: "Political conservatives, by virtue of their devotion to religion, and their recognition of its public functions, became the customary guardians of the Protestant social outlook."

The author systematically describes the development of conservative social thought and notes the weakness of concrete ameliorative and prophylactic action—limited to the paternalistic activities of a few Protestant entrepreneurs (Carl Ferdinand Stumm), to the regional "Christian Factories" of Gustav Werner, originally disowned by the Established Church, and to the Protestant endorsement of child labor and Sunday labor legislation. In the absence of other social activities of the Church, its endeavors in the field of individual charity are described in detail. The curious blend of ecumenic élan, evangelistic fervor, moral sincerity, and blindness to social and ideological realities which motivated the establishment and the subsequent activities of the *Innere Mission* is aptly analyzed, and Shanahan's critical remarks about recent "apologetic" interpretations of Johann Heinrich Wichern's social thought are to the point.

The description of the conservative roots of the Evangelical Social Movement is painstaking and objective, although it is here that the publication of the whole study in two separate volumes becomes cumbersome, especially for the American reader. The author's interpretation is often charitable to the weaknesses of the social outlooks of German Protestantism and Prussian conservatism. It draws upon excellent knowledge of German and especially Prussian "political" history. The presentation is sometimes burdened by the minutiae of conservative journalism and the complicated personal relations between the conservative theoreticians (C. L. von Haller, J. Stahl), politicians (the Gerlach brothers, the Pomeranian pietists, Bismarck, etc.) and journalists, such as Hermann Wagener. However, as a result of this presentation, the internal fragility of the fateful orthodox conservative alliance emerges conspicuously, and the loss of communication between the upper strata of German society, not excepting the Protestant clergy, and the disenchanted masses of industrial labor becomes intelligible. Even in contemporary Germany, despite a conspicuous revision of the social policies of the Protestant churches, the relationship between church and workers suffers from the consequences of this alienation.

In the main, the study relies on well-known material. It integrates the available sources in an admirably objective and readable fashion, and can be thus recommended as a genuine contribution toward the understanding of an intricate and frequently oversimplified problem. It is only in the area of the social-*psychological* history of the emerging labor force that the author inclines toward generalizations which are not substantiated by his own presentation of the data.

It is unfortunate that the usually conscientious analysis is marred, once or twice, by somewhat obscure asides, for example:

> Why the proletariat succumbed to the Social Democratic spell should not be difficult to understand. Men become separated from their spiritual tradition more easily than most conservatives imagine. Adam's Fall left mankind with a taste for inconsistency that has repeatedly jeopardized the continuities of its history. The modern crisis of religion is the most serious of these historical discontinuities.

THOMAS LUCKMANN

New School for Social Research

The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812-1848. By JOHN R. BODO. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. xiv, 291 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Bodo has probed into many fascinating questions in this useful study. His focus has been chiefly on the educated ministry of New England and the middle states. Their theology was Calvinistic; they were mainly in the Congregational, Presbyterian, and Reformed denominations, though some were in (low-church) Episcopal, Methodist and Baptist pulpits. The uneducated frontier preachers and revivalists, however, are specifically excluded from consideration. The well-trained clergymen whose positions on public issues are here analyzed were "anchored firmly in their belief in the universal sovereignty of God and in His particular concern for the United States"; they had a definite pattern for America to which they wanted the nation to conform. This pattern is labelled "theocratic," and those who favored it are throughout the book called "theocrats"—the term appears in the titles of every one of the book's nine chapters. It was this "theocratic pattern" which gave to these men both an ideal of what America should be like and also a strategy of action for making the dream come true. They hoped to realize their shining goal by utilizing the technique of the voluntary

society—indeed, they founded many national, undenominational voluntary associations such as the American Bible Society and the American Colonization Society.

The bulk of the book is a topical examination of the attitude taken by this segment of the Protestant clergy with respect to a number of major national issues. Their aims for the state, their distrust of Catholicism, their solutions for the Indian problem (they were not of one mind on this), their answer to the Negro question (here they were of one mind, believing in colonization and not abolition), their views on western expansion, and their position with respect to America's role in the world are explored. A great many intriguing quotations and some penetrating insights give the work a measure of solidity and interest. Typical of the first-hand acquaintance with the sources is the chapter on "The Theocrats and the Indian Problem," with its presentation of the "master plan" of Jedediah Morse, its treatment of the unforgettable story of Elias Boudinot, and its comparison of the views of realist Isaac McCoy and idealist Jeremiah Evarts.

It seems to me unfortunate that the author decided to use the term "theocrat" for the group he has studied. If the word is used with any precision, it simply does not apply to the subjects of this work. They did not believe in a form of government in which God was recognized as supreme *civil* ruler, his laws being administered by ecclesiastical authorities. Indeed, most of them believed (or in this period came to believe) in the separation of church and state, many (e.g., the "Baptist theocrats") aggressively so! Samuel Hopkins is named as one of the major contributors to the pattern labelled "theocratic," yet examination of Hopkins' main systematic work, the two-volume *System of Doctrines,* will show but one main paragraph on the Christian and civil government, and that not at all theocratic. To be sure, the men of whom Dr. Bodo writes clearly did have the idea of a higher law and a divine pattern to which America should conform, and their considerable energies were spent in attempting to effect this, but I think another term, rather than the emotionally-loaded "theocrat" would better describe them, for their approach was basically persuasive and quite in conformity with democratic forms of government.

Furthermore, the educated, Calvinistic clergy of this study were not the only ones with a pattern for America in mind. The topical organization of the work has some decided advantages, but it has the disadvan-

tage of obscuring some of the dynamic developments within American Protestantism between the years 1812 and 1848. Indeed, the very group here studied was so profoundly affected by such trends that I suspect its history, were it chronologically considered, would appear quite different after 1830 from what it was before. The chapter on "The Theocrats and the Negro Problem" is indeed periodized: 1812-1831, 1831-1848. Some such periodization might well have been applied to the entire study. Early in his work the author makes it clear that Charles Grandison Finney is outside his concern, for Finney was rejected by the theocrats. Yet after 1830 a somewhat sobered Finney, a Finney now won to co-operation with the Tappan benevolent empire, a Finney who had brought into synthesis aspects of the somewhat restrained revivalism of the east with the more volcanic western form—such a Finney "invaded" the circles of the eastern educated clergy, and influenced not a few of them. Thus a man like Lyman Beecher, who had earlier rejected Finney, came to co-operate with him in the 1830's (cf. W. R. Cross, *The Burned-over District*). It is significant that Beecher is a central figure both in this book of Bodo's and also in Charles C. Cole's recently-published *The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists 1826-1860*. The point is that the proponents of revivalist Protestantism of the "new measures" type took over the voluntary societies and gave them new power. They extended them into a whole array of social reform causes —causes which the "theocrats" were hesitant to undertake. The revivalistic Protestants also had a pattern for America, and they strove to shape America after what they believed to be God's will by the full exploitation of the revival and the reform crusade that was made in its image. It may be that the group about which Dr. Bodo has supplied us with so much useful information was especially important in the period 1812-1830, and after that time, as the other group increased, it decreased and lost its homogeneity. Indeed, when discussing the attitude of the "theocrats" to the Mexican War, the author notes that the Congregationalists were opposed to it, but declares that "surprisingly enough, however, the theocrats in the other major denominations either remained silent or upheld the war effort" (p. 219); what this may reflect is that the group had ceased to be an entity easily identifiable by that time.

Such useful monographs as this that probe the areas of relationship between the churches and the life of the nation will greatly contribute

to our understanding of both. The value of this particular study is rounded off by a good bibliography and a careful index.

ROBERT T. HANDY

Union Theological Seminary

Religion as Man's Protest against the Meaninglessness of Events. By MARTIN P. NILSSON. (Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund, 1953-1954, II.) Lund: C. W. K. Geurup, 1954. 67 pp.

This meaty brochure seems to carry in its title a thesis as to the nature of religion. But Professor Nilsson deprecates the suggestion that he is defining religion; he is pointing out a motivating factor in its origin and development. He is carrying out a proposition made without elaboration at the close of his major work, *History of Greek Religion.* He there stated that this thesis was akin to Höffding's view that religion is a belief in the conservation of values. But Nilsson proposes to specify what Höffding leaves indefinite: what values are conserved? And in point of fact—if I may now interpret what Nilsson seems to do—he gives religion the function not so much of conserving existing values as that of adding value, or supplementing the empirical picture so that value emerges where existence appears devoid of it: religion "protests against the meaninglessness and tries to find a meaning in them (in life and events), viz., to interpret them as having meaning," though, as he adds, there are some religions—and as it turns out, they are the religions of India with which the brochure closes—in which, finding life and events actually meaningless, the way of salvation is not supplement nor reinterpretation nor conservation, but release.

But whether religion tries to cure the void of meaning or accepts it and facilitates escape, its datum is meaninglessness, and the reaction thereto is man's doing, beginning with his protest, and running through a wide gamut of remedial devices, an historical review of which, as a phenomenological study, constitutes the substance of the essay.

The range of this study is wide: there are few aspects of the present stage of anthropology of the beginnings of religion that are not called to witness on the thesis of the essay, sometimes as pure commonplace and often with an enlivening originality of interpretation. But the study continues into the field of ethnic cultus and the developed religions of the present world, and in the course of this advancing enquiry the au-

thor reveals—shall I say a second purpose, or an inclusive purpose of his study? He holds, as against the tendency to decry a meaningful evolution in the history of religion, that "there is an evolution in religion—look at Greek or Israelitic religion—but it is meaningful. The purpose of my paper is to prove this" (p. 52). Would it be fair to interpret this as a second thesis, namely, that there is an increasingly meaningful reaction to the meaningless? If so, the study raises two questions. First, in what sense is an empirical judgment of meaninglessness an incentive to historical religion? Second, in what sense does this reaction become increasingly meaningful?

Dr. Nilsson points out that meaninglessness is of two sorts, that of the particular event and that of the inanimate necessity of causation. The former, man has always recognized as accident, the contingency of fortune, the purpose-crossing intrusion of death. The latter, inanimate necessity, is late in coming to recognition, since it implies a conception of law divorced from purpose. The recognition of mechanical causation is indeed universal, for without it there would be no learning from experience; but the recognition of universal causation is far from universal. If it were not for astrology, on which subject Dr. Nilsson rightly and enlighteningly expands, one might call this conception peculiarly modern: the purposeless universe is the definitive consequence of the campaign against final causes in nature, and could not antecede the era of Descartes, Bacon, and Spinoza.

Indeed, my main query regarding the author's first thesis is whether "meaninglessness" is the right name for what he is discussing as the object of protest. It is not an accurate synonym for the ancient "problem of evil." Death, which is the theme of Dr. Nilsson's first chapter, is definitely not meaningless to the human being of any age: its immediate impact is that of an evil, a breach of meaningful continuities of purpose, a highly significant negation. In its total relation to human destiny, death has a positive value which has not escaped thoughtful recognition, even in early times. Man has always held a protest against death—"protest" I think is the right word, a beginning of enquiry. I have been inclined to use the word "resentment," as of an infringed right, and to see in this resentment an implied acknowledgment of a purposive over-rule in the cosmos ("Meaning of God," pp. 145f.). The resentment is levelled partly against the breaking-off involved in death, but chiefly against its appar-

ent meaning of closure, finality. I am inclined to think that the sense of meaninglessness is, properly speaking, a disease of advanced sophistication, such as could hardly animate the origins of religion.

There is a fragment of the unmeaning, however, that has been always present to reflective consciousness, namely, that of the unexpected particular, the incalculable, the decisive total configuration within which our purposes work out their goals. This may be to our advantage as well as against us: it is "Fortune"—a great deity or half-deity under some name or other in any well-developed pantheon. But a whimsical goddess, who may play with the outcome of the best-laid plans of mouse or man, has still her own fancies to achieve: fortune is not truly meaningless if a *daimon* is in charge—it becomes truly meaningless only in an insensate procession of particulars. This is definitely the shape in which contemporary man faces his universe, as described by his science: it is his problem, and the great merit of Dr. Nilsson's essay is that he has identified that problem, and shown its relation to the religious thought of the world.

What, then, of what I have called his second thesis, that religion has evolved, in the sense of offering a more meaningful solution of the apparently meaningless?

Here, I confess I am deeply puzzled over the outcome of Dr. Nilsson's essay. He becomes most enthusiastic over the message of the Jewish prophets, who found a meaning in the calamities of Israel, as "the punishment with which Yahwey afflicts and destroys the people because of its sins" (p. 55): they found "a continuous meaning in the historical events," and in the hopes for the future. "Such a vigorous, enduring, and in its issue so successful a protest against the meaninglessness of events . . . is not to be found elsewhere in human history" (p. 59). The Christian gets on with unconditional submission to the will of God; but Christianity "has still to grapple with materialism" (p. 61).

If the final place in a book is reserved for the conclusion, it is certainly, in this book, not reserved for triumph. "The crowning end is Buddhism: Life is a chain of evils and the evils are continued, each existence producing new existencies by causal necessity. The only escape is Nirvana." And, as for Nirvana, the author has already said, "In fact this too is meaningless" (p. 68).

Dr. Nilsson is here speaking of classic Buddhism as expounded by

western scholars. He is not speaking of the Buddhism which has long lived in modern China and Japan as a doctrine of the Buddha-principle in each human being, which is to be realized by each one, who in so doing will find the significance of his life in this world. Nor is he speaking of the Buddhism which, making up its old quarrel with Hinduism, is welcomed by the ranking Hindu of Calcutta, Pandit N. N. Das Gupta, president of the Sanskrit College, on the occasion of the opening of the new Buddhist temple at Sarnath in 1931, as a token of the "Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India" and so of all Asia; and which is now, with Hinduism, putting out a new claim to interpret to Indians their autonomous national consciousness. Contemporary Buddhism, like the Buddha, has put aside the allurement of Nirvana, for the sake of a life in this world, lifted out of meaninglessness by the active principles of compassion and spiritual ambition.

Even in classic Buddhism, we must include with the Noble Fourfold-Truths, and the Noble Eightfold-Path, the Noble Inconsistency whereby Buddha himself put away Nirvana, nominally the highest good, for the sake of a higher good, Nirvana plus a Life of Teaching. And the contemporary versions of all religions coming out of India are thus brought nearer to the conception of a life-meaning containing, as its kernel, the Confucian picture of a *Ming* or Heavenly Mandate, or the Christian picture of a Kingdom of God to which the poorest in endowment can contribute, in full satisfaction of his will to power.

And as for materialism, the mentality which worked out the appalling spectre of the purposeless universe, will in time recall that there was a purpose in creating this image of perfect lawfulness, namely, the purpose of mastering Nature by first obeying her, since only a purposeless causal nexus can be freely and without compunction exploited by the thinking will.

One of the most impressive passages in this rich compendium of reflections on the history of religion in its encounter with the meaningless is the passage in which Dr. Nilsson sets against each other two principles "equally essential to man, causation and free will," remarking that philosophy "has not been able to overcome the clash" between them (p. 4). He cites a prominent Swedish mathematician, C. W. Oseen, who has committed himself to the belief that science "will never contradict the belief in the freedom of the will," and suggests that future generations may see the solution. There is indeed a mathematical problem of

uniting freedom and causality: it has, I believe, been solved. But from the standpoint of experience, the solution is implied in the inescapable purpose of the purpose-free segment of the universe. If we add that purpose is both free and creative, and that creation is always attended with suffering, then creation, the highest good, must include suffering. The *will to create through suffering* provides a concept of the good in which at least Christianity and recent Buddhism tend to converge. This understood, Dr. Nilsson is sustained in his thesis that the evolution of religion has been significant.

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

Madison, N. H.

A Theology of the Living Church. By L. HAROLD DE WOLF. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. 383 pp. $5.00.

This reviewer expects to use Professor De Wolf's book as text for a regular spring course to be called Basic Christian Thought. In overall perspective Professor De Wolf's book is usable either for college teaching in the field of the Christian religion on junior or senior level, or as a general introduction to theology in divinity school. The completeness of this study, both in scope and depth, is admirable. Setting forth the great themes of Christian Thought or theology, such as the relation of reason to faith, evidences for the existence of God, the authority of the Bible in the light of modern research, the Christian conception of God and man, the person and work of Christ, the idea of the Kingdom of God, the Church, sacraments, and prayer—De Wolf's book is magnificently ordered and finished, as much as one volume on these high themes could be. (A possible defect in scope is mentioned below.)

Without grinding any special theological or philosophical axe, his discussion proceeds in the spirit of tolerance and caution, yet enthusiastic affirmations appear wherever and whenever main evidences seem to call for positive conclusion. This work is in the tone of the finest liberal writing. Rationally penetrating, both historically and philosophically, it leaves no disturbing dichotomy between "faith" and "reason." By no means, however, an attempt to reduce Christianity to a system of logical syllogisms, it rounds out the reasonableness of the Christian world view in broad coherent measures, letting rational faith itself where necessary be an element in the arc of understanding. On the whole, this book is a "systematic" development, yet one of its most helpful features is a thor-

ough discussion of biblical material where relevant to the main themes.

De Wolf's study, of course, raises problems as any good book should. I suggest three, more or less at random, for illustration, the first of which is technical rather than critical in nature. His discussion in the two chapters on belief in God (Chapters 5 and 6), while outlining the more significant arguments, seems too brief. They would present, however, an admirable basis for expansion in classroom work. If the book is ever revised, this section might be enlarged.

Second, in the section entitled "Some Truths Regarding the Divine Judgment," this reviewer was puzzled by what the author may have meant by the following statement: "The divine judgment is the last judgment in the sense that it is *final.* All others are tentative, conditional, uncertain. God's judgment is absolute, unconditional and truth-determining, . . . we live according to the principles which He has decreed." By God's judgment as "absolute, unconditional and truth-determining" does the author indicate a Calvinistic or Islamic type of theology that looks to the divine will as the arbitrary absolute behind all "truth" and "being," itself "above" or not responsible to the laws of truth and being? Such theological irrationalism would be contrary to the author's own philosophical heritage in personalistic idealism, which has believed that "truth" is at least one intimate expression of the very thought, will, and life of God himself. Things are not true because God wills them, but God wills them because they are true.

Third, and this more in approbation than criticism, De Wolf sets forth what may be called *the fellowship interpretation of agape* (pp. 301-2). He writes:

> Love is the longing for and delight in that fellowship in which the treasurers of God's own life, "the unsearchable riches of Christ," are shared. . . . In the motivation of true friendship there is neither desire to exploit the friend for the sake of self nor the desire simply to advance the individual well-being of the other alone. There is desire for the transcending of the "I" and "thou" in the "we" of shared experience.

This is another way to state the general position of philosophical and theological personalism on agape.[1] It is contrary to the idea that agape implicitly cancels and disregards "self."[2] A minor clarification,

1. E.g., Albert C. Knudson, in *Basic Issues in Christian Thought* (Nashville, 1950), pp. 185 f.

2. E.g., Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York, 1950), pp. 92 f.

in the opinion of this reviewer, would be to say that De Wolf here formulates the completed or perfected state or result of agape in the "we" which transcends the "I" and the "thou." But agape in its role of initiative motive must put the "thou" ahead of the "I," in the sense of the "I" as serving the "thou" (this obviously does not cancel the "I," for how can the interests of the "thou" be served unless there is an "I" which serves?). We must, of course, acknowledge the difficulty in clarifying all subtleties as one struggles with the concept of philia, or mutual love, on its higher legitimate plane in relation to the full New Testament agape.

Third, this reviewer finds some ambiguity with the following paragraph, with which De Wolf concludes his discussion of agape.

> It would be self-contradictory to demand that every person consider himself less than any other person. But it is plain truth that every person is less than the divine-human community and to put that truth into the whole-commitment of faith is to discover what life can be. Even God Himself, in all His power and holiness, so far transcending our imaginations, is yet less than the kingdom which includes Him and also all with whom He is permitted to share His glory. . . .

Relative to this statement, the question may be asked, How can God be "less" than anything? Is this a quantitative "less" or a qualitative "less"? That God would be quantitatively less seems a most extraordinary comparison. On the other hand, if the kingdom represents the highest and the best, how could God be less than that? Analogous to the problem of quantity just mentioned, it would be absurd to say that God is less than the highest quality! Is the upshot of De Wolf's dilemma at this place a too limited, finite, or even "anthropomorphic" conception of God (indeed contrast his chapter on "The Absolute Being of God")? The idea of God as Personal Being would not imply that His kingdom is something other than Himself. But, like the problem of truth discussed above, God's kingdom in its completed sense would be an expression of His own very life and will. The depth of God's own personal life would not be in any degree subordinate to the kingdom (as the above quotation suggests) but would be, indeed, that most transcendent focus and light from which is derived the logical and psychological reality of the kingdom as moral experience to its citizens.

DOUGLAS STRATON

Colorado College

The Origins and History of Consciousness. By Erich Neumann. With a foreword by C. G. Jung. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xxiv, 493 pp. $5.00.

In the opinion of this reviewer the title of this interesting book should have been: "The Development of Ego Consciousness in Mediterranean Cultures." It describes the psychological process in which the individual personality differentiates itself from the world as an autonomous complex. The author introduces the term "centroversion" for this consciousness which obviously is running in the opposite direction to the primitive consciousness called *participation mystique.* The observations of anthropologists and psychiatrists indicate that the perceptions in the latter state may be at least as "conscious" as in the state of mental health Western style. In fact, the self-observations of Joanna Field (*A Life of One's Own.* Pelican Books, 1952) are suggestive of the generally unacknowledged positive part *participation mystique* plays in the emotional balance of Western man.

Neumann devotes slightly more than half of the book to the myths in which man all over the world has symbolized the conflict between possession by the world and individuation. The Mediterranean, in particular the Egyptian, mythology is treated more thoroughly than other cultural spheres, but from the latter enough illustrations are given to make the general significance of the author's thesis plausible. It appears as another version of the "monomyth" which Joseph Campbell published under the title, *The Hero with the Thousand Faces* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1949) simultaneously with the original German edition of the present book.

Neumann starts his story with the universal symbol of the serpent which forms a circle by eating its own tail, called uroboros in alchemy. It represents the most undifferentiated level of existence, which corresponds in biology to the primitive level of life on which the alimentary process dominates and new entities are mere multiples obtained by cell division. Sexual differentiation developed very gradually in the course of evolution as part of the evolution of complex and individualized organisms. Mythology expresses this process in various myths of creation which are parthenogenetic or sometimes "spermatogenetic" and in which the child is apt to be reabsorbed by the parent. Eventually the child, the symbol of the individualized ego, acquires

strength, and the one cosmic, non-sexual parent is separated into two sexes, heaven and earth, the two "World Parents." The uroboric character of the overweening power of one parent, however, persists for a long time, usually in form of maternal predominance. This phase is reflected in matriarchal cultures, in which fertility is ensured by ritual sacrifices of the king or of young males, symbolizing the death of the mortal lover of the goddess, e.g., the Adonis myth. Later the male element gains strength and asserts itself against the female. This is expressed in the myths of the hero who slays the dragon as the negative female aspect of the uroboros. Once the patriarchal stage is reached, the hero becomes the slayer of the father. Regarding this phase of cultural development, Neumann takes issue with Freud's interpretation of the Oedipus myth as a symbol of sexual rivalry between father and son. According to Neumann, the significant feature is not an infantile conflict, but the revolt of the creative individual against the traditionalism of the collective father generation. The self-perpetuating, uncreative character of the father archetype represents the negative male aspect of the androgynous uroboros, the female aspect of which was encountered as the dragon. Neumann considers the preceding interpretation of the Oedipus myth a "resounding defeat for psychoanalytical theory" (p. 184), although in general he indicates his awareness of the fact that personal and transpersonal elements determine the personality simultaneously, even though in individually varying proportion.

The last stage of the myth is the "transformation" of the hero. Now his exploits as symbols of physical creation become stages of spiritual transformation. The mystery religions celebrate it as "mortification of lower masculinity in the interest of the higher" (p. 253), and the head becomes the "higher" phallus (p. 231), symbolizing the ultimate goal of the hero becoming pure spirit and one with the divine father. This development is exemplified in great detail by the myth of Horus and Osiris and is pointed out in many religions belonging to the Mediterranean cultures. There is no material in this book which indicates that, in the religions of the Far East, the relationship between the individual and God has quite the same character as far as the struggle for spiritualization of the body is concerned. The different role of the body and of historical time in non-Mediterranean consciousness should have received some attention in a book claiming to discuss the history of

consciousness in general. Neumann shows in many examples that the religions of mankind have many experiences in common, but he beclouds the merits of his account by parochial generalizations. This criticism applies particularly to the last part of the book, in which the myth of the hero is treated as a symbolic description of the psychological stages in the development of personality. Here the self is identified with the uroboros which, in sublimated form, becomes integrated by ego consciousness:

> Hence the "perfect" figure of the uroboros, standing as it does at the center of the unconscious world of the primitive and the child, is simultaneously the central symbol of the second half of life and the nucleus of the developmental trend we have called self-formation or centroversion. The symbol of the circular mandala stands at the beginning as at the end. In the beginning it takes the mythological form of paradise; in the end, of the Heavenly Jerusalem (pp. 36 f.).

Contrary to the factual mythological part, the detailed applications to modern individual psychology are highly speculative and repetitious. Actually the basic concepts are all made evident in the first half of the book.

In the end the author declares himself, in Jungian language, for the same humanism which Erich Fromm's *Man for Himself* proposed in Freudian language. He hopes for a development of mankind in which "the danger of recurrent invasions from the unconscious will be averted. A future humanity will . . . realize its very self, whose coming to birth will finally vanquish and cast out that old serpent, the primordial uroboric dragon" (p. 418). Many will share the skepticism of this reviewer whether such a goal is possible or even desirable. It seems to deny the positive aspects of the uroboros of which the book has given such rich account.

GOTTHARD BOOTH, M.D.

New York City

Psychotherapy and the Christian Message. By ALBERT C. OUTLER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. $3.50.

This is the attempt of a theologian who has long been interested in psychotherapy to formulate the issues between that discipline and Christianity, and to suggest the terms of resolution. The issues are

twofold: psychological and philosophical. In general, Christianity's leaders have much to learn from the clinical findings of the psychotherapists, while the latter stand to benefit by the world-view of Christianity. Psychotherapy can become a more effective healing art by admitting "the Christian doctrines of God and men as the referential 'frame' of its empirical work," Outler writes. And Christianity can relate the love of God to men in a more meaningful way if it acknowledges "the direction and counsel of scientific psychotherapy" (p. 245).

Unhappily, such a synthesis of "the practical wisdom of psychotherapy and the Christian wisdom about life and destiny" (p. 245) is blocked by Christian teachers who assume that they know men's problems and the answers to them without recourse to psychotherapeutic data, and by clinicians who imagine that the only mature and rational outlook on life for themselves and for their patients is naturalistic humanism. Outler rightly questions both assumptions.

Less space is devoted to psychological problems than to philosophical ones. Indeed, there do not seem to be many issues of the psychological type separating Christian faith and psychotherapy. The main difficulty is the pride of Christians who will not deepen their understanding of man by the appropriation of clinical insights. None of the insights are discussed at length, but one or more are mentioned in each of the six chapters, and nine are discussed in Chapter One. Among these are the respect for persons which characterizes the therapeutic approach, psychotherapy's awareness and acceptance of biological vectors in human life, and its recognition of the significance of irrational behavior. The list in the first chapter is impressive and important, even though it has been presented in one way or another many times.

Most of the book is devoted to philosophical problems. Five are discussed, four of them stemming from the fundamental one; namely, the radical incompatibility of Christian theism and naturalistic humanism, the philosophy of most therapists, Erich Fromm being the contemporary example most often cited by Outler. Fromm's idea that man is his own end is assumed to be the heart of his and psychotherapy's wisdom about ultimates. Of course, such a view runs counter to Christian conviction, and Outler proceeds to argue against it. He points out that such a world-view is, after all, a faith, the purposelessness of the natural power(s) beyond man being as incapable of scientific demonstration as the existence of the willing God. He argues

that a theistic philosophy is actually a more reasonable option than a naturalistic one, if doctors like Fromm would only examine the two philosophies as philosophies. And he contends that this philosophical bias of the therapists leads not only to rationally unsatisfying conclusions but to psychologically destructive attitudes; these constitute the four subordinate issues treated in the four main chapters of the book. Just to the extent that naturalistic humanism dominates the mind of therapist and patient: (1) the sense of the uniqueness and ultimately the transcendent importance of the individual is lost, (2) superficial estimates of man's quandries (sinfulness) are made, (3) autonomous styles of life are embraced, and (4) ethical systems which are governed by no objective or eternal principles are adopted.

The seriousness of these charges alone should be enough to provoke wide reading. Unfortunately, Outler depends solely upon reason (and repetition) to substantiate them. Even though they lend themselves to clinical observation, no cases are cited. It is argued, for example, that the psychotherapist's ideal of men moved by spontaneous love for truth and justice is humanly impossible. Such virtue can develop only to the extent that man relies upon God. This may stand to reason as far as Outler is concerned; it is rationally consistent with his presuppositions. But therapists have grown accustomed to looking for empirical evidence. Under certain conditions, they see or think they see progress toward the impossible. It would be meaningful to relate such phenomena with which the clinician is familiar to the work of the Holy Spirit with Whom he may be on more familiar terms than he realizes. But apparently Outler's theological position prevents stress on the immanence of God.

The adequacy of Christianity as a frame of reference in contrast to a secular one can, of course, be argued on philosophical grounds alone, but if so, cogency depends upon the continual translation of terms. And this, in turn, requires a realm of experience common to the disputing parties. Outler's success as a translator of the Christian message is not great. To take one illustration, what will it mean to clinicians, largely untrained in philosophy and theology, to be told that their own self-knowledge and their patients' cannot be profound until it is triadic? "No interpersonal relation is deeply understood until it is recognized as *triadic:* we know ourselves and others through our knowledge

of God's knowledge of us and His purpose to fulfill in us His design for our living which we have so disordered" (p. 140).

The basic difficulty with Outler's treatment of the issues common to Christianity and psychotherapy is that he has located the problem in the clash of formal philosophies. He has done this job well, developing in detail the various aspects of formal atheism and relativism in the philosophic statements of the psychotherapists. This is admittedly a difficult job because, for the most part, they deal only incidentally and sometimes quite uncritically with the philosophical aspects of their discipline. But the formal philosophy of naturalistic humanism to which these men subscribe is not necessarily the most adequate expression of the ontological and metaphysical dimensions of their clinical experience. Outler points this out a number of times, and each time goes back to the attack on naturalistic humanism as such. He does not go on to find and explore the realm of experience common to clinicians and Christians, namely, the experience of alienation through pride and, to varying degrees, reconciliation through grace. The philosophical issues for psychotherapists stem from conflicting interpretations of the problem of sin and the power of grace as these phenomena appear in their own experience as therapists. Christian faith might be made meaningful and convincing to them if it could be shown to be the most cogent interpretation of the ground of clinical events, and the faith most consistent with clinical aspirations. Outler rather stresses the discontinuities between clinical experience and the realities of the Christian faith. At one point he declares that "human love remains forever human" (p. 230), meaning that it cannot be regarded as a clue to the nature of divine love. There is here no hope for a synthesis of Christian faith and psychotherapeutic insight based upon experience: psychotherapy disclosing new means and forms of grace (from which Christianity can learn new lessons in regard to the meaning of divine and human love); Christianity exploring and expressing the ultimate reaches of this grace. If this is the case, it is difficult to find any meaning in Outler's hope for a "synthesis." What he calls for is an "exchange": Christianity swapping some of its outmoded psychological views for scientific ones, and psychotherapy rejecting secular philosophy in favor of Christian faith. Meanwhile, the need continues for a theology of clinical experience.

ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

Vassar College

Jaspers' Metaphysics. Based on Karl Jaspers' *Philosophie (Metaphysik).* By Adolph Lichtigfeld. With a Foreword by Karl Jaspers. London: Colibri Press Ltd., 1954. xviii, 120 pp. 10*s*.6*d*.

That Karl Jaspers is close to the spirit of Kant and has gone beyond him, as Dr. Lichtigfeld says in his historical introduction, is certainly true. But Lichtigfeld is certainly not justified in claiming that *only* Jaspers has found an adequate response to the spiritually new situation of our times. We are told by the author of this little volume that its object is "to provide a better understanding of Jaspers' original achievement in the sphere of modern philosophy." Yet, except for the Introduction, it can hardly be said to *provide* such an understanding, but only to give us one more basis for it; for one discovers (not indeed from any explicit statement of the author's but through reference to Jaspers' *Philosophie*) that this book is actually nothing other than an almost literal, if condensed, translation of *Metaphysik,* the third volume of Jaspers' major philosophical work. It includes two sections of background material from the first two volumes, but it leaves out a large section of the first part of the *Metaphysik* and the whole of the second part, "The World of the Ciphers," including chapters on "Nature," "History," "Consciousness," "Man," and "Art," which might have been of greater value as illustrative material than a number of the sections which are included, such as those on Hegel and on the proofs of the existence of God. The heaviness and frequent awkwardness of the translation, combined with the abstruseness of Jaspers' metaphysical terminology, force one to doubt Jaspers' statement in the Foreword that this book will serve as a guide to those who do not themselves study his works. Even a reader familiar with Jaspers' works will have difficulty with such sentences as this: "The totally otherness of Transcendence has become for consciousness the empty limiting-thought of Being."

Jaspers' "philosophy of existence" resembles the philosophies of the Jewish existentialists Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber in its emphasis on communication, historicity, uniqueness, authentic selfhood, and response, but differs from them in its insistence on a Transcendence which man can never meet directly and which is always wholly other and absolutely distant, even when one reads its "ciphers" in historical existence. True existence, to Jaspers, is the relation of the self to other existential selves and to transcendence, a relation including freedom,

decision, and a Kierkegaardian leap from simple being-there to authentic existence. No objectification of the absolute is possible to Jaspers. Hence it remains open to freedom and depends on the spontaneous reaction of our moral nature to the limit-situations confronting us. These are not only the limits of human existence, such as death, but the paradoxes and antinomies of human thought (the many and the one, the finite and the infinite), which inevitably bring it to failure and, just in so doing, point to the reality of transcendent Being beyond all categories.

Jaspers' emphasis on the indirect and ambiguous revelation of Deity, coupled with his references to a "real Nothing" apart from Transcendence and to a "cipher of the devil" which is "as obvious as the one of the Godhead," inevitably leaves the reader with the question of how Jaspers can affirm in such an unqualified way Transcendence and eternity. Equally unsatisfactory, from a philosophical as well as religious point of view, is his rejection of daily prayer as "a questionable fixation which philosophy cannot tolerate," in favor of the constant doubt and anguish which he feels is demanded by the hidden nature of God.

Recognizing the reading of the cipher as a dialogue between man and Transcendence which demands man's co-operation and involvement and is essentially dependent upon his becoming an authentic self, Jaspers contrasts the freedom, possibility, historicity, and uniqueness of the cipher with the non-historical, immutable, objective, and universal nature of ontology. Yet he then goes on to a series of statements which are really ontology in a new guise, as shown by his rejection of any immediate or personal relation with God and his "demand for the Godhead as the true Transcendence." This hidden ontology of Transcendence betrays Jaspers into the very objectification of the absolute that he has ruled out. As the result of this objectification, the master of antinomies falls afoul of the fundamental antinomy whose tension is experienced in the lives of countless believing men—the conviction that one may have direct relationship with the Absolute and may address it as Thou without necessarily degrading it or reducing it to complete relatedness, and without blocking communication among men or laming man's independence—all of which Jaspers insists must take place if we do not "keep Transcendence pure in its hidden form and distance." But then he adds, in sublime contradiction (as if Godhead actually did communicate with man in a personal way), "God as Transcendent wants man to

be himself." Perhaps in the end it is not "philosophical illumination of existence" but a religious or mystical faith which leads Jaspers to his certainty that, although shipwreck and destruction are the inevitable outcome of human existence, our anguish passes into tranquillity because "in the consciousness of our failure" we "experience real Being."

MAURICE S. FRIEDMAN

Sarah Lawrence College

BOOK NOTES

Gayômart: Étude sur le syncretisme dans l'ancien Iran. By SVEN S. HARTMAN. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksell, 1953. 215, CIV pp.

Gayômart, the figure of the Iranian Primal Man, is at the center of a vast complex of problems extending from Indo-Iranian (and even Indo-European) origins to the Gnostic Anthropos (Hermetic, Mandean, Manichean, etc.), including here especially the "Son of Man" of the Judeo-Christian tradition. From this ensemble, Sven Hartman has selected for his doctoral dissertation but one well limited question, and he has produced an original work. How, when, and why, he asks, has this ancient figure of the Primordial Man (Yama or Manu) received the new name of *Gaya-maretan* ("mortal life," from which (in Pahlevi), Gayômart)?

This term is not found in the Gathas, but its two components appear, at some distance from each other, in Yasna 30, in strophe 4 (*gaya,* "life") and strophe 6 *(maretan,* "mortal"). The two words were coupled by a particular exegesis, and the new term imposed. Certain later passages of the Avesta, however, have preserved a trace of a personage, Gaya, which has been wrongly confused with him, even to the present time. Hartman shows that *Gaya* designates life, in so far as the element was pre-existent to the creation of the material world, and that *Gaya-maretan* is the incarnation of this element.

The question involves two corollaries, to which the author has accorded unequal attention: (1) To what development does this exegesis belong? (2) To what ancient name were the new words the successor? As to the first, Hartman unhesitatingly attributes the innovation to the Zervanite theology, but of this we know almost nothing, not even whether it existed before the time when Greco-Babylonian astrology prevailed in Iran! (See Zaehner's work, *Zurvan,* published in 1955 and reviewed by J. D.-G. in *The Journal of Near Eastern Studies.)* As for the second, Hartman advances several reasons for thinking that before being called Gayômart, the Primal Man bore the name of Mithra. These reasons, however, are not all valid, e.g., the reading *Mihr* which he proposes on the basis of certain manuscripts of the Bundahishn, in place of *Mashyak,* one of the twin divinities *sprung from* Gayômart, hardly suffices to support a scaffolding of conjectures concerning a tradition which, it must be admitted, eludes us. But the other reasons adduced do merit consideration, and one can add to them further the following: If it is true that the bull sacrifice was not, originally, the work of Ahriman, as the late Bundahishn has it, but the work of Mithra, as in the Mysteries, was it not in the capacity of the Primordial Man that Mithra immolated the Primordial Ox? (Cf. Pettazzoni, *I Misteri,* p. 258.)

The author must be praised for having proved himself, in his first book, to be an inquirer admirably prepared and capable of using the sources at first hand,

Arabic as well as Pahlevi (of which the text, often unpublished, and the translation fill two thirds of the volume). His book is difficult reading, it must be admitted, and will be of use to only a narrow circle of specialists. (I am not sure, after three attempts, of having understood, in the whole of chapter IV, what he means by "horizontal tradition" and "vertical traditions.") The person responsible for the French translation of the first part, and the correction of the second, does not deserve felicitations. Fortunately the author will be able, with a little more practice, to dispense with such collaboration.

J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN

Studies in Urdu Literature. By FAZL MAHMUD ASIRI. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1954. vi, 146, vii pp. Rs. 12.

The interest of the six studies printed in this volume is that they open up something of a world strangely unfamiliar to most of us, for Urdu is but little studied in this country and Urdu literature a world practically unknown. For this reason the first study, on the "Origin and Development of Urdu Literature," is perhaps for us the most important of them all, giving as it does a succinct account of how Urdu came into being as a "camp language," fought for recognition among Muslims as a literary language against Arabic, Persian, and Turkish on the one hand, and Hindi on the other, till from the fourteenth century onwards it has been the medium of cultural expression for no inconsiderable proportion of the population of Hindustan. The second study is devoted to the poet Mirza Ghalib, who died in 1869, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth to Shah Wali Allah, an eighteenth century writer who considered himself as the Renovator of Islam for his age, and whose work has long been the subject of Dr. Asiri's special research. The study of greatest popular interest, however, will be the third, on "The Vision of Iqbal." There is almost a cult of Iqbal in modern Pakistan, where he is acclaimed as a great philosopher and thinker and the pride of his country. As a poet in Persian and Urdu he may be great, for the charm of his verses is something we cannot judge, but as a thinker he seems to have been grossly overrated. The "Vision of Iqbal" here analyzed has, however, an independent value, for it is concerned with his *Javid Namah* in which, in imitation of Dante, he is taken by the Sufi Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi, as Dante was taken by Vergil, on a tour of the Other World, where he converses with Zurvan, Visvamitra, Buddha, Zoroaster, Hallaj, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and even Kitchener, who has become like Pharaoh a symbol of an unjust oppressor. Finally, like Muhammad on his Mi'raj, Iqbal even has words with the Almighty, Who excuses Himself for the current state of the world. All this is most instructive, but it is a pity that the author did not have someone correct the faulty English diction before it was printed.

A. J.

The New Testament in Cadenced Form. Designed by MORTON C. BRADLEY, JR. New York: Rinehart, 1954. ix, 676 pp. $5.00.

This is a beautifully printed edition of the New Testament in the King James Version, the "cadenced form" meaning simply that the natural divisions of the verses, usually the words found between commas, are printed in single lines. The result is a kind of blank verse, which will make it easier for some readers to recognize the structure of thought. But the scheme was there all along, ever since 1611, as most readers of that version have probably realized—certainly those who have read it aloud.

It is curious how much protest there has been against the "over-punctuation" of the King James Version, for that version was designed (whether or not actually "appointed") "to be read in churches," and the ordinary reader, clerical or lay, was aided in phrasing the lessons by the simple punctuation followed by the translators. If he happened to be reading in a large church, cathedral, or abbey, the brief phrases would escape collision by echo—a fatality in much modern public reading of the scriptures, which is too fast, and too "dramatic," the reader trying to "render" the scriptures, as if he had written them! Now comes an edition which will bring out the beauty of the old version, almost inevitably, and will also make people realize that ninety per cent of the Bible is either poetry or rhythmic prose.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Through the Gospels to Jesus. By DWIGHT M. BECK. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 453 pp. $3.75.

In his preface to this book, the author states that "its purpose is a general study of Jesus" intended as a "beginning textbook" for college use, and "for any reader who desires to know how scholars study the Gospels" and what the more recent results of such scholarship are. There are sections devoted to background material—history, geography, sources, etc. but the major part of the book consists of an exposition of the contents, first of the Synoptic Gospels and then of John. In his interpretation of the former, the author follows in a general way the arrangement to be found in *Gospel Parallels,* itself based on Huck's *Synopsis.*

Dr. Beck, who for many years has taught in the Department of Bible and Religion at Syracuse University, has not attempted, as either critic or theologian, to make an original contribution to the study of the Gospels. His purpose has rather been briefly to present, in simple form, to those who are beginning a study of the Gospels, traditional and not-so-traditional interpretations of various sayings, events and "confessions" recorded in the Gospels. On the more difficult passages the author takes no stand of his own; but his personal leaning toward a fairly conservative point of view is revealed in his acceptance of Papias' view that Mark's source was primarily if not 100 per cent, Peter's reminiscences, and his taking at face value Mark's representation of

Jesus as predicting that his disciples would one day fast (Mark 2:20). The author has been little touched by *Formgeschichte*.

Frustrating to the scholar will be the scarcity of footnotes. The many interpreters whose exegesis is cited are mentioned only in lists of bibliographies and not in footnotes; and sources for many historical statements, some of which are at least questionable, are not to be found. Frustrating also to the beginning student, one would think, will be the absence of biblical references in the body of the text. Each chapter is prefaced by a list of passages to be discussed in the chapter, but only an exceptionally conscientious student will take the time to discover what passages of Scripture he is reading about.

The book could serve a useful purpose as a guide for the seeking, but it is the kind of book that can easily become a wheelchair for the blind. The teacher will be decisive.

BURTON H. THROCKMORTON, JR.

Otherworldliness and the New Testament. By AMOS N. WILDER. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 124 pp., $1.75.

This brief, but striking and significant book contains the four lectures delivered in 1954 on The John C. Shaffer Foundation at Yale University. The first lecture is concerned with a consideration of the principal contemporary indictment of Christianity—that it is other-worldly, having to do with a transcendent heavenly world or an inner private world, but not with mankind's real life in a real world. The author concedes that this charge only too truly applies to much modern Christianity, "liberal, orthodox and neo-orthodox," but insists that authentic Christianity, as the Bible sets it forth, is in close grips with the actualities of existence and is concerned with man's salvation not *from* life but within life and to richer life. The following three lectures deal with three selected themes: the "new" New Testament theology, the quest of the historical Jesus, and the meaning of the Resurrection—all with a view to showing the relevance, in a very realistic or down-to-earth sense, of the essential Christian doctrines and of the whole Christian theological enterprise.

Dr. Wilder is a gifted poet and critic of literature and art, as well as a theologian and New Testament scholar of great distinction, and his pages brilliantly reveal his wisdom and imaginative insight. The book closes with a powerful plea for the new freedom and creativeness as the Church seeks to meet the "living needs of the present and to make good its inherent claim upon the whole of life."

JOHN KNOX

Christology of the Later Fathers. Edited by EDWARD ROCHIE HARDY. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954. 400 pp. $5.00.

One may wonder why the Fathers of the fourth century are introduced as "the *later* Fathers." Were they not rather, in a certain sense, precisely *the*

Fathers, and the fourth century itself, in an eminent sense, *the* "Age of the Fathers"? In the present volume a judicious selection of texts is given, which would introduce the reader into the inner life of the Church, in its formative period. St. Athanasius is represented by his glorious *De Incarnatione;* St. Gregory of Nazianzus, by his *Theological Orations* and letters to Cledonius and Necrarius, concerning the Apollinarian issue; St. Gregory of Nyssa, by his *Answer to Ablabius* and his famous *Catechetical Oration,* both in the new and excellent translation by Dr. Cyril Richardson. In addition, a number of "documents illustrating the Christology of the Ecumenical Councils," well arranged, is given. The selection is not complete. One would regret that nothing of St. Basil has been included, even his remarkable *On the Holy Spirit.* Certainly, almost all the most important Patristic writings of the fourth century (except for the "minor Fathers," like Didymos or Amphilochius) have been available in English translation long since, e.g., in the renowned series of *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,* which is now being reprinted, and scholars would still prefer the original, even when it is not accessible in a good critical edition. Yet an average reader, including theological students and ministers, would hardly readily use the voluminous collections. He may restrict himself to the selection offered in the present volume and get an inadequate picture of the matter. But, of course, this is an inevitable danger of any "selection" or "anthology."

The Post-Chalcedonian period is covered in the selection scarcely at all. St. Maximus is not represented, nor is St. John of Damascus. There is no material to judge the final synthesis of the Greek Patristic thought on Christology. Unfortunately, St. Maximus is almost unknown in the English-reading theological circles, which seriously distorts the understanding of the Christological development of the Patristic Church. The introductory article of Dr. Hardy, "Faith in Christ, Theology and Creeds," is very helpful and stimulating. It is a pity, however, that the editor could not use the recent monumental symposium by Alois Grillmeier, S.J. and Heinrich Bacht, S.J., *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* (1951, 1953). Especially, the article of Fr. Grillmeier in the first volume of this impressive publication, "Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon" (pp. 5-202) could have given him some valuable suggestions in the interpretation of the proper Christological dispute around Ephesus and Chalcedon. The book is not mentioned in the bibliography at all. The book of L. Prestige, *God in the Patristic Thought,* should have been included in the General Bibliography (p. 39), although it is not on "Christology" in a narrow sense, but yet is an indispensable reference-book for any student of the fourth century theology. Prestige's other book, *Fathers and Heretics* (1940), is not referred to at all, though it contains suggestive chapters on Athanasius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Cyril. To bibliography on St. Athanasius, should have been added both Louis Bouyer, *L'Incarnation et l'Église—Corps du Christ dans la théologie de saint Athanase* (1943), and Regis Bernard, *L'Image de Dieu d'après St. Athanase*

(1952); to the chapter on St. Gregory of Nazianzus, the recent monograph by Jean Plagnieux, *Saint Gregoire de Nazianze Théologien* (Paris, 1951), and finally, to that on Gregory of Nyssa, the monograph by Jerome Gaith, *La conception de la liberté chez Gregoire de Nysse* (Paris, 1953). These few remarks do not, in any sense, intend to belittle the value and importance of the volume under review.

GEORGES FLOROVSKY

The Last of the Fathers. By THOMAS MERTON. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1954. 123 pp. $3.50.

Encyclicals are intended to be intensely popular documents which attract readers by their own obvious importance and readability. Actually, however, these papal documents too frequently fail of immediate popularity. Some of them require advertising and explanations to win adequate readership. Such support apparently was judged desirable for the Encyclical Letter: "Doctor Mellifluus," given at Rome, in St. Peter's, on the Feast of Pentecost, 24th of May 1953, by Pope Pius XII. Hence, in 1954, Thomas Merton issued the volume we are considering.

Besides a Preface by Merton, an introductory letter by the Cardinal Protector of the Cistercians, Peter, Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi, and a commendatory letter by the Abbot General, Fr. M. Gabriel Sortais, besides these introductory items, the volume includes two essays by Merton: "The Man and the Saint" and "St. Bernard's Writings." Merton's notes on the Encyclical then are presented and, finally, an English translation of the complete Latin text of "Doctor Mellifluus."

This attractively presented little booklet was planned to take its place on the expanding shelf of advanced spiritual guidance for our Christian laity. In this form, Thomas Merton restates his invitation for all of us to consider the life of contemplation, even as followed in monasteries. "It is this essentially monastic character of all St. Bernard's writing that especially recommends his books to us now, in an age that is proving itself hungry for the spiritual provender that has lain hidden, all these centuries, in Christian monasticism." Merton's own Trappists have experienced this rush to the cloister, so that he may be excused for thinking that monks of all communities and faiths are being crowded out by those piling in. How truly popular this movement toward regularized contemplation is, one may wonder. Not much uncertainty, though, is there that many Christian souls are aspiring towards deeper spirituality than that popularly ascribed to St. Bernard's inspiration. This booklet will assist devout souls who seek union with God freed of sentimentality but not tied to barbaric rigors. "A paradise of charity . . . nourished by a deep interior life, sustained by contemplation and bearing fruit not so much in material works as in true love for other men"—this is Merton's desired result in souls nourished by the teaching of the Mellifluus Doctor.

"Sanctity is born of conflict—of contradictions resolved into union." While approving this proposition, Fr. Merton warns us that we shall be mistaken in seeing in St. Bernard only the conflict between social and cultural forces of his time. He did work out in his life and career the union of the Romanesque and the Gothic; he was a transition from Saint Gregory VII to St. Francis of Assissi; but this can be only one factor in his sanctity. More significant help to us in understanding sanctity comes from studying the life-giving effects of the Saint. This aspect of St. Bernard's life is stressed in the Papal Encyclical when it considers him as Doctor and Father of the Church rather than as a great historical figure. The booklet is very readable but unhappily forbidding for many to own because of its expense.

JOHN K. DALY

Der Heilige Kassian und die Schaltjahrlegende. By OSKAR LOORITS. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 1954. (FF Communications, No. 149.) 205 pp. Finnish marks 700.

This is a very careful compilation of the legends connecting St. Kassian (Johannes Cassianus Romanus) with St. Nicholas of Myra and the East European legends on the ill-omen of Leap Year. The author has traced these both to clerical-literary and popular sources, with the latter almost certainly derived from the former, but with probable contamination from other folk superstitions, perhaps of the old Slavic paganism involving Koshchey the Deathless, and perhaps Bogomil elements.

He has also carefully noted the distributions of these legends which undoubtedly passed from Greece and Bulgaria to Ukraine and then up the Varangian road, the line of the Dnieper and the Volkhov, to the Slavic influenced sections of Estonia, but avoiding the Roman Catholic Lithuanians and the German influenced Latvians. He notes also secondary infiltrations of this legend from White Russian (Byelorussian) and Great Russian territory into the same area of Estonia and even into Karelia and some other sections. He shows also the changes in the legend from its original form of an accusation in heaven against the popular St. Nicholas, who was regarded as the patron of sailors, in the continental atmosphere of the Slavs, to a condemnation of Kassian and a justification of St. Nicholas as the friend of the peasant whose load of hay is caught in the mud. He sees rightly that these changes are connected with the national psychology, the mocking spirit of the Greeks as opposed to the cold officialism and formalism of the Great Russian system of government under tsarism. Yet it is interesting that he can cite very few references that can be clearly connected in origin with the distinctively Great Russian sections of the country, for the most of the actual Russian references either come from the Ukrainian-Russian border, or are not distinctively localized.

He rightly connects this legend attacking St. Kassian with the growing an-

tagonism between east and west after the schism of 1054 and the Latin capture of Constantinople. He believes also that the Church attempted to correct this, but that "the evil spirits called up by lack of forethought of human fantasy and love of fabulizing were so strong that the Church was unable to tame them and inspire the folk tradition with the new positive motives" (p. 160). Despite this, we may perhaps ask a few other questions. Why was Kassian selected as the foil to the universally popular St. Nicholas, who has himself, in all ages and places, had his legend also contaminated with the favorable and kindly superstitions? Why also did Eastern Europe develop the dislike for Leap Year instead of treating it in a jesting mood, like the Swedes and other Westerners?

In its restricted subject the work is more than valuable, and we can only hope that the author, who has recognized the complex character of his sources, will sooner or later extend his field to include some of these many threads of connection and treat the subject on a still broader scale, with due allowance for the entire question of Greek-Slav-Scandinavian and Finnic relations. That may be asking too much, but it is obvious from this book and many others that the line of the Dnieper-Volkhov and the overland routes from Bulgaria to Kiev and Novgorod were two way roads, and that influences moved in both directions along them. This is one of the more startling new ideas, and Dr. Loorits has undoubtedly done much to strengthen it. That is perhaps one of the chief merits of the work.

C. A. M.

The Way of the Pilgrim and The Pilgrim Continues His Way. Translated by R. M. French. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. x, 242 pp. Two maps. $2.75.

We can only welcome the appearance in New York of these two outstanding examples of a certain type of nineteenth century Russian mystical writing. They represent the Russian form of the hesychast method of prayer which was developed on Mount Athos in the early Middle Ages and later was carried north through Moldavia into Russia. The Pilgrim, whose name is unknown, was a native of Orel, who, in consequence of personal and family misfortunes, dedicated himself to a life of contemplative service of God without attaching himself in any way to the monastic life. Many such men became mere charlatans, preying on the generosity of the faithful, or drifted into some Russian form of sectarianism. The Pilgrim, thanks to the advice of his spiritual father and his reading of the *Philokalia,* a collection of Byzantine mystical writings, escaped these dangers and wandered around European and Asiatic Russia as far as Irkutsk, encouraging his fellow men and often, by his humility, affecting them for good. This makes the work a unique spiritual autobiography which the attentive reader can translate into his own Western idiom.

Yet the book is more than that, for it contains delightful and keen pictures of Russian peasant life and thought. As the Bishop of Truro writes in his introduction, it need not shrink comparison in this way even with the peasant stories of Tolstoy, for artist though he was, Tolstoy never caught the essence of religion as distinct from ethics. The nature of the reforms of Peter the Great and the introduction of Western thought into Russia concealed from the intelligentsia, and also from the Western world, the depths of Russian devotional feeling on the personal plane. It is only in a few characters of Dostoevsky that the Western reader can even glimpse the positive sides of that world. He cannot grasp it even from the majority of the trained Russian theologians. Yet something of it was felt by Stephen Graham in his book, *The Way of Mary and the Way of Martha,* which appeared before World War One.

The Pilgrim carries us into a world of self-abnegation, of humility, and of deep religious faith. It is not a world of personal isolation or spiritual pride, even though it lacks entirely those elements of organized preaching and philanthropy that have been so consistently regarded in the West (both Catholic and Protestant) in recent centuries as alone consonant with a full self-devotion and of complete service to Christ. That is why these simple narratives still retain their power and their appeal, and we can only be glad that they are now available to the American reader.

C. A. M.

The Paramount Doctrines of Orthodoxy. By Apostolos Makrakis. Chicago: The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1954. vii, 248; xv, 234; x, 285, 45 pp.

This volume is a combination of the *Tricompositeness of Man* and the *Apology* of Apostolos Makrakis, an outstanding thinker and preacher of Greece in the second half of the ninteenth century. It also contains an account of the trial of Makrakis in 1879 by a Greek court on the charges of heresy and opposition to the government. The two works of Makrakis are in a way complementary, for, in the first, he proves that man consists of body, soul, and spirit from the words of the Church Fathers, and, in the second, he does the same thing from the words of the Bible. Since his death Makrakis has been fully rehabilitated and cleared of all charges of heresy, but during his lifetime he was continuously protesting against the development of a false secularism in Greece and fighting simony among some of the higher clergy. It was these activities and his polemical and forensic skill that caused most of his difficulties, but his works, now available in ever larger numbers in English, show the breadth of his reading and study and allow us to have a good picture of this remarkable man.

C. A. M.

Högmässa och nattvardsgång i reformationstidens svenska kyrkoliv. (High Mass and Communion in the Swedish Ecclesiastical Life of the Reformation Period.) By Åke Andrén. Stockholm: Sv. kyrkans diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1954. xxxvi, 516 pp. Kr. 30.

A similar study, by the same author and in the same series, was published in 1952. The topic was then treated from a more individual, and now from a more congregational point of view. Perhaps there is room for another study. There remain other factors, spiritual and psychological, which are touched upon only incidentally or not at all.

The Swedish church still retains many forms and terms from Catholic times. Among these terms we find "high-mass" (a single word in Swedish) which now refers to the principal religious service, with its distinctive ritual, on Sundays and holidays. During the period under discussion, from 1521 to 1611, the word could only be used if a communion service was included and some actually partook of the communion. Could the clergyman, if no one else volunteered, save the day by giving himself communion? That was disputed and finally denied.

The author looks backward but not forward. In his lengthy "Introduction," he follows the development of the theory and practice of communion from the beginning to the end of the seventeenth century. He shows how Sweden was influenced by the theological trends of Catholic Europe and Lutheran Germany, but his exhaustive study of Swedish conditions begins in the 1520's and ends about 1614. He then merely notes that a new era, with new viewpoints, had already begun, with no indication of what the later development was to be like. The masses were still largely illiterate and superstitious and not easily led. Their attitude had to be taken into consideration and care exercized in inaugurating changes. They were told that communion was voluntary, but they might, nevertheless, be disciplined if they refrained from communing for too long a period. They were urged to commune more frequently, but the majority continued, during the greater part of the period, to follow the old practice and commune only once a year, generally at Eastertide.

The early Swedish Reformers followed Luther closely, but there were also Calvinistic and Catholic influences. The compromisers were represented in Sweden by John III, whose influence was tremendously disturbing. After 1593 strict Lutheranism came to prevail. In the sacrament, bread and wine remained bread and wine, but the communicant simultaneously partook of the true spiritual body and blood of Christ. The theologians could accept this dogma and yet engage in violent disputes concerning the theory and practice of the sacrament. Luther's own explanation was that the words of consecration were simply meant to strengthen the faith of the hearers, while the "real presence" was due to the fact that Christ is present always and everywhere. This was not abstruse and clerical enough for the "orthodox." Just exactly how should the elements be consecrated, and just what was implied by this conse-

cration? The author shows that different theories about consecration were especially important in leading to different communion practices.

Considerably more than half of the work consists of footnotes, diagrams, statistics, etc., based on a painstaking study of local manuscript sources, etc. From the amount of wine and wafers purchased by various congregations, or the amount paid for wine, compared with fluctuations in the price of wine, together with the times when purchases were made, the author deduces the number of communicants as compared with the total population. His deductions seem conclusive. The whole work is the result of thorough scholarship and should prove definitive, as far as it goes.

A brief summary in German concludes the work.

CONRAD PETERSON

Action in the Liturgy, Essential and Unessential. By WALTER LOWRIE. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xi, 303 pp. 6 plates. $4.75.

The renewed interest in modern times in public worship and especially in the central act of the Eucharist, the Holy Communion, the Mass, the Lord's Supper, or whatever one chooses to call it, is, of course, a thoroughly serious enterprise in which all sorts and conditions of Christians are engaged—ranging from Free Churchmen to Roman Catholics. Dr. Lowrie cites, in the epilogue to this rich and fascinating book, the case of a clergyman who objected to spending time discussing the Liturgy because he felt it was inconsistent with the mind of Christ as found in the Gospels. Lowrie replies (with the devastating results familiar to one who knows his style) that not only was Christ Himself frequently at pains to reform and correct corruptions in public worship, but that the modern clergyman ought to consider that "in teaching them (his congregation) how to pray and leading them together in common prayer he will edify them more than by his sermons, or even his pastoral calls."

This book is a discussion of the Christian Eucharistic rite, especially that form of it found in the Episcopal Book of Common Prayer, together with an extended discussion of the ceremonial usages connected with its celebration. Lowrie's main point is that the Eucharist centers properly in the experience of communion and not in the idea of a repeated or "re-pleaded" sacrifice. For this reason, he urges the revival of the ancient tradition of the celebrant facing the people over the altar, a custom maintained in several of the Roman churches to this day and being revived in some Anglican churches, notably the New York Cathedral. Naturally Anglicans will be most consistently interested, but Dr. Lowrie's familiarity with early Christian art, his provocative insights into New Testament theology, and his easy familiarity with "everything of importance that has been written about the Eucharist" make this a stimulating and rewarding book for any serious student of Christianity. The author's delightfully leisurely style and his irrepressible and biting humor make reading this book a great joy.

J. M. K.

The Manner Is Ordinary. By JOHN LAFARGE. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1954. viii, 408 pp. $4.75.

The title of Father LaFarge's autobiography is easily the best of the year, and the quality of the book itself is not far behind. John LaFarge is the son of an old family with roots deep in America's past. His background was Newport and Harvard. Improbably, it was Theodore Roosevelt, a family friend, who urged him to become a priest. Throughout his long career as a member of the Society of Jesus, Father LaFarge devoted himself to the cause of social justice. He worked for years among the poor Negroes in southern Maryland. As editor of *America,* he brought to that weekly a new sense of Catholic social responsibility. As leader of the Catholic Interracial Movement, he fought for Negro rights in Christ's name. Told with wit and humility, Father LaFarge's story is the expression of a simple yet highly sophisticated intelligence. The events described are those of a life touched by sanctity. *The Manner Is Ordinary* well deserves its reputation as one of the year's notable autobiographies.

J. G. B.

Manners and Morals of the 1920's. By SISTER MARY PATRICE THAMAN C.PP.S. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. 215 pp. $3.75.

Sister Mary Patrice offers her book as an historical study, intending to demonstrate that press material is solid enough to bear the weight of substantial history. Her contention meets the opposition of other historians who have asserted that judgments based on current periodical reports will tend to be inaccurate, unreliable, and sensational. Admitting that books would reveal more thorough, better-considered opinions, and more deliberate comments, the author still maintains that popular sources better express the thought of the average man and of larger groups.

For her study, Sister Mary Patrice selected the Roaring Twenties. During that decade, the editorial columns of religious journals made many comments on innovations in morals and manners. This study would concern itself with only those "manners and morals which consistently occupied a place of primary interest in our periodicals." Fashions, fads, movies, automobiles, professional sports, are some of the manners considered. Birth control, companionate marriage, divorce, and crime, are the moral problems studied. To collect the expressions of thought on such issues as viewed by persons and groups formally professing a religious creed, and to place such views in perspective against the intellectual climate of time and place for purposes of significant comparisons, these were the tasks Sister Mary Patrice set for herself.

Representative periodicals of various Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups were studied. In each case, testimonials were sought and are reprinted in the volume attesting to the official or quasi-official status of the periodical representing each group. The study proceeds carefully and professionally, re-

vealing that it was submitted originally in fulfillment of requirements for a Doctorate in Philosophy.

One finds the various summaries of religious opinions on the varying manners and morals somewhat obvious. Perhaps we are too close to continuing views on these problems to treasure the collation of these opinions. It may be that studies of this kind become more valuable as the evolution of view clouds our memory of earlier enthusiastic positions. How long a time must pass one could only guess to be perhaps fifty years. In the meantime, a volume like the current one possibly can only be bought and stored to mellow. At the moment, it is as unpalatable as new brew.

JOHN K. DALY

Sens Chrétien et vie sociale. By CHANOINE P. TIBERGHIEN. Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1954. 271 pp. 600 frs.

Canon Tiberghien has a chair of Moral Theology at the Catholic Institute of Lille. His books and articles on the relevance of classical Christian ethics to medicine and to moral questions have made him well known as an enlightened exponent of a Catholic moral theology that is clothed in modern garb and tackles modern problems. The present book is intended both for laymen in daily contact with the temptations and dilemmas of the fluent social order of European countries, and to professors and priests who have to teach or give advice to those laymen. It does not claim to be a treatise on social ethics, but only to "suggest themes of reflection capable of opening new vistas on these questions" (p. 7). But the result is much more than a catena of themes of reflection. It points to a very coherent view of the moral issues of an industrial and commercial society. Canon Tiberghien shows convincingly (to the judgment of the present reviewer) that such a coherent view has been propounded in the writings of the modern social-minded Popes, from Leo XIII down to Pius XII. This is apparent, at least, when their encyclicals are not watered down or misread, as it seems to happen more often than not.

While condemning Marxism unequivocally, "the Church is very severe in her judgment on capitalism such as it exists at the present time, and she declares it vitiated" (p. 184). The author gives it as his own interpretation that a sound organization of property would make it neither collective, as in communist society (at least in its theoretical form), nor exclusively private, as in capitalist society (at least in its undiluted form), but rather *communautaire:* ownership would then be divided between a first owner (proprietor of the land, building, and goods involved) and secondary owners—employees, consumers, society in general—whose need of that particular property and its products gives them a certain right to control it.

Similar openings on many other points make the reading of this book a refreshing experience, even when it challenges accepted ideas. Thus Canon Tiberghien asserts, with a good deal of plausibility: "The traditional doctrine

of the Church on the nature of lease-contracts, which one is accustomed stubbornly to declare outdated and inapplicable, is quite capable of renovating modern economy by exposing one of the deepest vices of modern capitalism, which consists in having depersonalized money and substituted a society of capitals for a society of persons" (p. 172).

Deepseated as is the author's conviction of the ability of classical Christian ethics to answer the questions posited by modern industrial and social developments, his approach is far from scholastic. As a sign of his originality—and of a certain difference between a European and an American Roman Catholic reading public—we may note that the author, though writing for Roman Catholics with the *imprimatur* of his bishop, feels he has to apologize for quoting St. Thomas: "We beg the reader not to be surprised at seeing us quote St. Thomas often. We hope he will not see in that a vain wish to put the clock back" (p. 8). According as he is used, St. Thomas is a "barrier" or a "point of departure" (p. 8). Canon Tiberghien makes an excellent use of him, and his own social thinking is eminently constructive.

GEORGE H. TAVARD

Congregationalism: A Restatement. By DANIEL JENKINS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 152 pp. $2.00.

It has been the aim of Daniel Jenkins, English minister and—for three months each year—an American seminary professor, to revaluate Congregationalism in the light of the ecumenical movement. One is reminded of the recent call for an "agonizing reappraisal" of our nation's foreign policy. The reappraisal turned out to be a revision of strategy for achieving unrevised objectives, with the agony suspiciously more verbal than spiritual. A similar conclusion may come of the effort to reappraise one's own denomination (to which primary loyalty is given) in the light of a co-operative ecclesiastical movement (to which secondary loyalty is the best that can be mustered). The desire to retain traditions and the fear that cherished ones may have to be sacrificed in union lead us to a view of ecumenicity created in our own denomination's image. We then tend to concentrate on strategies for securing acceptance by others of our view of the Church, and to avoid serious consideration of alternative views.

If Mr. Jenkins is guilty of such denominational myopia, he is less so than most of his contemporaries. The idea of ecumenicity has seemed to inspire among most denominations the frantic writing of new denominational histories, with final chapters on how much has been contributed to co-operative Christianity. This modest document actually discusses the correctives which the ecumenical movement can bring to, and ought be welcomed by, Congregationalism.

Such a "looking back in upon" Congregationalism means, to Jenkins, a review of New Testament doctrines of the Church, a humble recognition of

other churches' ways of achieving what Congregationalism lacks, and the willingness to view the denomination as a creature of culture as well as of religious impulse.

It is found that the witness of Congregationalism to the realities of Freedom, Faith, and Fellowship is the mark of the seriousness with which it takes the New Testament view of the Church. Its faith has been evangelical without being doctrinaire. While its achievement of fellowship must not be idealized, the denomination has never been content to assume that the participation of all classes of persons in a formal worship service constitutes fellowship. Suppose they are also "expected to attend church meetings and serve teas at church social gatherings together and send their children to the same Sunday schools"? "Alleged universality" is no substitute for the Congregationalists' attempt to create "a genuine Christian fellowship in the place where it matters most and where it is most difficult and costly, in the particular local congregation" (pp. 46-47).

Inasmuch as the problem of freedom is currently *the* debated issue in the denomination, Jenkins directs some of his most serious attention to this problem. He believes that the constitutional disease of Congregationalism is likely to be shallowness. What is needed, among other things, is the will to commit carefully selected powers to the councils and synods of the denomination. Such a step would insure rather constant reflection upon the question of just what a church is, as well as encourage the development of more widely recognized standards for the Congregational ministry. He suspects that the defenders of absolute freedom for the local congregation fear less the loss of a congregation's freedom than the fact that they personally might be brought to judgment for having given ecclesiastical sanction to the privileges of favored classes. In a final survey of prospects, the author leaves open the question of Congregationalism's capacity for renewal and adjustment sufficient for survival in a world where "trivialization and 'suburbanization' have gone very deep."

A seasoning of humor would have enhanced the taste of Mr. Jenkins' honest criticism of his own denomination. But this lack may be forgiven. In a day when professional secretaries of ecumenical agencies have been lonely critics of denominationalism, the emergence of a book with similar perspective although written from within a denomination is an event worth celebrating.

CYRUS R. PANGBORN

Community of Faith. By T. RALPH MORTON. New York: Association Press, 1954. 153 pp. $2.50.

T. Ralph Morton was for some time a China missionary, but for over ten years has been associated with the Iona Community of Scotland, which he now serves as deputy leader. In the present volume we are given good evidence of the kind of earnest striving after historical perspective and understanding

which has given Iona such vitality and relevance in our day. The thesis is simple: that from age to age the pattern of the Church's life has been forced to change in the face of new conditions in the world around it. The clue to such change lies not in institutional or doctrinal history, but "in the way men lived and suffered and died." The major part of the book is given over to a consideration of these changing patterns in the actual life of the Church. The result is a fresh and original sketch of church history that covers familiar ground in a stimulating and provocative way. Beginning with the biblical doctrine of community, the author traces the pattern of life in the early church, the rise of the monastic movement ("It has always been through the minority who have been willing to make experiment that new life has come to the Church."), the Christian family of the Puritan era, and finally the modern congregation. In each of these critical eras change has come through the effort to direct and uphold men and women in faith and love.

Now, in our time, we are faced with the same urgent necessity to rethink the question: "What kind of life should we as Christians be trying to live in the world today?" The answer comes in radical terms, terms that imply a sharp challenge to "successful" American Protestantism. The pattern must be new, taking into account the depersonalization of modern life that destroys all natural and traditional forms of community. Mr. Morton suggests for the Church three essential guideposts: (1) Seeing all its members fully as persons, which involves the repersonalization of all aspects of individual life; (2) Concern for all the activities of its members, involving the whole area of work and vocation; (3) Restoration of actual freedom of choice to the individual, including especially freedom in the use of money. This last point is really a plea for Christians in community to develop some form of economic discipline, although the author does not overlook the immense difficulties that always arise. In the American edition (the original volume was entitled *The Household of Faith*) a brief introduction has been added by Alexander Miller and a concluding chapter by John Oliver Nelson which lists a number of American experiments in new forms of community.

G. W. Webber

The Message of Christianity. By Peter H. Monsma. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. 124 pp. $2.75.

This is a book written primarily for the public, for the intelligent layman, rather than for the scholar. As such, it is a good introduction to some of the basic beliefs and problems of the Christian Faith. After the introductory chapter, in which religion in general is discussed and defined as "adjustment to reality as a whole," Dr. Monsma then proceeds to analyze some key Christian concepts and beliefs. God, Sin, Salvation, The Kingdom of God, Nature, History, and Human Destiny are the major topics. Of the fourteen chapters comprising this book, chapter XI, "On the Witness of Nature," is the weakest, while chapter XII, "On the Witness of History," is the best.

While Dr. Monsma (who has been Professor of Bible and College Pastor at Grove City College since 1946) spent a year studying under Karl Barth at the University of Bonn, his viewpoint is anything but Barthian. Whereas Barth stresses a sharp discontinuity between God and man, Dr. Monsma insists that "There is no absolute discontinuity between Him and us, but basic continuity" (p. 17). Whereas Barth maintains the "wholly otherness" of the Kingdom of God in reference to this world, Dr. Monsma states that "The victory of God's Kingdom here and now is feasible" (p. 87). Furthermore, whereas Barth finds justification for Christianity in its supernatural "absurdities," Dr. Monsma finds justification in the strong appeal which it makes to our reason and common sense. We ought to believe it because: (1) it is psychologically sound; (2) it makes for a strong, well-balanced, happy life; (3) it is socially transforming; (4) it gives great meaning and purpose to life and the world; (5) it assures one of salvation from sin and Divine judgment; and (6) it works (pp. 106-9).

All of this is scarcely Barthian. It is, in reality, a strong statement of Christian Liberalism. And as such it is written with a warm evangelical fervor and with a lucid and an engaging style. It would make an excellent handbook for catechetical classes or for adult study classes in the life of Christian congregations. Conceivably, it could also serve as a handy reference book for supplementary study in a college course in the Philosophy of Religion.

EDWARD K. STIPE

Faith and Culture. By BERNARD EUGENE MELAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. vii, 229 pp. $3.75.

In the broadest sense, both Neo-Orthodoxy and Liberalism have been moving toward a more creative and positive concern for the domain of culture. While one could assume that Liberalism was interested in the broad cultural scene, one could not always say that its relation was sufficiently creative. This book by Professor Meland, as well as a number of other notable works in recent years, is one clear indication of the redirection of Protestant Liberalism in terms of new vitality and relevance.

Professor Meland is as concerned as any Neo-Orthodox theologian with the loss of "depth dimensions" in our culture since the Enlightenment. And because of his real interest in the cultural problem, he sees it with a kind of freshness which is not always apparent in more orthodox movements. Over and again, he clearly shows that a culture which is too concerned with directness and clarity must forego depth and tends to shrink the most meaningful dimensions of life. He sees, too, that the moralism from which we are emerging led to the loss of depth and vitality, not only in respect to man, but also in respect to the doctrine of God.

The recovery of vital dimensions must, however, be related to a reconception rather than a denial of conceptions of immanence and rationality. This does not mean the denial of God's transcendence, but rather that the qualitative

conception of transcendence must be discerned within the structures of life. Professor Meland does not insist upon continuity. For him, Christ is unique, but His experience and apprehended presence does not demand the breaking of the self or of the world.

The author has carefully delineated a position which still takes seriously the concepts of growth, development, and structure, but in no sense is the religious dimension identified with these areas. Nor does the religious dimension destroy them. Rather, it is that the religious dimension is the quality and reality which works in and through them. The Church as a genuine community of grace is the source of renewal and transformation for itself and for the various cultural manifestations.

Professor Meland is particularly aware of the role which depth psychology is playing in contemporary religious thought. He also has some discerning things to say about the nature of myth and theology. He finds theology a very necessary endeavor, but also sees the danger of formal and rigid theological thinking. Yet, for him, the opposite of rigidity is not the absence of rigor. In every way, this is a very rewarding book.

J. D.

The Moral Foundations of Democracy. By JOHN H. HALLOWELL. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. ix, 134 pp. $3.50.

The aim of this book is both to demonstrate that democracy requires moral foundations and to exhibit what those foundations are. Professor Hallowell also argues for the possibility and desirability of achieving democratic government. He feels obliged first to dispose of two pseudo-solutions, viz., that of Thurman Arnold, which says that democracy is a fiction, and that of T. V. Smith, which holds that democracy is merely the art of compromise. Arnold's view, he says, makes it impossible to distinguish between democracy and any other form of government, and Smith's approach, since it also denies the existence of absolute norms, makes compromise itself impossible through failure to understand its proper limits.

Democracy is approached by the author through its institutions. He explains that democracy is government by persuasion and deliberation by popularly elected representatives in a condition of civil liberty; it is constitutional government operating through the party system. Since it is a form of government, it is a means to freedom and thus not identical with it.

Liberalism, he claims, not only did not provide an adequate basis for democracy through its failure to unify the ideas of law as the product of wills and law as the embodiment of truth, but it also undermined, through its secularism, the Christian conscience, which can alone perform that unifying function. The task of our generation is to recover not merely the insights of classical liberalism which have been obscured by contemporary positivists, but to rediscover the theological foundations on which these insights can be adequately

grounded. This brings him to the conception of man in the Hebraic-Greek-Christian tradition. According to this view, which the author opposes to the pragmatic approach, man is created in the image of God in a reality to which he must conform, endowed with rationality and free will, limited by his social environment, but free to transcend the historical process of which he is a part. Politics is the art of governing men in such a way as to assist them in doing what they are meant to do, to achieve justice and become better human beings. Democracy thus rests on the fact that man can know justice and right but tends to lack the will to achieve them. It rests on natural law and the authority of the reasoned judgment of the majority.

This is, then, a thoughtful and sophisticated defense of Christian theology and contemporary philosophical realism as the only possible moral and philosophical basis for democracy. The questions which it raises are many, e. g., how is it possible to achieve democracy in other cultures, what of the conflicts within the Hebraic-Greek-Christian tradition, etc.? This reviewer feels that somehow Professor Hallowell is on the right track, but wonders, nevertheless, whether he is going in the right direction. He seems to be saying that man, by his nature and the nature of the universe, is required to accept certain theological and philosophical principles. If he accepts these, he will defend democracy as the best form of government and will be a responsible citizen in a democratic state. This is a dogmatic rather than a philosophic approach. The philosopher might ask, if you accept democracy, what other notions about man and the universe are you forced to accept, and what fundamental moral and metaphysical principles are you led to? What I am suggesting is that it may be necessary not only to reach back past classical liberalism to the Christian tradition, but also to reach past Christianity to the insights of Socrates and Plato, some of which may have been obscured by Christianity. Thus the crucial questions about this book are, first, are moral foundations given or are they to be searched for, and second, if they are to be searched for, what are the moral and intellectual implications of that search?

HENRY M. MAGID

The Septuagint Bible. Translated by CHARLES THOMSON, and edited by C. A. MUSES. Indian Hills, Colo.: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1954. xxvi, 1426 pp. $6.50.

This first English translation of the Septuagint was made by Charles Thomson, Secretary of the Continental Congress (1774-1789) and personal friend of Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin. It was published in 1808. In his Foreword, the editor explains the changes and additions made to bring the original text up to date in the light of modern biblical scholarship. Since the "Thomson Bible" has long been out of print, this new edition should be welcome to the general student, though the scholar will still prefer to use the Septuagint in the original Greek.

Das Gesetz Erfüllen: Matth. 5, 17 ff und 3, 15 Untersucht. By Henrik Ljungman. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1954. 140 pp. Kr. 14.

The author's purpose, as he states it, is to discover the meaning of the word "fulfill" in the two crucial texts cited, in relation to both the context and the background out of which the concrete meaning emerges. He uses the translation "fulfill" for both texts, like the King James version, whereas the Goodspeed translation gives two entirely different meanings: "I have not come to do away with them but to enforce them" (Matt. 5:17); and, "Let it be so this time, for it is right for us to do everything that God requires" (Matt. 3:15). The author's task, therefore, is to discover the different senses in which the original Greek word is used in the two texts.

The Catholic Church in Japan. By Johannes Laures, S. J. Tokyo and Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1954. xxi, 252 pp.

The first six chapters of this short history describe the growth of the Catholic missionary movement from its beginning in 1549, with the arrival of St. Francis Xavier, to its heyday of prosperity in 1581, with 300,000 converts. The next five chapters recount the tragic story of the persecutions, beginning with that of Hideyoshi, and culminating in the great persecution under the Tokugawa shoguns, from 1614 to 1651, in which more than 4,000 Christians were martyred. The persecutions continued during the period of Japan's seclusion, and, after the restoration of the Catholic mission in 1859, were renewed with great cruelty, continuing until 1873. In the end there were about 14,000 crypto-Catholics left in Japan, and today the Church numbers more than 185,000 members.

Life, Faith, and Prayer. By A. Graham Ikin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 127 pp. $2.50.

The Art of Christian Living. By Lawrence McCafferty. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. xiii, 171 pp. $3.50.

The Creative Encounter. By Howard Thurman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 153 pp. $2.00.

These three small books have much in common in their search for a Christian way of life in the modern world. It is characteristic of the turn toward subjectivity in our present day religious thinking that they all stress faith and prayer, and emphasize the need for inner religious experience. Miss Ikin's book is an attempt to bridge the gap between science and religion, especially in the sphere of psychology. Many years of important work in the fields of industrial and pastoral psychology have fitted her well for her task. Dr. Mc-

Cafferty devotes the first part of his book to the subject of prayer and other forms of Christian discipline, and the second part to the philosophical and historical backgrounds of present day thought. The book ends with an interesting Appendix entitled, "Spirituality in Roman Catholicism." Dean Thurman's book consists of his Merrick Lectures, given at Ohio Wesleyan University in 1954. It is divided evenly between the inner and outer aspects of the religious life. The author closes with an earnest plea for "a vital religious fellowship," a Church for the Fellowship of All Peoples, including *all:* white and black, Jew and Gentile, Protestant and Catholic, Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist.

Tro och otro (Belief and unbelief). By NILS FREDRIKSSON. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1954. 64 pp. Kr. 2.

This small, beautifully printed brochure, by a councillor of the Royal School Supervisory Board, and chief of the vocational schools division, represents the left-wing liberal religious thought of Sweden. At the age of eighty, the author felt impelled to write a brief biographical survey, "My Belief," of his own religious pilgrimage from the unthinking orthodoxy of his youth, through a long period of doubt, to his present position of unorthodox, self-discovered faith. In two addresses before the Religious Reform Alliance, Dr. Fredriksson comes to grips with the problems of religious instruction in the schools with the forthright statement: "If we do not believe in the dogmas of the church, of course we ought not to teach others to believe in them." He continues: "Thus what ought to come about certainly appears to be rather a *revolution* than a *reformation*. . . . The main point must be not to save the church, nor even the Christian faith. It is concerned with *saving human beings*."

Reinhold Niebuhr's Works: A Bibliography. By D. B. ROBERTSON. Berea, Ky.: Berea College Press, 1954. 60 pp.

The author does not claim that this is a complete list of Niebuhr's works, only that it is the nearest to a complete bibliography (up to 1953) that has appeared. He feels that even the short articles and book reviews are valuable for a complete understanding of Niebuhr's many facets. The list begins with the fifteen books, in chronological order. The other writings are listed chronologically also, beginning with 1916, and filling fifty-five pages of small type. At the end are three pages of books and articles about Niebuhr, an indication of his great importance for contemporary thought.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

Bulletin des Religions de l'Asie occidentale ancienne. By René Follet. *Recherches de science religieuse,* XLIII (1955), 129-58.

Appunti sulle origini religiose delle metafore parola-luce. By A. Bausani. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 26-35.

Orgia sessuale e riti di recupero nel culto dei morti. By V. Lanternari. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 163-88.

Teogonie greche e teogonie orientali. By U. Bianchi. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 60-75.

Sur le rationalisme des premiers philosophes grecs. By André Rivier. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* V (1955), 1-15.

Théurgie et télestique néoplatoniciennes. By Pierre Boyancé. *Revue d'histoire des religions,* CXLVII (1955), 189-209.

Un culto preistorico vivente nell'Italia centrale. By A. Brelich. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 36-59.

Pyrrhus et l'influence religieuse de Dodone dans l'Italie primitive. By J. Gagé. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* CXLV (1953), 137-67; CXLVI (1954), 18-50, 129-39; CXLVII (1955), 1-31.

Patrizi e plebei nello sviluppo della religione romana. By D. Sabbatucci. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 76-92.

Njordr, Nerthus et le folklore scandinave des génies de la mer. By G. Dumézil. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* CXLVII (1955), 210-26.

Oriental Religions

The Fundamentals of Jainism. By Prithvi Raj Jain. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 16-20, 70-75.

Jainism and the Way to Spiritual Realization. By Indra Chandra Shastri. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 215-20, 251-55.

The Rise and Fall of Buddhism in India. By Nalinaksha Dutt. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII, 256-66.

The Code of the Mahayana in China. By J. de Groot. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII (1955), 103-115.

The Third Session of the World Fellowship of Buddhists. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII (1955), 57-61.

Buddhism in Eastern Europe. By Karlis M. Tennisons. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII (1955), 116-20.

Vaisakha Number. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII (1955), No. 5.

The Mutations of Modern Biology and the "Rebirth" of Buddhism. By Anton Kropat Kropatsch. *The Maha Bodhi,* LXIII (1955), 3-10.

Local Factors in Indian History and Civilization. By V. M. Apte. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 264-67, 304-9.

Il valore cosmico dell'Aurora nel pensiero mitologico del Rig-Veda. By G. Montesi. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 111-32.

Le "nozze sacre" della regina col cavallo nel rito dell'Açvamedha. By C. D'Onofrio. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* XXIV-XXV (1953-1954), 132-62.

The Indian Conception of Soul. By B. C. Law. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 200-8.

The Spirit and Ideals of Hinduism. By S. N. L. Shrivastava. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 30-34, 136-40.

The Background of Indian Science. By C. R. K. Murthi. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 115-20.

The Medical Aspects of Ganesh Worship. By G. Sumati Taranath. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 159-61.

Non-Violent Biology. By J. B. S. Haldane. *Visvabharati Quarterly,* XX (1954-55), 218-26.

Religious Basis of Hindu Architecture. By P. K. Acharya. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 96-100.

New Discoveries Regarding Swami Vivekananda. By An American Devotee. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 120-34, 163-77, 207-22, 233-49, 283-303, 313-24.

Tagore on Death—Two Poems Translated by Maitreyi Devi. *The Aryan Path,* XXVI (1955), 11-14.

Resurgence of Asia. By The Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 114-19, 158-62, 198-206.

Biblical Background of Islam. (Editorial.) *The Muslim Sunrise,* XXVII (1955), 2-9.

The Concept of Justice in Islam. By Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. *The Muslim Sunrise,* XXVII (1955), 14-20.

An Interpretation of Islamic History. By H. A. R. Gibb. *The Muslim World,* XLV (1955), 4-15, 121-33.

Connaissance de l'Islam. By Jean Bichon. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses,* XXXV (1955), 225-32.

Carlyle on Muhammad. By W. Montgomery Watt. *Hibbert Journal,* LIII (1955), 247-54.

"Each Other's Face." By Kenneth Cragg. *The Muslim World,* XLV (1955), 172-82.

Muslims in India since Partition. By S. A. Kamali. *The Muslim World,* XLV (1955), 45-52.

Aḥmadiyyat in Pakistan. By Stanley E. Brush. *The Muslim World,* XLV (1955), 145-71.

Modern Muslim Thought. By Fazlu-r-Raḥmān. *The Muslim World,* XLV (1955), 16-25.

Another Religion Also Calls Israel Home. By Carl Alpert. *The Reconstructionist,* XXI (1955), No. 6, 19-22.

Judaism

Travaux du Premier Congrès Français d'Archéologie et d'Orientalisme Bibliques. Saint-Cloud, 23-25 avril 1954. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses,* xxxv (1955), No. 1.

The Future Life in the Thought of the Old Testament. By H. H. Rowley. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxxiii (1955), 116-32.

Great Archeological Discoveries and Their Bearing upon the Old Testament. By Merrill F. Unger. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* cxii (1955), 55-61, 137-42.

La guerre des fils de lumière contre les fils de ténèbres ou le "Manuel du parfait combattant." By M. Delcor. *Nouvelle revue théologique,* lxxxvii (1955), 372-99.

L'immortalité de l'âme dans le livre de la Sagesse et dans les documents de Qumrân. By M. Delcor. *Nouvelle revue théologique,* lxxxvii (1955), 614-30.

Les diverses manières d'écrire le tétragramme sacré dans les anciens documents hébraïques. By M. Delcor. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlvii (1955), 145-73.

Some Cosmic Connotations of *Mayim Rabbîm,* "Many Waters." By Herbert G. May. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxxiv (1955), 9-21.

The Derivation of Sabbath. By Robert North, S.J. *Biblica,* xxxvi (1955), 182-201.

La mère du Messie et la mère de l'Aspic dans un hymne de Qoumrân. By A. Dupont-Sommer. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlvii (1955), 174-88.

The Beth Alpha Mosaic—A New Interpretation. By Rachel Wischnitzer. *Jewish Social Studies,* xvii (1955), 133-44.

Recherches récentes sur l'ésotérisme juif (1947-1953). By G. Vajda. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlvii (1955), 62-92.

Note méthodologique pour l'étude de la Littérature rabbinique. By Renée Bloch. *Recherches de science religieuse,* xliii (1955), 194-227.

The Development of the Jewish Law on Interest from the Biblical Period to the Expulsion of the Jews from England. By Siegfried Stein. *Historia Judaica,* xvii (1955), 3-40.

Hugo Grotius' *Remonstratie.* By Jacob Meijer. *Jewish Social Studies,* xvii (1955), 91-104.

The Jewish Badge and the Yellow Star in the Nazi Era. By Philip Friedman. *Historia Judaica,* xvii (1955), 41-70.

The Einsatzgruppen. By Joseph Tenenbaum. *Jewish Social Studies,* xvii (1955), 43-64.

From Many, One: A Jewish Community at the Turn of the Century. By J. Jacob Neusner. *The Reconstructionist,* xxi (1955), No. 4, 14-20.

Tercentenary Issue. *Jewish Quarterly Review,* xlv (1955), No. 4.

The Tercentenary Conference on American Jewish Sociology. By Werner J. Cahnman. *The Reconstructionist,* xx (1955), No. 19, 24-28.

Anniversary Issue: Celebrating the Completion of Twenty Years of Reason. *The Reconstructionist,* xxi (1955), No. 1.

Attitudes of American Rabbis on Zionism and Israel. By Eliezer Whartman. *Jewish Social Studies,* xvii (1955), 121-32.

Portrait of a Yemenite Weavers' Village. By Shelomo Dov Goitein. *Jewish Social Studies,* xvii (1955), 3-26.

The "Club of Contention." By Gideon Dean. *The Reconstructionist,* xxi (1955), No. 3, 10-17.

Aaron David Gordon's Letters. By Itzhak Ivry. *The Reconstructionist,* xxi (1955), No. 7, 9-17.

Judaism, Distortion and Reality. By Ephraim Frisch. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* xxiii (1955), 38-41.

Genesis and Kings. By William Schack. *The Reconstructionist,* xxi (1955), No. 10, 9-14.

Christianity: Historical

Eine Bemerkung zum Geschichtsrahmen des Johannes-evangeliums. By J. Blinzer. *Biblica,* xxxvi (1955), 20-35.

Problems in a Literal Interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. By James F. Rand. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* cxii (1955), 28-38, 125-36.

The Ichthyology of the Gospels. By Philip Carrington. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxxvii (1955), 50-55.

Considerations of Methodology in the Study of the Mystery Religions and Early Christianity. By Bruce M. Metzger. *Harvard Theological Review,* xlviii (1955), 1-20.

Mithraism and Its Challenge to Christianity. By S. G. F. Brandon. *Hibbert Journal,* liii (1955), 107-14.

The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man. By George Seaver. *The Modern Churchman,* xlv (1955), 25-30.

La doctrine pénitentielle du Pasteur d'Hermas et l'exégèse récente. By R. Joly. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlvii (1955), 32-49.

The Riddles of Josephus. By Roderic Dunkerley. *Hibbert Journal,* liii (1955), 127-34.

Kingdom to Church: The Structural Development of Apostolic Christianity in the New Testament. By David M. Stanley, S.J. *Theological Studies,* xvi (1955), 1-29.

Jesus' Understanding of History. By James M. Robinson. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* xxiii (1955), 17-24.

The Relation of Religion to History in Early Christian Thought. By Anton-Hermann Chroust. *The Thomist,* xviii (1955), 61-70.

Le cosmos du Pseudo-Denys. By Jean Trouillard. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* v (1955), 51-57.

The Distinctive Sources of Palestinian Pilgrimage Iconography. By Harold R. Willoughby. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxxiv (1955), 61-68.

La lettre d'Anastase l'apocrisiaire sur la mort de S. Maxime le Confesseur et de

ses compagnons d'exil. By Robert Devreesse. *Analecta Bollandiana,* LXXIII (1955), 5-16.

Saint Jean Chrysostome et les spectacles. By Bruno H. Vandenberghe. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* VII (1955), 34-46.

Miscellanea Georg Hofmann, S.J. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* XXI (1955), Nos. 1-2.

Chronique d'hagiographie slave. By Paul Devos. *Analecta Bollandiana,* LXXII (1954), 427-38; LXXIII (1955), 214-36.

L'abesse Frisilde et les débuts de l'abbaye de Messines. By N. Huyghebaert. *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique,* L (1955), 141-57.

The Immaculate Conception in the Writings of Peter Aureoli. By A. A. Di Lella, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XV (1955), 146-58.

The Development of the Doctrine on the Immaculate Conception in the Fourteenth Century after Aureoli. By Ignatius Brady, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XV (1955), 175-202.

Reine de l'univers. By J. Galot, S.J. *Nouvelle revue théologique,* LXXXVII (1955), 491-505.

Roman Catholic Sainthood and Social Status. By Katherine and Charles H. Gore. *Journal of Religion,* XXXV (1955), 85-98.

Crosses and Angels from Fourteenth-Century China. By John Foster. *International Review of Missions,* XLIV (1955), 170-74.

Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Mediaeval Origins. By Ernst H. Kantorowicz. *Harvard Theological Review,* XLVIII (1955), 65-91.

Thomistisk och luthersk legitimering av staten. By Axel Gyllenkrok. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* XXXI (1955), 77-87.

Cas de conscience pour un confesseur de Roi: Madame de Montespan. By G. Guitton, S.J. *Nouvelle revue théologique,* LXXXVII (1955), 61-70.

Sulla redazione primitiva dell' "Atheismus Triumphatus" del Campanella. By Romano Amerio. *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,* XLVII (1955), 154-64.

The Anabaptists and the Civil Authorities of Strasbourg, 1525-1555. By Robert Kreider. *Church History,* XXIV (1955), 99-118.

The Pacifism of the Sixteenth Century Anabaptists. By Harold S. Bender. *Church History,* XXIV (1955), 119-31.

Recent Interpretations of Anabaptism. By Robert Friedmann. *Church History,* XXIV (1955), 132-51.

Luther ur antropologisk synpunkt. Ett forsök. By B. Lundman. *Religion och Kultur,* XXVI (1955), 59-64.

Au temps de Luther: les premiers Apologistes du Libre Examen. By Joseph Lecler. *Recherches de science religieuse,* XLIII (1955), 56-81.

Gudstjänsten och reformationen. By Gustaf Törnvall. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* XXXI (1955), 1-13.

The Problem of 17th Century Soteriology in Reference to Milton. By Amadeus P. Fiore, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XV (1955), 48-59.

Denominationalism as a Basis for Ecumenicity: A Seventeenth Century Conception. By WINTHROP S. HUDSON. *Church History,* XXIV (1955), 32-50.

The Cambridge Platonists. By A. W. ARGYLE. *Hibbert Journal,* LIII (1955), 255-61.

John Woolman and the Holy Experiment. By JOHN M. GESSELL. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXXVII (1955), 111-19.

Ein Vierteljahrhundert Psalmenforschung. By JOHAN JAKOB STAMM. *Theologische Rundschau,* XXIII (1955), 1-68.

Svensk psalmforskning från Plantin till Beckman. By ALLAN ARVASTSON. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* XXXI (1955), 14-33.

The Olney Hymns. By JOHN H. JOHANSEN. *Religion in Life,* XXIV (1955), 278-90.

Ante-Bellum Negro Baptist Churches. By BENJAMIN QUARLES. *The Chronicle,* XVIII (1955), 26-36.

Fifty Years of the Baptist World Alliance. By W. O. LEWIS. *The Chronicle,* XVIII (1955), 52-69.

Le dossier "Rome et Louvain" de Charles Périn. By M. BECQUÉ ET A. LOUANT. *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique,* L (1955), 36-124.

Nevin and the Mercersburg Theology. By SCOTT FRANCIS BRENNER. *Theology Today,* XII (1955), 43-56.

C. A. Briggs in the Retrospect of Half a Century. By LEFFERTS A. LOETSCHER. *Theology Today,* XII (1955), 27-42.

Americanization of Karl August Rauschenbush. By CARL E. SCHNEIDER. *Church History,* XXIV (1955), 3-14.

CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

A Survey of the Year 1954. *International Review of Missions,* XLIV (1955), 3-84.

Roman Catholic Impressions of the Evanston Assembly. By EVA-MARIA JUNG. *Ecumenical Review,* VII (1955), 117-26.

Un point de vue catholique sur l'ecclésiologie d'Evanston. By GEORGES TAVARD. *Foi et vie,* LIII (1955), 54-64.

The Disciples of Christ and Ecumenical Issues. *The Shane Quarterly,* XVI (1955), No. 1.

Baptists and Ecumenicity. By ANNA CANADA SWAIN. *The Chronicle,* XVIII (1955), 70-85.

(Six articles on the relation of Judaism to the ecumenical movement.) *Ecumenical Review,* VII (1955), 221-55.

Conversation: On the Evanston Assembly's International Affairs Report. *Christianity and Society,* XX (1955), No. 2, 7-11.

Philosophie et Théologie: Études présentées à l'Institut œcuménique de Bossey. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie,* V (1955), No. 2.

The One Church and Our Many Churches. (A symposium.) *Religion in Life,* XXIV (1955), 163-94.

From the Father and the Son: The *Filioque* after Nine Hundred Years. By GEORGE S. HENDRY. *Theology Today,* XI (1955), 449-59.

The Baptists of the Soviet Union. By Ernest A. Payne. *Ecumenical Review,* vii (1955), 161-68.

Fifty Years in Nigeria. By J. Lowry Maxwell. *World Dominion,* xxxiii (1955), 153-58.

Desideranda Islamica et Christiana. By E. F. F. Bishop. *International Review of Missions,* xliv (1955), 161-69.

The Little Brothers of Jesus. By Ralph Wouldham. *Sobornost,* Series 3 (1954-55), 195-99.

The Challenge of the Church of South India. By W. B. Harris. *World Dominion,* xxxiii (1955), 37-42.

In Formosa To-day. By John Whitehorn. *World Dominion,* xxxiii (1955), 85-90.

Moral Re-armament's Initiative in Asia. By R. C. Mowat. *The Modern Churchman,* xlv (1955), 108-11.

Il sincretismo religioso afro-cattolico in Brasile. By T. Seppilli. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni,* xxiv-xxv (1953-1954), 189-233.

Protestantism as a Catholic Concern. By Gustave Weigel, S.J. *Theological Studies,* xvi (1955), 214-32.

The Historic Episcopate and After. By H. E. W. Turner. *Theology,* lviii (1955), 205-16.

Anglican Religious Communities: Their Revival and Present Status. By R. L. Wrathall, C.R. *Theology,* lviii (1955), 87-91.

The Contribution of the Episcopal Church to the Maintenance and Extension of Freedom. By M. Moran Weston. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxxvii (1955), 119-31.

Considerations on the Need for a Theology of the Place of Women in the Church. By Madeleine Barot. *Ecumenical Review,* vii (1955), 151-60.

Sociologie et Pratique Religieuse. By François-G. Dreyfus. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses,* xxxv (1955), 210-24.

M.R.A. and Christian Sociology. By Maurice B. Reckitt. *Theology,* lviii (1955), 163-66.

A Symposium on Changing Religious Perspectives. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* xxiii (1955), 81-118.

Symposium: Commentary on the National Council's "Assumptions for Economic Life." *Christianity and Society,* xx (1955), No. 1, 13-19.

Catholiques et Protestants devant le monde ouvrier. (A symposium.) *Foi et vie,* liii (1955), No. 2.

Has "Biblical Theology" Served Its Turn? By B. M. G. Reardon. *Theology,* lviii (1955), 5-12.

Kristendomens avmytologisering. By B. Edmar. *Religion och Kultur,* xxvi (1955), 52-58.

Samtida teologisk etik. By Sigfrid von Engeström. *Ny Kyrklig Tidskrift,* xxiv (1955), 1-20.

Chastity in a World of Three Billion Souls. By Susannah Coolidge. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxxvii (1955), 41-49.

General Theory of Religion

La trascendentalità dell' essere. By Carlo Arata. *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,* xlvii (1955), 201-24.

Eléments pour une théologie du travail. By G. Salet, S.J. *Nouvelle revue théologique,* lxxxvii (1955), 27-48, 123-43.

Is There a Special Affinity between Christianity and Democracy? By John C. Bennett. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxxiii (1955), 105-15.

Are There Tests of Revelation? By John C. Bennett. *Theology Today,* xii (1955), 68-84.

Vad kunna vi tro? Försök i några huvuddrag till en religiös trosmetafysik på empirisk basis. By D. Edenholm. *Religion och Kultur,* xxvi (1955), 1-8.

The Quest for Unity through Religion. By Lesslie Newbigin. *Journal of Religion,* xxxv (1955), 17-33.

Modernist Movements in the Non-Christian Religions. By E. C. Dewick. *The Modern Churchman,* xlv (1955), 31-42, 97-108.

The Present Relations between Eastern and Western Philosophy. By H. H. Price. *Hibbert Journal,* liii (1955), 222-29.

Religion as a Universal Problem. By Pandit Rishiram. *Forum: Journal of the World's Congress of Faiths,* No. 24 (April, 1955), 1-4, 32.

Le problème de la paix. By Albert Schweitzer. *Foi et vie,* liii (1955), 226-39.

Religious Differences and the Study of Religion. By David G. Bradley. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* xxiii (1955), 32-37.

Roadblocks in Modern Thought. By Ralph Tyler Flewelling. *The Personalist,* xxxvi (1955), 5-16.

Shall Humanists De-emphasize Beliefs? By E. C. Vanderlaan. *The Humanist,* xv (1955), 216-21.

The Need of International Society. By Paul N. Zammit, O.P. *The Thomist,* xviii (1955), 71-87.

Christian Theology and Vedanta. By W. Perston. *International Review of Missions,* xliv (1955), 153-60.

Leonardo e il suo tempo. By Emilio Garroni. *Rassegna de filosofia,* iv (1955), 5-37.

The Young Milton. By Pennar Davis. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxxiii (1955), 160-71.

Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel. By Hans Joachim Schoeps. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* vii (1955), 1-34.

Emerson's Glimpse of the Divine. By William A. Huggard. *The Personalist,* xxxvi (1955), 167-76.

L'antimetafisicismo di John Dewey. By A. Bausola. *Rivista di neo-scolastica,* xlvii (1955), 41-67.

A Thomistic Appraisal of the Philosophy of John Dewey. By Ferrer Smith, O.P. *The Thomist,* xviii (1955), 127-85.

Kafka, Freud, Husserl: Probleme einer Generation. By Peter Demetz. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* vii (1955), 59-69.

Religion among the Novelists. By JOHN J. BUNTING, JR. *Religion in Life,* XXIV (1955), 208-18.

Religion and Beauty. By BISHOP BARKWAY. *Theology,* LVIII (1955), 43-51.

Art and Culture. By O. C. GANGOLY. *Prabuddha Bharata,* LX (1955), 258-64.

La forma e l'arte. By ROSARIO ASSUNTO. *Rassegna di filosofia,* IV (1955), 107-30.

Does Spiritual Faith Insure Physical Benefits? By GERALD RUNKLE. *Theology Today,* XI (1955), 483-94.

Psychiatry and Religion. By FREDERICK HACKER, M.D. *Journal of Religion,* XXXV (1955), 74-84.

Psychology with a Psyche. By N. O. LOSSKY. *The Personalist,* XXXVI (1955), 129-40.

NEW PERIODICALS

Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. I, No. 1. April, 1955. A Quarterly of Christian Thought. Chairman of the Editorial Committee, Professor David W. Hay, D.D., Knox College, Toronto, Ont. $3.00 per year (students, $1.50). 75 Queen's Park Crescent, Toronto 5, Ontario.

Journal of Praxiology, Vol. I, No. 1. March, 1955. Published by the University of Melbourne at Melbourne, Fla. $3.00 per year. Single copies, $1.00.

"He takes philosophy and theology seriously as a means of deepening one's literary understanding."—CHAD WALSH

Studies in Literature and Belief

by MARTIN JARRETT-KERR

What effect does a writer's belief have upon his art? In a brilliantly written study the author examines the works of Manzoni, Dostoevsky, Kafka, Graham Greene, Mauriac and others, and shows how their passionate faith informs, reforms, and sometimes deforms their imaginative creations. "Admirable essays in literary criticism with a Christian existentialist bent."—DOUGLAS STEERE

At your bookseller • $2.75

HARPER & BROTHERS · New York 16, N. Y.